355. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts1
1056. In call November 30 on Assistant Secretary Talbot to discuss Yemen, British Minister Stewart stated HMG willing in principle recognize compromise Yemeni Government which might emerge from forthcoming conference but with number conditions to be sorted out before such recognition granted. Said HMG continued hold same criteria for recognition (i.e., general popular acceptance of government which exercising effective control bulk of country) however willing apply these leniently to situation to gain bargaining points. Stressing treaty obligation to obtain SAF approval before acting, Stewart read and left paper describing preliminary views Foreign Office on HMG pre-recognition desires as follows: (1) Substantial reduction UAR forces and firm prospect they will run down at least to a low level; (2) For purposes assuring acceptance SAF as a fact, would hope for statement from YAR at least equivalent to December 1962 assertion its respect for international agreements and calling upon Yemenis in adjacent territories to respect law and order (would be desirable for YAR make specific mention Treaty of Sanaa and HMG in acknowledging such statements would make clear it intended live in peace with Yemen); (3) Essential put stop to subversive and propaganda activities in SAF (required if HMG to persuade SAF acquiesce in recognition; HMG would make point directly to UARG but would welcome similar action by US); (4) Desirable obtain progress demilitarization, demarcation or observation proposals [Page 667] put forward by HMG at UN in April (HMG prepared in return take all possible action insure that SAF rulers abstain from activity across border). Stewart emphasized HMG wanted continue discussions with US including US views on paper, and specifically desired parallel US approach in Cairo.
In response Talbot noted our understanding that many moderate Yemenis apparently strongly desire easing Yemen-SAF frictions and removal UAR troops. Indication to them now of British willingness recognize government provided certain criteria met could strengthen them in pressing get UAR out. He assumed that Saudi position on recognition would also play significant role for HMG. British, according Stewart, felt that informing Yemenis at this time of British position would lead YAR expect quick recognition after conference and result in unwillingness take conciliatory attitude toward manifold problems involved. Agreed that argument could be made both for and against informing Yemenis at this time and expressed hope Talbot could further discuss with Foreign Office during visit London next week.
Concerning any US approach in Cairo, Talbot noted problem was one of timing since Arabs still handling matter among selves and we deeply involved with UAR at moment on other matters. Stewart agreed, saying any contemplated approach would only be for consideration after results Yemeni conciliation conference known.
During discussion Talbot also mentioned Yemeni allegations inflammatory output Aden Radio. British Embassy subsequently informed Department that Foreign Office already investigating matter on basis previous demarches Washington and London.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 16 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Davies and Judd, and approved by Talbot. Sent to Cairo, Jidda, London, Taiz, and Aden.↩