Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

421. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic¹

Washington, January 28, 1967, 6:44 p.m.

127476. Ref: State’s 127384,² Jidda’s 2926³ and 2930.⁴

1. Acting Secretary made following points to UAR Ambassador Kamel this afternoon re UAR bombing of Najran.

a. SAG has informed us Najran bombed twice January 27 by UAR aircraft with loss at least eight lives, others wounded and property damaged. One of these raids reportedly witnessed by foreign journalists. We also have reports of third raid on January 28.

b. We have no evidence SAG has taken any actions which would have provoked such bombing raids. Our indications are Faisal has been making determined and successful efforts restrain Yemeni royalists from resuming hostilities in Yemen.

c. Such raids can only serve to harden positions and make solution in Yemen more difficult reach.

d. Acting Secretary expressed USG concern (1) over these raids in an area of world where we have strong interests and (2) that such incidents be avoided in this region where we desire see peace and stability maintained.

e. When these raids are reported by our press they will cause public reaction which, as Ambassador Kamel knows, will make more difficult our joint efforts improve US-UAR relations and reach agreement on various matters under discussion between us.

2. Kamel responded at length making following points:

a. He did not have facts this matter from his government.

b. Questioned fact foreign correspondents would be in out of way place such as Najran as raising doubts validity alleged bombing raids.

c. Gave detailed coverage Yemen problem from beginning, as seen from Egyptian viewpoint, concluding that Faisal out to humiliate and defeat Egyptians there rather than seeking mutually acceptable solution allowing their withdrawal. Made strong pitch USG should get active in Yemen matter via mediation or other means as he had been urging for some months.

d. Emphasized Najran was base for royalist infiltrators who were killing Egyptian “boys” and Egyptians could not give up right self-defense. If UAR bombed Najran there must have been provocation.

3. In response Acting Secretary stated we believe it true UAR planes had bombed Najran. He wanted emphasize strongly that this in no way helped situation of UAR or made solution Yemen problem easier. Faisal has been restraining resumption royalist activities including infiltration according to our information. Suggested correspondents could have been in Najran because of recent reports gas bombing by UAR in North Yemen near Saudi border.

4. Kamel said he would do his best express USG concern to his government and requested we restrain Saudi Arabia from provoking UAR.

5. Without specifically mentioning current top-level USG consideration UAR food request, presentations Acting Secretary (and Dep. Asst. Sec. Davies afterwards) gave Kamel clear impression USG concern over bombing raids could at the least slow up the deliberations.

6. For Cairo: You requested take up Najran bombing raids with highest appropriate level UARG drawing on Acting Secretary’s presentation paras 1 and 3 above for substance démarche⁵

7. For Jidda: In response Saudi query re proposed US action (paragraph 2, Jidda telegram 2925)⁶ request you speak to Saqqaf as follows:

a. Inform him of foregoing representation in Washington and of planned follow up in Cairo.

b. Should make clear to him that we deeply concerned over UAR action and that we indicating this concern in response press queries. (Unprovoked attack on Saudi territory should place SAG in powerful position vis-a-vis world press and public opinion. Presence foreign journalists in Najran strengthens Saudi case.)

c. Request he convey to King our renewed assurances of concern for Saudi integrity and indicate that various courses action in support Saudi Arabia are under active study by USG. We understand need for rapid action. At same time believe it of major importance that we avoid any precipitate step which could redound to ultimate disadvantage of both Saudi Arabia and US. King should be assured problem receiving urgent attention at highest levels USG and that we prepared consult continuously with SAG re most useful courses action.

8. FYI. Believe decision on issuance public statement should be deferred until receipt UAR reaction to our démarches. Concerning recommendation for dispatch infantry unit on “training mission,” we need better assessment UAR intentions and motives before making decision. Our 1963-64 experience with Operation Hard Surface demonstrated problems involved in sending token force. If faced with determined UAR action, would probably be necessary either withdraw or strengthen such symbolic force. (May be appropriate allow USMTM advisers travel Najran but would prefer delay decision at least until Army Attaché Col. Broady returns from projected visit.) We studying possibilities of action within UN framework (initiated either by Saudis or others) or of prompting third party mediation as suggested by Jidda. End FYI.

9. For London: Have informed British Embassy in general terms of representation to Ambassador Kamel. You may similarly keep Foreign Office informed.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 SAUD-UAR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Bennsky, Moore, and Korn; cleared by Davies, in substance by Director of the Office of UN Political Affairs Elizabeth Ann Brown, Quinn, and Judd; and approved by Katzenbach. Also sent to Jidda and repeated to London, Amman, Beirut, Kuwait, Sanaa, Dhahran, Taiz, USUN, CINCSTRIKE, and CHUSMTM Dhahran.
2. Telegram 127384 to Cairo, January 28, informed the Embassy that the Under Secretary had called in UAR Ambassador Kamel to express U.S. concern over the UAR air attacks on Najran. (Ibid.)
3. Dated January 28. (Ibid., E 11-3)
4. In telegram 2930 from Jidda, January 28, Eilts proposed possible measures to signal U.S. concern at the Najran bombings while also demonstrating U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s integrity, such as a public statement, a strong U.S. démarche to Nasser, a symbolic military gesture, and an effort to get a leading international personality, possibly through UN channels, to mediate. (Ibid., POL 27 SAUD-UAR)
5. In telegram 4219 from Cairo, January 29, Battle reported that he had expressed U.S. concern over the bombing to Foreign Office Under Secretary el-Feki, following the Department’s guidance, and had pointed out that there were newspaper reports from journalists who had witnessed the bombing. He noted that el-Feki, who was unable to give him an official response, made no real effort to deny the fact of the bombings. (Ibid.)
6. Dated January 28. (Ibid.)