Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

71. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom ¹

Washington, March 18, 1966, 6:49 p.m.

5494. Embtel 4367, Aden.²

1. In any forthcoming conversations following points might be used with Brenchley and other FonOff officials:

2. USG in full agreement on importance strong U.S. demarche Cairo that UAR pursue moderate course in Aden-South Arabia. Ambassador Battle has already made extensive presentation UAR FonMin Riad (Cairo tel 215 to London)³ whom we consider increasingly effective channel, and is currently seeking appointment Nasser to discuss this and other items of concern.

3. As British aware (e.g., Hare-Allen talks February), US-UAR relations complex matter; actions in South Arabia are but one of variety indices we use to judge Nasser’s over-all performance. However, South Arabia of sufficient concern that we singling it out (together with Yemen) for specific mention to Nasser as among factors to be weighed in considering any future PL-480 program.

4. While UAR doubtless playing major role instigating disturbances South Arabia, it would scarcely have been so successful without extensive indigenous support. Latter appears increasing as reported Aden tel 117 (67 to London).⁴

5. We continue fully willing do all possible bring UAR to moderate its activities. However, cannot hope for success without concurrent and continued British willingness use appropriate opportunities continue discuss constructive settlement with South Arabian nationalists. (Perhaps further opening given in Charge Clark’s talk with Makkawi and Asnag, Taiz tel 141 to London.)⁵

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 ADEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore; cleared by Judd, Russell, and Symmes; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Aden, Cairo, Jidda, Taiz, and CINCSTRIKE.
2. In telegram 4367 from London, March 16, Ambassador Bruce reported that in reply to his direct question as to what could be done to combat erosion of the security situation in Aden, Brenchley had responded that in spite of the evidence that the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) had considerable indigenous support, the terrorist campaign itself could be called off immediately from Cairo. Thus, his government had placed its greatest hope in the possibility that the United States might be able to influence Nasser toward moderation following the British announcement regarding the Aden base. (Ibid.)
3. Document 70.
4. Dated March 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-ADEN)
5. Telegram 348 from Taiz, March 16 repeated to London as telegram 141. (Ibid., POL 13 ADEN)