Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

271. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, June 8, 1966, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Near East South Asia IRG Meeting
• Wednesday, 8 June 1966 at 2:30 PM

1. There were two items on the agenda for discussion—Policy for Faysal Visit and Soviet-Syrian Relations.

Faysal Visit

2. The policy paper prepared by State² called for the USG to use Faysal’s visit to emphasize (a) the dangers of polarization in the NE, (b) the importance the USG attaches to maintaining our ties of mutual interest with all the States of the Near East, including Egypt, (c) that Faysal should not contribute to polarization, (d) that we assess the Communist penetration of the NE to be less than Faysal’s assessment (Faysal has declined a State briefing), (e) that he should be flexible on Yemen and avoid provocation and (f) that Saudi assistance to formation of as broadly based a regime as possible in South Arabia is desirable but that such assistance should be through multi-national organization to avoid impression that it is directed against any specific group.

3. Macomber (AID) took general exception to the paper. He urged State not use the term “progressive” in describing the radical Arab regimes, implying a desirable alternative to “conservative” regimes such as Faysal’s monarchy. Also, he disagreed with the principle that we should be impartial in our relations with friendly governments and those hostile to us. He thought the paper was negative, could have been written in 1962 and did not provide the basis for a positive approach.

4. Critchfield (CIA) said that in the brief 24 hours available, preliminary staffing of the paper in the Agency had produced a consensus that this approach, used by the President, would “go over like a lead balloon”. The implication throughout the paper was that Faysal was somehow a principal contributor to the tension of the area, had an exaggerated view of the Communist threat to the area, was being inflexible and obstructive vis-a-vis the Yemen, would be well advised to concentrate on internal economic and political reforms to keep the Communist wolf away from the door and that Faysal did not understand that polarization in the area, to which he was contributing by his policies, was dangerous. There was no suggestion that there are principles, objectives and interests in the area to which the USG attaches importance which could be identified quite separately from the issue of the radical revolutionary regimes versus the conservative regimes. We could and should identify the dilemma we face in the current polarization of forces in the area and the dangers to world peace and our interests that we could see in a deepening of the division of the two camps. We could acknowledge that there was a Soviet-sponsored threat to the area, and that the USSR was giving support to the revolutionary regimes for its own pragmatic purposes. We could point out that, whatever Faysal’s original intent, the Soviet Union had elected to distort the Islamic solidarity issue to suit its own purposes and anxieties and, for better or worse, it had become an element in the growing schism between Cairo and Jidda. Having shared our dilemma with Faysal, we could invite him to give us the benefit of his assessment and guidance. We could state that we had attempted to preserve a relationship with every Arab country—regardless of the character of its regime—as a means of preserving peace in the area. We were reluctant to abandon this policy, regardless of its weaknesses, in the absence of an alternative that accommodated our basic interest of peace and some stability in the Near East.

5. (USIA) said that the visit basically offered USIA problems since the mere fact of Faysal’s visit would provide an issue for the hostile press in foreign areas. USIA found it a difficult subject to deal with in its output. The fact that the President has ordered the full protocol treatment of a State visit made the USIA task even more difficult. Rodger Davies thought the treatment given Faysal would not be obviously that much better. The White House (Saunders) was quite firm that the form of the visit had been decided.

6. Hoopes (Defense/ISA) was interested in how the visit came about. Davies said that the invitation was extended by Ambassador Eilts when he presented his credentials. The idea dated back to the summer of 1965 when the Faysal-Nasser rapprochement and the Jidda Agreement provided the right atmosphere for a Faysal visit. Hoopes’ main interest was that the visit not result in any strengthening of our public commitment to “preserve the integrity of Saudi Arabia”.

7. Macomber thought that it was counterproductive to argue with Faysal about the character of the Communist threat. Hoopes recalled that Critchfield had indicated at the Iran session that our intelligence on the Communist threat was weak. Critchfield corrected this recollection; the statement was that our information on the threat to the immediate areas of Kuzistan and the areas of the Upper Gulf which the Shah felt were threatened was weak. For the area as a whole, we felt reasonably confident. Hoopes thought it would be good if the IRG were better informed. Symmes said that a statement of the threat had been sent out to Jidda for Faysal which represented the views of the community. Critchfield said that this was not the case; the version sent to Jidda was uncoordinated, incomplete and not entirely accurate. However, Faysal had been exposed to a good deal of briefing over a period of time and probably had a reasonably accurate understanding of the Communist threat. What he lacked was current intelligence on the Soviet presence, leaving him vulnerable to false reports on Soviet military activities in the area. The secretary of the IRG recalled the language of the NSAM setting it up required that the IRG keep the President informed of impending crisis.³ Critchfield said that it was the Agency’s intent to have appropriate intelligence memoranda on potentially critical problems which would be brought to the attention of the IRG—related where possible to items on the agenda. Scheduling of the agenda well in advance would be helpful for this reason.

8. Rodger Davies recalled that Nasser had apparently been prepared to leave the Yemen when he went to Jidda. I questioned that there was any real evidence of this. Nasser was pressed at the time, was probably reassessing his chances for ultimate success and might have been simply seeking a break in an increasingly rough game. We had no reliable evidence that he had reached a decision to disengage—all the UAR statements to U.S. officials notwithstanding. Turning back from the Yemen would be a very tough decision for Nasser and not one that he would be likely to come to until convinced that chances of success were nil. Davies also noted that we should keep in mind that the single greatest overseas investment that U.S. business holds anywhere in the world is in Saudi Arabia and that it is an important factor in our gold balance. He thought we should distinguish in our thinking of what we would really do if Saudi Arabia were threatened and what we indicated to Faysal, the Arabs and the world we would do. He personally thought we would end up intervening in a real crunch. This was obviously not something to convey to Faysal in the upcoming visit. Mr. Davies seemed to have unanimous support in the views he expressed on this point.

9. At the end of the discussion on Faysal’s visit it was agreed that, with AID and CIA dissenting, the paper would have to be re-drafted. The White House was also associated with this requirement—less on substance than on the point that it contained little usable for the President. State invited the CIA representative to provide any comment or ideas in writing.

[Here follows discussion of Syria and the Soviet Union.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-R01580R, DCI Executive Registry Files, Box 1, IRG. Secret. Drafted by James H. Critchfield, Chief of the CIA’s Near East and South Asia Division on June 9.
2. “Proposed Strategy for Visit of King Faisal,” June 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Visit Files: Lot 67 D 587, Visit of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, June 21-23, 1966, Vol. II, Memcons, Admin and Sub. Misc.)
3. NSAM 341, “Direction, Coordination, and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas,” March 2, 1966, set up the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) and the Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRGs). (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 341) NSAM 341 is scheduled to be printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXXIII. The first IRG/NEA meeting took place on March 17, 1966.