Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

68. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 4, 1966.

SUBJECT

• British Talks: Nasser-Faisal Relations; Yemen; South Arabia; Persian Gulf (afternoon session)

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

• United Kingdom
  • Sir Roger Allen, Deputy Undersecretary, Foreign Office
  • Frank Brenchley, Head, Arabian Department
  • Denis Speares, Head, North and East Africa Department
  • Christopher Everett, First Secretary, UK Embassy
• United States
  • Ambassador Hare
  • Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Director, NEA
  • Harrison M. Symmes, Director, NE
  • John M. Howison, GTI
  • Guy Lee, NR
  • George C. Moore, OIC, Arabian Peninsula
  • Observers
• United Kingdom
• David Crawford, First Secretary, UK Mission, New York
• Francis Brown, Minister, UK Mission, New York
• Nigel Trench, Counselor, UK Embassy
• Noel Martin, Petroleum Attache, UK
• United States
• William Brewer, S/P
• James Spain, INR/RNA
• Jonathan Stoddart, DOD/ISA
• Howard Meyers, G/PM

[Here follows section I: Nasser-Faisal Relations and Yemen.]

II. Aden and South Arabia

Sir Roger stated that the British decision to withdraw from the Aden military base would be officially announced in the Defense Review White Paper February 23.² While at present uncertain of the form of the announcement, he thought it might be phrased very simply along the lines of, “We do not intend to seek base facilities after the independence of South Arabia.” It might contain some reference to British intention to continue economic aid to South Arabia after independence. At present, HMG contributes £12 to 15 million annually. The High Commissioner is insistent that this be continued since, if the SAF leaders thought they were being abandoned, it would be difficult to obtain their agreement to any constitutional progress. Defense Minister Healey believes it necessary to continue paying for the South Arabian Federal Army. Additionally, HMG might keep a military mission under the aegis of its Embassy. It is expected that the British will simply move out of their present facilities in Aden at the appropriate time although they might try to retain limited staging and communications facilities. This has not yet been finally decided. Responding to Ambassador Hare’s question, Mr. Brenchley said that the British would try to keep the refinery operating since this was the main British asset in the area.

The current British timetable calls for first obtaining the approval of the Rulers of Bahrain and Sharjah to expand base facilities in that area. (This has just been obtained, although the Rulers have not been informed about Aden withdrawal.) The Hone-Bell draft constitution will be taken to Aden on February 10 and formally presented to the Rulers on February 12; Lord Beswick will travel to Aden on the 15th and inform the Federal Supreme Council on the 16th of the decision to withdraw militarily from Aden; Faisal will be informed on the 16th.

Sir Roger said that Nasser’s continued presence in Yemen presented a grave problem with respect to military withdrawal from Aden. Nasser continues strongly to support terrorist activities and HMG has evidence that he is currently training some 300 terrorists in Taiz. With announcement of British military withdrawal it is expected Nasser will increase these activities in order to hasten the departure and multiply its disorder. The announcement may well encourage him to stay in Yemen.

The announcement, said Sir Roger, is certain to have a bad effect on the situation in South Arabia. Some of the Federal leaders will no doubt consider switching their full support to Nasser; others may more strongly push their demands for immediate control of Aden town. The Adenis, in turn, will stiffen their opposition to greater Federal control. If Nasser were to withdraw from Yemen it is very possible that the Federal Army would move into Aden and liquidate the Nationalist leaders. In contrast, so long as Nasser’s troops are present in Yemen they could move into Aden under the pretext of protecting the Nationalists against Federal Army incursions.

In response to Ambassador Hare’s question, Sir Roger said that once the British had departed it was doubtful if Nasser would have any continuing interest in the Federation. He might maintain some concern for Aden town, probably in the form of indirect support to Nationalist politicians. However, the area would not in general be of much value to Nasser.

Ambassador Hare posed the theoretical question of what would occur if the British made no proposal for a constitution but merely departed. Sir Roger predicted increased disorder and, on the completion of the British withdrawal, the full control of Aden town by Federal troops. He said, leaving Nasser aside, there was little affinity between Yemenis and South Arabians/Adenis.

In response to a question from Mr. Symmes, Sir Roger said categorically that, even if asked, the British would not give any security guarantee to the SAF after independence.

Responding to a further query by Ambassador Hare, Sir Roger said that some consideration had been given to bringing in the UN. However, this was ruled out so long as Great Britain continued to be responsible for law and order. The UN, judging by its past attitude toward Aden, basically reflected only an extension of Egyptian policy. At present, the UN could be expected to be only trouble makers rather than contribute to a solution. Nonetheless HMG did not rule out UN intervention at some stage. (“Matters could get so bad we might throw the subject into the UN.”) Mr. Brenchley indicated he would spend the next two days in New York studying the feasible role of the UN but did not consider UN participation to be possible at present.

Sir Roger said that prospects generally were exceedingly gloomy in Aden and that it was difficult to foresee the necessary progress to enable the British peacefully to hand over the reins of power in 1968.

Sir Roger admitted that it was conceivable the Russians and Chinese Communists might take interest in Aden if a vacuum developed but doubted that this was an actual danger. Ambassador Hare suggested that Nasser would not react favorably to the Communists’ getting a firm foothold there. Mr. Brenchley said there were only a few Leftists in Aden and the Hadramaut at the present time; while their proportionate size would probably increase in the future as the overall population of Aden shrank due to emigration because of worsening economic problems, it was doubtful that the Leftists in the area would offer a conceivable base to facilitate Soviet encroachment.

III. Persian Gulf

Forces Buildup in the Gulf

Sir Roger stated that, as a result of the withdrawal from Aden, HMG was now seeking added facilities in the Gulf in order to maintain in some fashion its commitments to Kuwait and to the Rulers of the Gulf Shaikhdoms. If HMG were to maintain its present level of commitment to Kuwait it would need an added 11,000 troops in the Gulf—impossible on both political and financial grounds. Therefore it now must modify its Kuwait commitment to offer only air assistance unless given sufficient warning for it to be able to bring in additional troops prior to any attack. This change must now be discussed with the Kuwaitis; it is not unexpected that the Kuwaitis may use this shift as the basis for letting lapse their arrangement with the British.

It is currently contemplated to add 600 troops in Bahrain and 2000 in Sharjah. No buildup is planned at Masirah and it is quite possible that the current strength at Salalah will be decreased. The new troops can be accommodated in Bahrain with no new land acquisitions above the 3000 acres presently held. It will be necessary to construct a new battalion camp outside of the airfield at Sharjah and add a few new hangars. The Sharjah airfield will not need to be enlarged. At present it can take Canberras and similar aircraft. Bahrain would continue to be the main staging point for troop movement further east and would form the link between Kuwait and Sharjah. (A detailed British list of proposed troops in the Gulf is attached.)

The British hope that their troop increases in the Gulf will mitigate in the Arab World the impression of weakness which may be implied in their withdrawal from Aden and will underline their determination not to relinquish their position in the Gulf. They have informed the Shah of their contemplated moves in Aden and the Gulf and have assured him of their intention to maintain their Canberra bomber force in Cyprus. The Shah accepted the changes cheerfully and seemed to have no doubts about their future determination to remain in the Gulf. They doubt however that Faisal will react in the same accommodating fashion.

[Here follows discussion of Kuwait, Iran, and Dubai.]

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 3 ISLAMIC. Secret. Drafted by Moore on February 9.
2. The U.K. Government, faced with a serious balance-of-payments problem, was undergoing a defense review. It had previously informed the U.S. Government that the British base at Aden would be evacuated in 1968 and that British forces overseas would be reduced by one-third over the next 4 years. On February 22, it issued a Defense White Paper formally announcing these decisions.