70. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State1

2268. My conversation with Foreign Minister Riad last evening, his Chef de Cabinet and my DCM being present, covered Yemen, Aden, Ghana and US assistance to UAR. Latter two subjects will be reported separately.

1.
I opened by commenting favorably on Sadat visit saying all reports and press comments seemed to indicate it had been highly successful. Riad agreed and confirmed GUAR very gratified by manner and level his reception.
2.

Turning to Yemen I said had just come from call on Hassan Sabry al-Khouly who had informed me of new GUAR initiative (Embtel 2267).2 As result, this subject could be taken off agenda. Expressing great relief and pleasure at UAR effort break impasse through new constructive proposals I said this act of real statesmanship.

Foreign Minister stated that Yemen frankly very serious question for UAR and new proposals should make it clear President Nasser sincerely desired its resolution. Key was improved UAR-Saudi relations and were progress achieved here Yemen settlement would no longer pose problem. In effect it was not really a question of Jidda agreement or its implementation but what King Faisal wants. Latter has been acting on false assumption that UAR beset with serious internal problems and so can be pushed around. Unless this attitude changes Yemen problem would not be solved regardless of what UAR offered.

3.

I then raised Aden in context situation created by British Defense White Paper and made following points:

A.
South Arabia is a common US-UK concern. We have no military or economic interest in area but believe that instability there contributes to instability throughout the Middle East.
B.
British are irrevocably committed evacuate their military base at Aden by 1968. They have no plans to leave any troops whatsoever behind.
C.
Constitutional proposals which British have put forward for South Arabia are basis for discussion and not final proposal which must be either accepted completely or else rejected. British are sincerely [Page 168] interested in leaving behind stable and independent South Arabia and believe this can best be done by working out in advance constitutional arrangement acceptable to majority of people involved. They welcome participation of all political elements of South Arabia in reaching this agreement.
D.
We believe announcement of British plans withdraw from Aden removes UAR’s main objection UK policies in South Arabia. UAR, because of its connection with nationalist groups there, now has responsible role play in helping assure that transition from colonial government to independent state is performed peacefully. Alternative is likely be political chaos and economic stagnation. We assume UAR wishes avoid another situation like Yemen and hope we can count on UAR use its considerable influence toward rational and peaceful transition.

Riad reviewed again Thompson talks and said British base was not main question but genuine independence. UK must negotiate with key nationalist leaders on basis UN resolution and self determination. I suggested provisions UN resolution already being complied with or shortly would be as result British actions on ground. We wanted stable, viable, representative government in area. This is all British wanted and we assumed it UAR objective also. Riad agreed but reitereated situation would be greatly eased were UK formally to accept UN resolution and begin talking directly to FLOSY. He recognized that forthcoming British elections made any progress virtually impossible at present.

Comment:

On Yemen Foreign Minister clearly feels his govt has now made optimum gesture and future is up to Faisal.

With Aden he got the point namely that we are interested in peace and stability in area and UAR activities which are not conducive to this objective will inevitably adversely affect US-UAR relations.

Battle
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to London, Jidda, Aden, and Taiz.
  2. See footnote 2, Document 392.