Office of the Historian

273. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1

Washington, June 20, 1966.

Our goal with Faisal is to persuade him not to break with Nasser and split the Middle East. We also want him to feel you are his friend without thinking he has a blank check to pick a fight with Nasser. Suggested talking points:

1.
You would like to outline your views on the Middle East and then hear his. You will be frank and hope he will.
  • —You assume Nasser is Faisal’s most immediate concern. You have problems with him too. You are discouraged with trying to get closer to him, but you want to keep the door open.
  • —You share his concern over Communist penetration, and you know how Moscow exploits local nationalists like Nasser.
  • —Our goal is to keep Moscow from splitting the Middle East into radical and moderate camps. Slamming the door on Nasser would help only the Soviets. A Yemen settlement would thwart them.
  • —Economic and social progress is the best check on Communism. You are making our own reform programs the base for a worldwide attack on poverty, illiteracy and disease.
2.
You would like to hear Faisal’s views—on the widening Middle East split, Yemen mediation, and social and economic progress.
3.
You would like to hear how Faisal plans to fill the gap the British will leave in South Arabia and the Persian Gulf. (I hope you can get Faisal excited about cooperating with his moderate neighbors, either through the World Bank, the UN, or an Arab Development Bank. You can cite how we push the Asian Development Bank, Mekong Valley development, the Ganges-Brahmaputra River projects.)
4.
You want to reiterate our support for Saudi Arabia’s integrity. If he asks exactly what we would do if Nasser attacked him, your best answer is that we do not think either of us should be committed in advance to any specific course. But we will not let Saudia Arabia get swallowed up.

For flavor, I am attaching a short summary by our Ambassador, Herman Eilts. You might also want to review State’s fuller talking points.

Walt

Attachment2

KING Faisal’S VISIT

The King is reserved and modest, but proud. A devout Muslim and conservative, he has much natural wisdom. He believes in evolutionary progress. He is sensitive with an occasional streak of stubbornness. He is pro-American and a great admirer of the President. He has long wanted to meet the President. Now, with the moment at hand, he is slightly apprehensive that he may be rebuffed or be unable adequately to convey his concerns. These are the growth of Communism in the Near East, Nasser (whom he equates with Communism), Yemen, and the security of Saudi Arabia. We share a considerable community of interest on all these points, but do not entirely see them as the King does.

In talks with him, it may be helpful to know that he reacts positively to warmth, candor and confidence. A good way to get him to unbend is to ask his views. He usually gives them frankly, even in dissent. Where he agrees, his word is his bond.

Somewhat greater flexibility on Yemen would be helpful on his part. The President may wish to ask him about the Kuwaiti mediation effort, and impress on him our interest in an honorable settlement for all. He has moved ahead on internal reform, but should be encouraged [Page 522] to do more. The subject is sensitive. A good approach would be for the President to tell him of our own efforts in areas of social reform, such as civil rights, etc., then casually ask him how his program is progressing. He, too, has his domestic obstacles, and sympathetic appreciation of them will show our continued interest and spur him on.

Above all, the King is a good friend. He would like to be reassured that his friendship is appreciated. Our ability to continue to influence him constructively in the months ahead, including in matters where we reap tangible benefits, will depend in part on whether we can make him feel that, despite certain differences of emphasis, our friendship for Saudi Arabia is real, that we appreciate his problems and that he can count on us to give appropriate help to try to solve them.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, King Faisal Trip to U.S., 6/21/66-7/1/66. Secret.↩
  2. Confidential.↩