66. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • South Arabia

PARTICIPANTS

  • British Colonial Secretary Anthony Greenwood
  • British Colonial Under Secretary Eastwood
  • Mr. Noakes, Chief Information Officer, British Colonial Office
  • Minister Michael Stewart, British Embassy
  • Mr. Christopher Everett, British Embassy
  • Ambassador Hare, Assistant Secretary, NEA
  • Mr. Kitchen, G/PM
  • Mr. George C. Moore, NEA/NE

Mr. Greenwood opened the conversation with the statement that while Britain would study UN developments concerning Aden, it did not expect that they would contribute towards progress in the area. He then briefly described political developments concerning Aden subsequent to the Labor Government’s assuming power, including the [Page 154] UK-Federation agreement to establish a unitary state, the breakdown of plans to hold a constitutional conference in March 1965, and his subsequent trip to Aden in August when he persuaded Adeni leaders to talk in London on the basis of the UN principle of self-determination. He credited al Asnag with being of considerable help in bringing this conference about. Subsequently, however, al Asnag, Makkawi and other Adeni leaders brought a breakdown of the conference by their rigid insistence on full acceptance of the UN 1963 resolutions, particularly including lifting of the state of emergency. The subsequent deterioration in the security situation in Aden required the British to suspend operation of the constitution last month.

Mr. Greenwood said that he honestly did not know what the next British step should be. He hoped to restore stability in the country and then perhaps build further on the moderate progressive forces there. He felt that all efforts should be exerted to persuade Nasser that the British were firm in their commitment to grant independence by 1968 and in their belief that no military base was defensible, either politically or morally, if its presence was not in accord with the wishes of the people concerned. He said that the future of the British military base in Aden, within the framework of the worldwide UK defense review, was still completely undecided. It was possible that the base might be given up or might be maintained on a reduced status. In response to Mr. Hare’s question, he said that a reduction in the forces there might indeed abate Arab pressure since the fear existed that, with a larger number of troops, military pressure might at any time be exerted against Arab countries. He believed Nasser opposed the base partly because it was an insult to Arab nationalism, partly because it impeded his own aims at influencing the Gulf, and partly because he feared the growth of Saudi influence in the area which it fostered.

Mr. Hare asked, aside from Nasser, what were the elements of difficulty in Southern Arabia. Mr. Greenwood said the basic problem was one of conflict between the more advanced Aden group and the Federation and Eastern Aden Protectorate leaders. The Adenis had great fear of domination by the Federal Army. Britain, for its part, could not impose actions on the Federation states since it maintained only advisory treaties with them.

Responding to Mr. Hare’s question about relations with Yemen, Mr. Greenwood said the Federation rulers were essentially closer to the royalists, while the Adenis favored the republicans. He did not expect that Yemen would in the foreseeable future be interested in the take-over of South Arabia since the Yemenis would have more than enough of their own troubles to think about.

Mr. Hare asked if terrorism was continuing. Mr. Greenwood said there now appeared to be little terrorism in the Protectorate and that [Page 155] it had been greatly abated in Aden itself, with the exception of special snipers trained in Yemen. The biggest problem on the horizon was potential industrial unrest promoted by the NLF. While the ATUC was sympathetic to the British view, there was little they could do. The economy of Aden had already been greatly affected since many ships were now bypassing the port. (The port’s continued importance for bunkering is indicated by the fact that four million of the six million tons of fuel oil annually produced at the refinery are dispensed to ships in Aden.) It was feared that if a tough line were adopted toward labor unrest, the result would be a general strike which would seriously hinder operation of the military base.

Concerning the base, Mr. Greenwood said that the British did not want to vitiate its capabilities until we (the Anglo-Americans) had developed suitable alternatives, e.g., Indian Ocean facilities. In response to Mr. Stewart’s query, Mr. Kitchen said that we indeed considered British military presence in Aden as important since, for instance, it gave the British the possibility of moving forces quickly to various areas of potential trouble. Mr. Kitchen continued that the British, because they are already in situ, have the potential to take many military actions which we do not have. Mr. Stewart responded that he did not see why the British should be “mercenaries” for the Free World if any particular action involved was not also specifically helpful to UK interests.

In further discussion of the base, Mr. Greenwood noted that its usefulness for support of activities in the Far East was rapidly becoming impaired as “the various doors” for reaching it from the UK were being closed. Mr. Kitchen emphasized that the Shah of Iran was also concerned with the relaxation of Britain’s hold in Aden. Mr. Stewart said that, nonetheless, the Shah had not raised the subject with the UK.

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore.