357. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State1
504. Meeting with Faysal. Deptels 3042 and 311.3
Proceeded Riyadh late January 1, having been notified I would have appointment with King following day. Faysal granted interview morning January 2 as soon as he was informed my arrival. I found him extremely cordial and forthcoming in course of meeting which lasted over two hours. I gave him personal regards President, Secretary, Undersecretaries and Asst Sec Talbot.
President Johnson’s oral message obviously moved him deeply. For some minutes after hearing it Faysal groped for appropriate words to express appreciation and to reaffirm conviction importance of strengthening Saudi-American bonds. While much of ground covered was familiar from previous conversations and will be summarized by airgram, of particular interest was prominence his concerns over Soviet infiltration Red Sea area. Faysal expressed conviction Russian and Chinese pressures on Nasir have played important role influencing against withdrawal UAR forces from Yemen. He also sees Anwar Sadat as having personal stake in twisting execution of Nasir-Faysal summit agreement of September 1964. This agreement, as distinct from published communique had been drawn up secretly and signed in duplicate, [Page 671] Nasir and Faysal each retaining a copy. Without revealing text (“which preserves both our dignities”) he made clear agreement provided that nature of Yemeni state would not be decided in advance but left for Yemenis to ultimately determine. National conference would be held while UAR troops still in Yemen (Royalists had objected but SAG had overcome their objections). By six to eight months after national conference UAR troops would be out. Plebiscite would determine new Yemen Government which would climax UAR withdrawal. Faysal stated he had proposed but Nasir had not yet formally agreed that interim government be named “state of Yemen” and headed by sovereignty council (Lijnat Ar-ra’Asa) of three or seven personages. State organs would include council of ministers composed of mixed Royalist-Republican representatives and consultative assembly (Majlis Ash-shura) of 50 to 100 members whose membership component would be determined by decision of national conference. This interim government would conduct plebiscite.
King deprecated UAR maneuverings to select “rabble from streets” as true Yemeni representatives at national conference and to insist interim regime be called “republic,” contrary to Nasir-Faysal agreement. He asserted recent resignations YAR ministers plus wave of arrests had fully exposed as lie UAR justification it was keeping troops in Yemen solely to help liberate Aden and Arab South. Faysal stated he has instructed his Ambassador to Cairo to inform UAR leaders he, Faysal, considered Alexandria agreement still binding and basis for any progress toward Yemen solution. He commented “Nasir told me at Alexandria he had then 49,000 men in Yemen” and that his intelligence sources report arrival of additional 7,000 troops since.
When he raised matter of US relations with Nasir, I replied that when I had discussed this with Secretary December 23, latter had smiled and told me I might relay to him that US-UAR relations were now worse than those of SAG-UAR. He grinned at this.
In commenting on my statement of Dept’s position (Deptel 311) Faysal stated he had no desire see USG break off ties with UAR but maintained interests at stake in present situation were broader than those of either Saudi Arabia, UAR or Yemen due to Communist threat to area. He also dwelt on need for some Arab regime in south which would be completely independent of UAR or USSR and made clear his willingness to financially assist one whenever—as he had advised SAF officials as well as al Jifri and Asnaj—the various South Arab interests got together and settled their mutual differences. He expressed repugnance at recent UAR-inspired terrorist attacks in Aden, predicting they would not succeed in forcing pace of UK withdrawal.
Comment: In terms reminiscent of our mid-1963 exchanges, Faysal pressed for answer to question “When USG would act to force UAR [Page 672] withdrawal from Yemen?” Inconsistently and only half seriously he suggested that if USG used Sixth Fleet Nasir would get out at once. I replied this would play into Nasir’s hands. His words were couched in much less emotional terms than on earlier occasions, reflecting perhaps his belief time is on his side in view Nasir’s worsened relations with United States, UAR economic crisis and evolution of events within Yemen.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 SAUD. Secret. Repeated to Dhahran, London, Cairo, Aden, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Taiz, and Tel Aviv.↩
- Document 236.↩
- Dated December 30, 1964. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US)↩