Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

73. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom ¹

Washington, June 29, 1966, 7:39 p.m.

7856. Ref: Embtel 6243.²

1. We would feel better about FonOff recommendations on Aden if we could discern any alternative to UN role in solution of Aden problem. Unless UN steps in in some acceptable manner, it seems to us, British have no alternative to continuing unpromising policy of trying to turn over power to Federation Government whose access to power as independent state may well be signal for civil strife involving not only Aden, but UK, Yemen, UAR, and Saudi Arabia.

2. We understand British difficulties with Committee of Twenty-four resolution and HMG’s commitments to SAF rulers. We do not, therefore, wish to press HMG too closely on Aden problem.

3. However, if occasion presents itself Embassy might try out one additional suggestion for UK consideration: Would it be possible for UKUN to inform the Secretary-General that the UK would be willing to receive a Special Mission, provided that composition of that Mission was acceptable to HMG, and provided further that it was understood in advance that while HMG would be prepared to consider recommendations of Mission, it would be in no way bound, in advance, to implement all of its recommendations, particularly those involving the safety and security of populations in South Arabia for which HMG would continue to feel responsible until independence (this refers to paragraphs 7 and 8 of June 23 resolution).

4. Problem of paragraph 2 (relative to “unrepresentative regime”) remains, but conceivably this problem would diminish if acceptable role for UN supervision of elections could be worked out. Ultimately, it seems to us, this matter depends on whether Federation rulers can indeed control the hinterland vote (note Aden Consulate telegram 174 to Department on this subject).3 If Federal rulers cannot control tribes, their government is doomed to failure in any case.

5. It seems to us, line suggested in para³ puts British in more favorable position than out-and-out rejection of Special Mission “so long as its terms of reference are those of Committee of Twenty-four resolution” (Embtel 6192).⁴ For USUN—You may also offer UKUN the above as informal suggestion if appropriate occasion arises.

Ball

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell; cleared by Moore, Brown, and Judd; and approved by Sisco. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Cairo, Taiz, and Aden.
2. Telegram 6243 from London, June 28, reported a discussion between an Embassy officer and Foreign Office officials regarding the most recent UN resolution on Aden. On June 15 the Committee of 24, meeting in Cairo, had adopted a resolution calling on the Secretary-General to appoint immediately a special mission to Aden for the purpose of recommending practical steps necessary for full implementation of previous UN resolutions on Aden. It also deplored any defense arrangement the United Kingdom might enter into with “the unrepresentative regime” in Aden. (UN doc. A/6300/Rev. 1, ch. VI, par. 382) The Embassy officer urged the British to try to work out a formula that would provide for a mission led by Omar A.H. Adeel, appointed on June 9 by the UN Secretary-General as his Special Representative for the question of Aden. The Foreign Office response was that the real sticking point was the direct tying of the mission to the Cairo resolution, which was less acceptable than previous UN resolutions on South Arabia. (Ibid.)
3. Dated June 15. (Ibid.)
4. Dated June 24. (Ibid.)