Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

69. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic¹

Washington, February 19, 1966, 5:36 p.m.

4691. 1. On Feb 18 British Ambassador Dean delivered to Under-Secretary Ball message to Secretary from FonMin Stewart requesting USG use publication of British Defense White Paper on 22 Feb as opportunity urge Nasser adopt more constructive policy toward South Arabia. Message made following supporting points:

a. UK troop withdrawal from Aden will add to tremendous difficulties foreseen in bringing area to independence by 1968. Extent of difficulties will depend on attitude of UAR.

b. In past UAR has made clear its intention frustrate any constitutional advance except on terms of “unrealistic” UN resolutions and has used terrorism and intimidation to support this goal.

c. Hope US Ambassador in Cairo can make strong approach to Nasser as soon as possible after Feb 22 making plain that South Arabia is common US-UK concern and that he speaking for USG not HMG (since Canada is protecting power for latter).

d. Believe announcement UK decision withdraw from Aden gives perhaps last opportunity influence Nasser. Suggest that, in view absence incidents since January 18, stress not be placed on terrorist aspect, but rather on positive approach that announcement base withdrawal has removed Nasser’s main objection UK policies in Aden and should enable him adopt more constructive attitude. It in Nasser’s interest that South Arabia enjoy stable independence rather than become another Yemen.

e. Anticipate Nasser’s reaction will be he does not control attitudes South Arabians; any UAR support given is justified by alleged British support royalists in Yemen; UN resolutions provide ready-made solution. HMG willing supply additional detailed factual material counter these arguments if desired.

2. UnderSec pointed out we had made similar approaches in past to UAR and would be most happy repeat them directly to Nasser unless our Ambassador has strongly overriding reasons for making presentation at lower level UARG.

3. Request you take action in accordance with foregoing unless strong objections perceived.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore on February 18; cleared by Hare, Symmes, Russell, and Judd; and approved by Ball. Repeated to London, Aden, and Jidda.