67. Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
OUTLOOK FOR ADEN AND THE FEDERATION
OF SOUTH ARABIA
Summary
British efforts to forge a viable Federation of South Arabia out of Aden Colony and the former Protectorate sultanates, and to work out some arrangement for the future of the military base in Aden, are in trouble. The main internal problems are traditional antipathy between town and tribe, Egyptian-sponsored terrorism in Aden and the sultanates and Adeni fear that the sheikhs would suppress political liberties through arbitrary police power. The UK has promised independence to the Federation in 1968, but British refusal to discuss the future of the military base with the Adenis have raised doubts among them about Britain’s intentions.
In the wake of deteriorating security situations, the UK has suspended local government in Aden proper. The British probably will make no significant political moves in the near term, but will concentrate on keeping terrorism under control which they can probably do. Over the longer term, the British will probably have to come to terms with those elements now in opposition if they are to have any chance of both creating a viable Federation and keeping the base on acceptable terms.
1. The status of Aden and the neighboring British-protected states in South Arabia is confronting the UK with a troublesome problem. It is the familiar but difficult one of granting independence to a colonial possession without abandoning local friends and interests deemed to be important. Among these latter, Britain’s military base in Aden has loomed large, and this issue is a part of the broader question of the whole British military posture east of Suez and indeed of Britain’s role in the Western alliance itself.
[Page 157]2. The UK’s proposed solution was to establish the Federation of South Arabia,2 now composed of 16 sultanates and sheikhdoms on the southern Peninsula, together with Aden itself. Although the British retain overriding powers in respect of foreign affairs, defense, and internal security, the Federation is slowly assuming more authority in internal administration, education, and finance. The Federation’s governing body is a Council, three-fourths of whose members are from ruling families from the Protectorate states and the remainder from Aden. Mutual suspicion between progressive Aden and the backward sheikhdoms is greatly hampering Britain’s efforts to grant independence by 1968.
Aden
3. In British hands since 1839, Aden has been a major bunkering port on the imperial lifeline to India, since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. It has grown from a tiny village to a city of some quarter million people of diverse backgrounds, chiefly Arabs but with many Indians and Somalis. About a third of the population is temporary migrant labor from Yemen. Thanks to a very large bunkering trade (Aden has a large refinery), its free port status, and its role as entrepot for Yemen, Aden enjoys a moderately high standard of living. There is a fair degree of education, and a vigorous labor organization of about 10,000 members, the Aden Trades Union Congress (ATUC), has grown up.
4. The British permitted limited political activity in the 1950s, and in 1959 12 members of the 23-man Legislative Council were elected under a restricted franchise. By the early 1960s there had arisen a sizeable political force, the People’s Socialist Party (PSP), based on the ATUC. Both were headed by Abdallah al-Asnag, a middle class Adeni whose family has close ties with Yemen. The PSP has fought to broaden the franchise to include Arabs not born in Aden, which would give political control to the laboring class. As a long term goal it also advocates union of South Arabia and Yemen. No other party has much popular support.
The Protectorate
5. In sharp contrast to Aden itself, the Protectorate states are economically backward and politically primitive. British control has been [Page 158] exercised indirectly through long-standing treaties of protection with some twenty sheikhdoms and sultanates. The British paid subsidies to the rulers and for years intervened only when tribal warfare threatened trade routes or general security. Beginning in the 1930s the UK largely pacified both Eastern and Western Protectorates. More recently, London has begun to stimulate education and some economic development. But the region’s size, backwardness, and lack of resources—notably water—have impeded progress. The Protectorate states are still ruled in traditional fashion by leading families, although their participation in Federation ministries has given them some political experience.
The Federation
6. The British were aware that this congeries of petty states had little chance to survive in the long run. In 1958, they dragooned six sultanates in the Western Protectorate into forming a Federation. The rulers were hesitant, but they were persuaded that federation would increase their ability to resist absorption by Yemen, and their heavy dependence on British subsidies made them amenable to British desires. All but one of the 16 Western Protectorate states have now become members; a Federation capital has been established near Aden; and the Protectorate Levies have become the nucleus of an army. The Federation government is beginning to function, but it remains dependent on UK subsidies for nearly two-thirds of its revenue. The three principal Eastern Protectorate sultanates, more educated and aware of the outside world through long-standing connections with Indonesia, East Africa, and Saudi Arabia, have remained aloof from the Federation. They are unwilling to join a state with so many problems, and at least for the present prefer their own semi-independent status.
7. Adenis generally are dubious about the benefits of the Federation, and their participation has been half-hearted at best. Aden joined in 1963 only after the governor exerted strong pressure on the Legislative Council, and half of the Council’s Adeni members walked out before the vote was taken. Most Adenis fear that their money may be drained off to support the Protectorate areas. They demand representation in the Federation government out of proportion to the size of their population lest Aden be outvoted by the Protectorate representatives. Most important, and related to the representation issue, Adenis of all political shadings worry that the unreconstructed sheikhs and sultans will not only refuse to extend the electoral process in the Federation, but will also be able to suppress Adeni political freedom by control of the police and security forces. The British have responded to those fears by arranging that Federation police power be “delegated” to the High Commissioner.
[Page 159]8. Relations between the British and the responsible Adeni opposition deteriorated as a result of difficulties over elections for the Legislative Council in October 1964. [4 lines of source text not declassified] Asnag has been helped by Cairo, but he is probably a Baathist rather than a Nasserist. He has pushed for a government in South Arabia run by its people, not by hereditary chiefs or foreigners.
9. In response to the British move, Asnag boycotted the elections, though he probably could have won a third or more of the elected seats on the Council. Others in the PSP leadership wanted to contest the elections; some did, and the dispute between them and Asnag weakened both the PSP and Asnag’s control over it. As a move to bolster his own position, and as a counter to more radical elements, Asnag has joined with other Adeni and Federation opposition elements in the Organization for Liberation of Occupied South (OLOS), which is based in Yemen. This group is pressing for a drastically reduced measure of British influence now and for its own dominance when independence is granted. In particular, it wants the status of the base settled before independence. Asnag’s own current views on the future of the base are not clear, but 5,000 of his ATUC members are employed there, and as of 1964, he stopped short of demanding British withdrawal from it.
The Military Base
10. The British have not made up their minds about the need for the Aden base over the long term. On the one hand, the base represents a political vulnerability for the UK, not only on the Peninsula, but in the area as a whole. It is a target of nationalist criticism and a rallying-cry for anti-British propaganda by Nasser and others. It is also an expensive proposition. On the other hand, a number of factors have combined to increase the military value of the base since 1950. Suez is gone. Growing nationalist movements in the area have increased the chances of military or terrorist activities against British oil interests. Troops formerly stationed in Kenya have had to be relocated. Since 1962, the UK military garrison has grown from 7,000 to some 22,000 personnel—5,000 RAF, 14,000 army, and 3,000 navy—and there has been a vast amount of military associated construction—barracks, warehouses, dependent quarters, etc. [3 lines of source text not declassified]
11. The future of the base is now under debate in London, and there are divided counsels, not only on its military worth, but also on the political measures necessary to keep it. We believe it highly unlikely that Britain will decide to abandon the base completely, and the real question is how and on what terms it can be kept. Senior British officials in Aden and in the Colonial Office in London have believed that a substantial measure of control over the political institutions of the Federation and of Aden state was needed to assure the UK’s tenure at [Page 160] the base. Moreover, many of these officials—including the last governor, who developed and pushed the Federation scheme—felt more at home with traditionalist sheikhs than with modernizing nationalists. [3 lines of source text not declassified] Another school of thought in London prefers to work for a deal with an independent federation which would allow Britain to keep the base.
Yemeni and Egyptian Involvement
12. A further complication is the long-standing Yemeni claim to all of South Arabia. For years, border troubles between Yemeni and the Protectorate were endemic. The Yemeni revolution of 1962 made no substantial change in this situation until the appearance of Egyptian forces and the rise of Egyptian influence in republican Yemen led to strong British fears of UAR meddling in Aden and the Protectorate. [2 lines of source text not declassified] the Yemeni Republicans and particularly the Egyptians began in 1963 to increase their efforts to cause trouble in South Arabia. Dissident tribesmen, armed and trained by the UAR, and sometimes including important exiled members of South Arabian ruling families, have tied down a substantial proportion of the Federation’s 5,000-man army and some British forces as well.
13. British and Federal forces, however, have been able to control the dissidents in the Protectorate. Therefore, in late 1964, the Egyptians turned to Aden itself. Their puppet National Liberation Front (NLF) began to attack Arab police and British soldiers, as well as civilians. This campaign has seriously damaged the morale of the Adeni police officers, and the British have been forced to rely more and more on their own personnel to maintain security. Strikes and slowdowns have caused considerable economic loss. In particular, during a two-month labor slowdown in the port, more than half the bunkering trade was diverted elsewhere.
14. Though the Aden government was by no means a group of radicals, it tended to side with the NLF against the British, and blamed the terrorism on lack of progress toward independence. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] In September, however, the killing of two senior British officials goaded London into suspending the local government and imposing direct rule by the High Commissioner. The security situation is now fairly well under control.
Outlook
15. The British have enough force in Aden to maintain security for the foreseeable future, but they will continue to be vulnerable to terrorist attacks and will probably continue to be harassed by labor troubles in the port, refinery, and base areas. British ability to control terrorism would be improved if the projected settlement in Yemen [Page 161] actually does lead to withdrawal of Egyptian forces there. They can continue to help the Federation leaders to organize ministries, get them functioning, and in general lay down the necessary foundation of an administrative system for the Federation. But this does not get at the basic problems: the restoration of local government in Aden and the forging of a working relationship between Aden and the sheikhs.
16. Beyond this kind of temporizing, the longer term choices open to the British are not particularly attractive. On the one hand, they can press ahead with the Federation plans, make whatever arrangements with the Federation sultans they feel they need for continued tenure at the base hoping that the sultans will prove able to make these arrangements stick. This would bring on an increase in violence, political disturbance, not only among the political articulate forces in Aden, but also to some extent in the more troublesome states of the hinterland. In such circumstances, Aden might try to withdraw from the Federation. In the Arab world generally, the issue would continue to constitute a liability for the UK. This course would probably prove too costly in terms of property damage, lives lost, and economic decline to endure for long.
17. On the other hand, the UK could move to permit the nationalist elements to take political power in Aden. This would probably require new elections under a broadened franchise, and the consequent installation of a nationalist government, probably radical, and certainly hard to deal with. Establishment of confidence between the British and the Adeni politicians will be at best a long and difficult task. Given recent terrorist activity, it is doubtful that British authorities could bring themselves to let even a few terrorists or terrorist supporters into the government. Moreover, the authorities would have to put heavy pressure on the sultans, who applaud vigorous British actions in Aden, to conform, and this would cause other problems in the Federation. Particularly in view of the economic importance to Aden of the base, however, we believe that the British could probably work out with the nationalists a reasonably satisfactory arrangement.
18. For the next several months at least, the UK is most likely to avoid a clear-cut decision and will concentrate on providing greater assurance of security in Aden. However, unless the independence promised for 1968 is to be postponed, London will have to begin soon to get a government in Aden which represents local opinion and which can participate in the Federation. The longer the period of drift persists, the more the nationalist forces will grow in size and strength and the harder the British task will be. In the end, the UK will probably be forced, in order to avoid chaos, to deal with the very people they have sought to exclude.
Chairman
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-4/67. Secret. Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency.↩
- The Federation of South Arabia consists of the former Aden Colony (75 square miles and an estimated population of 220,000), and the Protectorate area. The Protectorate was for administrative purposes divided into the Eastern Protectorate (the Hadramaut) with four states, 90,000 square miles in area, and with an estimated population of 320,000, and the Western Protectorate with 16 states, comprising 22,000 square miles and a population of about 550,000. The Federation includes 15 of the Western Protectorate sultanates, but only one—the smallest—of the Eastern sultanates. [Footnote in the source text.]↩