422. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State1
4239. 1. I am deeply disturbed by increasing tensions between Egyptians and Saudis. While these tensions arise from many sources, current focus is, of course, Yemen. In Yemen problem there are various elements that can lead to rapid and dangerous escalation regardless of whether it is what anyone wishes or serves interest any party. Unfortunately this escalation may well involve us. I can well understand Amb Eilts’ concern over situation and his belief we must reassure Feisal that we will back up often repeated words of assurance that we will come to his assistance in event of unprovoked aggression. It seems to me, however, that what is most needed by the Saudis, the Egyptians, the Yemenis and, most importantly, by the US, is time. Feisal needs time to provide excuses for not unleashing royalists and/or retaliating. Nasser needs time to keep from getting himself in greater mess than he already has stirred up. The Yemenis need time because they will be the greatest loser with the least influence on outcome of any participant. The US needs time because it does not want to risk instability, war, or direct and serious confrontation with Nasser in which US would be on side conservative regimes against Nasser and revolutionary countries, thereby increasing dangerous trend toward polarization which has been under way for some months. Time alone will solve nothing. It might, however, permit a loosening of positions already much too rigid and possibly the creation of a climate in which new elements can emerge.
2. Our choices for the moment are the following:
- A.
- To rely on Kuwaiti or other efforts (Moroccan, Sudanese, Pakistan, etc.) with little hope of success.
- B.
- Do nothing except continue our words of warning and concern to both UAR and Saudis.
- C.
- Take such steps as necessary to reassure Saudis we will back up our commitment recognizing that such steps run risk escalation.
- D.
- Take new initiative to resolve Yemen conflict or at minimum provide cooling off time for all countries involved.
3. Of the alternatives only the new initiative (para D) offers much hope in situation that is inherently dangerous and contains elements real risks for US. It is wiser for us to face fact we are already involved and to take relatively small risk of mediation than to permit drift which will bring us inevitably to point we will have to back up commitment to Saudis, presumably with US forces.
4. I understand reasons that have argued against direct US offer mediate Yemen since last Bunker mission. However, to offer to mediate now risks only loss prestige in effort preserve peace. I am quite willing see us risk minor loss of face to prevent or at least delay major confrontations which can be disastrous from our point of view.
5. Various ideas have been advanced in recent weeks re possible mediators from Arab or international world. I recommend we recognize that we are involved in outcome Yemen no matter what happens and try to make our involvement as helpful toward bringing solution as possible. I therefore urge that we make offer either of good offices or mediation in situation that is highly explosive. Suggest Amb. Bunker, long acquainted with Yemen problem and having great stature in area and world, be assigned task of mediation. It would at least give time for situation to sort itself out and avoid dangerous military escalation. Believe it especially important we take such a step before we find ourselves committing US forces in Arabian peninsula.2
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, Aden, Sanaa, USUN, Beirut, Amman, Kuwait, and Jidda.↩
- In a January 31 memorandum to Rostow, Howard Wriggins commented that although there was merit in Battle’s proposal that the United States should undertake a new mediation effort, he agreed with Deputy Assistant Secretary Rodger Davies, who argued that the U.S. Government should attempt to reactivate the Kuwaiti mediation before involving itself directly. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, UAR-Saudi (Yemen issue), 4/1/66-1/20/69)↩