356. Memorandum of Conversation1
SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, December 1964
SUBJECT
- The Yemen Situation
PARTICIPANTS
-
U.S.
- The Secretary
- Mr. Walsh
-
Saudi Arabia
- Deputy Foreign Minister Omar al-Saqqaf
- UN Ambassador Jamil Baroody
The Secretary opened the discussion by asking the Minister for an assessment of the Yemen situation. In response, the Minister said that the meeting which had been planned between the royalist and republican factions in Yemen had been postponed because the UAR had withdrawn its concurrence to certain arrangements which had been agreed upon by Nasser and King Faisal. Whereas it had been agreed that representation at the meeting was to be on a 2/3 republican and 1/3 royalist basis, the UAR subsequently claimed that the republicans had refused to accept these proportions. As a result the meeting was postponed.
The Minister went on to say that he hoped that a solution could be found to the Yemen question but at the moment he was uncertain as to when or how this could be accomplished. He believed that a viable agreement would have to permit the Yemeni to have an Imam. He said that the King wanted Nasser to withdraw his troops from Yemen but he had not insisted that this occur prior to a meeting of the warring factions. Abrupt withdrawal would subject Nasser to increased domestic pressures from his army, as well as pressures from a variety of dissident Arab elements. The King contemplated phased reductions from the very high current level of over 50,000 troops. Some method of certification of these withdrawals would have to be agreed upon in addition to arrangements for joint Saudi-UAR policing of the cease fire in Yemen. Actually, he said, Saudi Arabia is less concerned about the UAR forces today than it was a year ago. His Government continues, however, to be seriously concerned about the dangers of anarchy and [Page 669] Communist activity in Yemen. Today, virtually every facet of international communism, including the Russians, Chinese, Poles and Czechs, are at work in Yemen. About 900 Chinese are in the country.
The Minister said that the relative positions of King Faisal and Nasser had changed considerably in the past year. Faisal now has very broad support in Saudi Arabia and expatriate elements are returning to the country. In addition, his social and economic programs are showing signs of success. Furthermore, UAR propaganda attacks on King Faisal had largely ceased.
Nasser, on the other hand, is considerably weaker than he was a year ago. His economic situation is increasingly chaotic and there is growing opposition to him in the army. The King has no desire to destroy Nasser in part because of uncertainties about the nature of a successor regime.
Turning to the subject of U.S. aid to Nasser, the Minister said that at times it appeared that the U.S. was providing direct assistance to him to carry out policies in Yemen which the U.S. opposed. He recognized, however, that the U.S., as well as Saudi Arabia, was confronted by dilemmas in respect to this question. Saudi Arabia could not, for example, oppose aid given to help the people of the UAR. Yet this assistance freed other resources for utilization in Yemen. It is a difficult situation.
The Minister went on to express the opinion that the U.S. could be helpful in the present situation if it urged Nasser to come to an agreement with King Faisal in regard to the future of Yemen. The establishment of peace and stability in that country was clearly to the advantage of everyone but the Communists.
In response, the Secretary said that he was very pleased to note the progress that had been made by Saudi Arabia in the past year. Looking back upon the Bunker Mission, one had to admit that the disengagement objective had not been realized. After all, he said, there are more UAR troops in Yemen today than there were at that time. In another sense, however, there had been positive benefits. By means of Hard Surface and other means we had made perfectly clear to the UAR that we wished them to refrain from attacks on Saudi Arabia. Other internal Saudi Arabian factors had manifestly found expression in political stability and economic and social growth.
The Secretary stated that there are, of course, dilemmas in economic aid policy. We have employed economic aid, in part, as a means of maintaining a meaningful dialogue with the UAR Government. The situation today might have been worse if we had not been able to exercise certain restraint on U.A.R. policy decisions. The disengagement process in the Yemen has not been satisfactory and this has been a factor in our decision to halve the flow of certain types of economic assistance to the UAR. We continue, however, to advocate an accord [Page 670] that will bring peace and stability to Yemen and that will reduce some of the current difficulties that we have with the UAR.
In closing this segment of the conversation, the Secretary asked the Deputy Foreign Minister to convey to King Faisal the assurances of President Johnson that the United States firmly supports the independence, integrity and well-being of his country.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by John P. Walsh on December 12. The memorandum is Part I of II.↩