Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

57. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, May 5, 1964, 7:59 p.m.

2064. Depcirtel 1990;² Cairo’s 2572,³ 2585⁴ and 2586⁵ to Department.

Concur in your assessment re Nasser’s motives for unleashing attack on British position in Aden. Agree also he has been operating on basis tactical rather than strategic considerations. For this reason we suggest in your forthcoming call on Nasser⁶ you have confidential and forthright discussion re Aden making points along following lines in manner you deem most likely to have impact (assume in addition you will draw on ref Depcirtel):

1. As long as British maintain dominant influence in Persian Gulf, considered necessary for British have military base at Aden. In short run and at this stage of primitive political development of most Persian Gulf principalities problem is who is to replace British in Gulf and occupy vacuum created by abrupt withdrawal? UAR certainly does not have this capability and US has enough other worries. Nasser must realize that if British pulled out precipitously, neighboring states, each of whom harbors separate designs, would try step into breach. Result would be build-up of tensions, chaos and perhaps local war. Only USSR would ultimately benefit therefrom.

2. At same time not in Nasser’s or our interests that chaos and instability prevail in South Arabia. If British left Aden suddenly, what would result? Neither YARG nor presumably UARG has capability to control for long large assortment of primitive, unruly and venal tribes stretching from Gulf of Aden to Yemen-Saudi border. UAR’s current problems in Yemen in obtaining and keeping loyalties of tribes would only be multiplied. Without arguing pros and cons of nature of political entity British endeavoring to create and sustain in South Arabia (i.e., South Arabian Federation), must be admitted British administrative and security umbrella there tends to keep lid on. We would submit to Nasser that reasonably orderly change in South Arabia, rather than uncontrollable chaos which would ensue in wake of sudden British withdrawal, in our mutual interests.

3. If Nasser examines history of British program for “constitutional advance” in South Arabia, he will note that British have promised independence and that in their own way British endeavoring train Adenis take over government. Therefore, while case could perhaps be made that path toward self-government too slow, no denying that British on right track. Recognition that British military base at Aden important link in UK commitment to Persian Gulf does not preclude possibility of negotiation of satisfactory base terms with emerging South Arabian Federation government.

4. Best way now to move toward desirable objective of independence, progress and stability of Aden area is to give British chance to sit back and take fresh look at situation. Unquestionably recent developments have pricked HMG to an increasing awareness of necessity to be more accommodating to forces of change. However, in these circumstances HMG, like any other country, can hardly be placed in position of seeming to succumb to outside pressures. Accordingly, further UARG drum-beating on subject should be avoided. At same time Nasser can be assured that USG will continue its efforts at persuading British to acknowledge existence of YARG and to curtail any unorthodox operations from SAF territory. UN offers current best prospect for damping down Yemen-Aden border tensions.

FYI. You may also, if you feel useful, continue to plug theme of US subsidiary naval interest in Aden base. US naval visits to Aden occur on average of one per week. US Naval Liaison Officer to Aden Consulate being assigned. However, you should keep in mind that US naval consideration secondary. Beyond this, fact that our allies place such stress on importance their position is something we cannot ignore, as Nasser must appreciate. End FYI.

For London: You may inform Foreign Office that we are making another demarche to Nasser re importance of Aden to our interests and urging an end to UAR drum-beating re British position there. Also, drawing on appropriate material contained in Cairo reftels 2585 and 2586 to Department, rptd 154 and 155 to London, request you stress importance HMG avoid overreacting to Nasser’s speeches, etc. “Cool and measured” response by British best likely to de-fuse situation. We would urge British take up matter directly with highest UAR authorities. Certainly there is no harm in direct UK-UAR dialogue and probably something to be gained.

FYI. Our hope that combination of United Kingdom restraint and acceleration of process of Adeni “constitutional conference” (which British officials here last week hinted at) will check current trend toward erosion of British position. End FYI.⁷

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Seelye; cleared by Davies, Curtis F. Jones, Judd, Buffum, Colonel Robinson (G/PM), and in substance by Quinn (DOD/ISA), and Colonel McKinnon (NAVY/OPS-611); and approved by Jernegan. Sent to Cairo and London and repeated to Jidda, Taiz, Aden, USUN, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Kuwait, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, and Dhahran.
2. Document 54.
3. Telegram 2572 from Cairo, May 2; not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN)
4. Telegram 2585 from Cairo, May 3, reported the Embassy’s view that Nasser’s frustration at his inability to resolve the Yemen imbroglio lay at the heart of his motives for unleashing violent attacks on the United Kingdom’s position in Aden. (Ibid., POL 1 UAR-UK)
5. Telegram 2586 from Cairo, May 4; not printed. (Ibid., POL 7 UAR)
6. See Document 336.
7. Telegram 5522 from London, May 6, reported that an Embassy officer had discussed the points in circular telegram 2064 with Brenchley of the Foreign Office, who replied that his government was not overreacting to Nasser’s speeches but that its actions were the direct result of the magnitude of the UAR/YAR-inspired subversive threat in the South Arabian Federation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ADEN-YEMEN)