Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

272. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, June 18, 1966.

King Faisal’s visit will depend—more than usual—as much on the tone you set as on the substance. He is apprehensive—largely because he has been fed a variety of myths about our motives in the Middle East. For example, he has never completely believed that we have not made Nasser our “chosen instrument” there. He is suspicious of Zionist influence in Washington. These are not chip-on-the-shoulder views—probably because he knows better. But they are deep-seated enough to make him uneasy about what he will find here.

There is also real substance to talk about. Your first look may make you feel it will be hard to hit it off with this bearded, robed desert king. But Faisal is a lot more modern than he looks. Under those robes, you will find a sharp mind and deep devotion to educational and social progress. I am sure he will warm to your sincerity and frankness. I would be surprised if you do not find him a man you can like and draw out.

It is worth the effort. Our largest single overseas private enterprise is the Arabian-American Oil Company’s $1.2 billion investment in Saudi Arabia. In addition, all our other Middle East interests—from blocking Communism to preserving Israel—depend heavily on gradual modernization under moderate leaders like Faisal who oppose the revolutionary methods of Nasser and Communism.

Nasser’s propaganda machine will have a field day with this visit. After two years of relative harmony, the Middle East is splitting again into two camps centering around Faisal and Nasser. The Egyptians see moderate leaders like Faisal, the Shah and King Hussein as “imperialist tools” and accuse us of conspiring with them and the Israelis to undercut him.

So State recommends we keep the public part of this visit low-key. While I agree that we do not want to throw our arms around Faisal, I feel the tone of State’s briefing papers is too negative. We have invited Faisal for good reason, and we realize that some Arabs will give us a hard time for it. But within reason, we want to treat him like the friend he is.

Faisal comes with two worries. First, he believes the Communists are intensifying their push into the Middle East. Second, he sees evidence of this in his rising tension with Nasser over Yemen. He sees Nasser as Moscow’s pawn. He has never understood why we have tried to get close to Nasser and feels we overlook the real menace. He is uncertain that we will stick by him in a showdown.

I will give you a brief talking paper Monday night, but here in outline are the points we want to get across:

1. We share his opposition to Communism.

• —We do not define Communism as broadly as he does. We do not see Nasser, for instance, as a Communist. But we know full well how Moscow can exploit Nasser’s kind of local nationalism.
• —We think the main Soviet objective is to split the Middle East into two camps—the revolutionaries (UAR, Syria, Iraq) and the evolutionaries (Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon).
• —One way to undercut this Soviet strategy is to keep Moscow from posing as the only champion of modernization by proving that the methods of the moderate regimes offer better hope of effective social and economic development.
• —Another way is for Faisal and Nasser to patch up their dispute over Yemen. Although we sympathize with Faisal’s grievances about Nasser’s behavior there, we think it would be worth considerable effort and maybe even a little loss of face to reach agreement and undercut the Soviet effort to divide the Middle East.

2. We have not made Nasser our chosen instrument.

• —You can be quite candid in admitting we are disappointed with our effort to get closer to Nasser. Faisal has always felt we judged Nasser wrong, and he will appreciate your not being defensive.
• —However, we still feel our objective is right. We still do not see how slamming the door on Nasser—much as we sometimes feel like it—would help anybody but the Communists. We doubt cutting off aid completely would change his policies.

3. We will not let Nasser swallow up Saudi Arabia.

• —We will continue to “support Saudi integrity.” We have often restated that purposely vague assurance, but Faisal may want to pin us down. He would like to know whether we will send troops or aircraft. We cannot give that kind of assurance (a) because we do not want to give him a blank check for triggering a showdown with Nasser and (b) Vietnam makes us more wary than ever of involvement. The best way to answer him is to repeat our general assurance but to say that it is impossible to say exactly what our response would be. It is in his interest as well as ours that we retain maximum flexibility and not commit ourselves to jump in militarily when other tools might be as effective—and better both our interests.

4. We hope Faisal will play a constructive role in South Arabia and the Persian Gulf as the British retrench there.

• —That area is the prime candidate in the Middle East for the kind of sub-regional cooperation we are pushing in Africa and the Far East. The British pull-back will leave a vacuum which Nasser is trying to fill. There is room for cooperation among the moderates—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and even Pakistan and Afghanistan—to help financially and politically as the shaky new nation emerges in South Arabia.
• —If you could capture Faisal’s imagination on steps he might take to promote these developments, this could be the top accomplishment of the visit and a big step forward for our Mid-East policy.

I recommend you take a good look at the strategy and talking points papers in the smaller State Department briefing book (Tabs A 1 and 2).² If you have time to look at a few of the background papers (under Tab II in the larger book), I would start with the rundown of our security assurances (Tab C) since you may have to discuss this in some detail. Beyond that, it might be worth glancing over Tabs A (Saudi objectives in the Middle East), B (Yemen) and D (South Arabia and the Persian Gulf).

Walt

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, King Faisal Trip to U.S., 6/21/66-7/1/66. Secret.
2. None of the tabs is attached. Briefing material for Faisal’s visit is ibid., King Faisal Visit, Briefing Book, 6/21-23/66; and National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Visit Files: Lot 67 D 587, Visit of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, June 21-23 1966—Volume I—Briefing Book.