Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

420. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia¹

Washington, January 20, 1967, 6:27 p.m.

122702. Jidda 2755 (Notal) SAG-UAR Tension.²

1. Agree SAG-UAR struggle has sharpened, with specific problems of Yemen and Islamic solidarity contributing to what has now become general Faisal-Nasser confrontation. Head-on military collision clearly not in our interest. Question arises, however, if such collision as imminent as has been true at other times in past, e.g., summer 1965. While Saudi and Egyptian troops are facing each other across north Yemen border, they have been in relatively static position for many months. We have seen no offensive troop deployments on either side which might foreshadow attack. Nasser has publicly threatened attack Saudi support bases for Yemeni royalists in Najran and Jizan, but such threat has been conditioned on Saudi resumption major aid to royalists. Current UAR policy seems blend propaganda and harassment which hard on Saudi nerves but unlikely escalate to military conflict. Meanwhile Faisal seems clearly recognize that continuing restraint of royalists is very much in his own self-interest. We do not discount existence royalist pressure on him but believe Saudi influence on royalists greater than vice versa and that SAG restraint likely continue be exercised at least until end pilgrimage season early April.

2. UAR emphasis on propaganda and support Yemeni subversion in Saudi Arabia may diminish in strength as non-Saudi subversive types rounded up, recently initiated SAG security precautions become more effective and absence significant popular Saudi support for anti-regime activities becomes clearer. (Jidda 2763³ indicates such popular response to UAR efforts has not been forthcoming.) Just as Faisal has overestimated domestic impact on Nasser of lengthened UAR involvement in Yemen, so Nasser seems to underestimate extent popular acceptance Faisal within Saudi Arabia.

3. Foregoing is not to downgrade very real concern Dept shares with Embassy about present state Saudi-Egyptian relations, but does indicate that these relations have not yet deteriorated to point where area peace threatened. In this tense but not traumatic situation, and in absence any indication that either side ready for détente, we doubt there is at present any useful action which USG might take. In fact, US initiative at this time might make positions of parties more rigid, each believing our action was sign that other side weakening under existing pressure. Aside from question of whether Helou would be acceptable to both sides or willing undertake role (on which we have doubts), foregoing argument would seem apply any approaches at present by Lebanese. While Kuwait mediation dormant, it is an open channel available to parties whenever they choose to use it. Intervention this juncture either by USG or by Helou could result closing this channel. In event situation were to deteriorate to point where hostilities appear imminent, we would be willing consider high level US approach to both sides.

4. Both Embassies Jidda and Cairo should nevertheless continue make use suitable occasions to discuss SAG-UAR problems, importance for both of meaningful détente, and need exercise restraint on military activities Yemen in order avoid provoking direct Saudi-Egyptian hostilities.

5. Possible encouragement for Pakistan effort (Dhahran 477 Notal/)⁴ is subject separate message.

6. For Kuwait. You should continue encourage GOK at highest appropriate level keep mediation effort active. DeptOff took this line with Kuwait Ambassador January 19 but latter indicated immediate outlook not promising.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 SAUD-UAR. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Moore and Brewer; cleared by Houghton, Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs in the Office of Near Eastern Affairs George M. Bennsky, and Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan James W. Spain; and approved by Davies. Also sent to Kuwait and Cairo and repeated to London, Beirut, Amman, Sanaa, and Rawalpindi.
2. Telegram 2755 from Jidda, January 17, reported that recent indications were that Saudi-UAR confrontation was sharpening, and that as mutual Faisal-Nasser suspicion deepened, the few remaining threads of meaningful direct contact that might allow some dialog to be resumed on smaller matters were being severed. Eilts proposed that the U.S. Government continue to urge Kuwait to proceed with its mediation effort, but also take additional steps to ease present tensions, such as urging Faisal and Nasser to look for ways and means to bring about a Saudi-UAR détente as a prerequisite to resuming a meaningful dialog on outstanding problems such as Yemen. Alternatively, the United States might seek to have some mutually acceptable, uncommitted Arab chief of state, such as President Helou of Lebanon, use his good offices between Faisal and Nasser. (Ibid.)
3. Dated January 17. (Ibid., POL 23-7 SAUD)
4. Telegram 477 from Dhahran, January 19, reported that during a meeting with the Ambassador on January 18 Pharaon had expressed his personal view that the Kuwaiti mediation effort was “finished.” He also informed Eilts that the Government of Pakistan had sent a letter to the Saudi Arabian Government indicating its willingness to help and suggesting a Faisal-Nasser meeting in Karachi. The Saudis had replied by sending Pakistan a statement of the Saudi position on the Yemen problem, to which there had so far been no response. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN)