270. Background Paper Prepared in the Department of State1

KFS/B-2

VISIT OF KING Faisal OF SAUDI ARABIA

June 21-23, 1966

U.S. POLICY ASSURANCES ON SAUDI SECURITY

The U.S. interest in the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia was first expressed by President Truman and has been reaffirmed in varying terms and intent by each succeeding Administration. Behind these assurances lie our considerable economic and political interests in Saudi Arabia, which are to a significant degree bound up with the fate of the Saudi dynasty, in the absence of a suitable alternative.

Saudis Fear Israeli Expansion

From 1948 until the late 1950s Saudi Arabia’s main security concern was of attack by Israel. The Saudis sought and were given assurances that we would oppose any expansion by Israel at the expense of its neighbors. It was with Israel in mind that President Truman wrote King Abdul Aziz on October 31, 1950 that aggression or the threat of aggression against Saudi Arabia would be a matter of “immediate concern” to the United States. These assurances were reiterated by President Eisenhower in letters to King [Page 513] Saud. President Eisenhower again told Crown Prince Faisal, in a meeting at the White House in September 1957, that we would “allow no aggression on the part of Israel against the Arab nations”.

U.A.R. Becomes Major Potential Adversary

Saudi concern shifted from Israel to the U.A.R. in the late 1950s and particularly following the Yemeni revolution in September 1962. We responded to Saudi requests for support in the event of U.A.R. attack with public and secret statements designed: a) to encourage the Saudi Government along the path of internal reform and development; b) to secure Saudi disengagement from Yemen; and c) to deter U.A.R. aggression on Saudi Arabia and prevent the Saudis from taking actions which might provoke U.A.R. attack. In the public domain are:

  • —President Kennedy’s October 25, 1962 letter to Faisal stating that in pursuit of his modernization program the Crown Prince “may be assured of full United States support for Saudi Arabia’s integrity”.
  • —Secretary Rusk’s March 8, 1963 press conference statement that “we are very much interested in the security of our friends in Jordan and Saudi Arabia”.
  • —President Kennedy’s May 8, 1963 press conference declaration of U.S. opposition to the threat of force or use of force in the Near East.
  • —A Department press spokesman statement on August 4, 1965 that “we have clearly indicated our support for the maintenance of Saudi Arabia’s integrity”.

Almost all the many letters exchanged secretly by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson with Faisal contain some mention of our interest in or concern for Saudi integrity.

What Do U.S. Assurances Mean?

To the Saudis

The Saudis place considerable reliance on our assurances. There may be some tendency within the Saudi Government to overestimate the extent to which the U.S. is actually committed to defend Saudi Arabia, and perhaps at times even a temptation to use our assurances to provoke a showdown with the U.A.R. Faisal however seems to understand the dangers of such a course and appears to realize that he cannot count on an unconditional U.S.G. security commitment.

To the United States

Our security assurances to the Saudis represent a continuing expression of U.S. policy designed to protect our interests in the Arabian Peninsula. Our statements have been vaguely worded and, with the exception of an offer (which was accepted) of the presence in Saudi Arabia for eight months of a squadron of U.S.A.F. interceptors, “Operation Hard Surface”, in the framework of the Bunker Yemen disengagement negotiations, have never included specific promises of military action. Our [Page 514] assurances to the Saudis have never been submitted for Congressional consideration. We have on frequent occasions in past years (most recently in Ambassador Eilts’ conversation with the King on March 23)2 sought to impress upon the Saudis that our assurances cannot be used as a shield behind which they could stimulate hostilities in Yemen or provoke an attack by U.A.R. forces there.

The intent of our assurances was defined most clearly in an instruction from President Kennedy to Special Ambassador Bunker in March 1963 stating that we “should seek to avoid giving the impression of an open-ended U.S. commitment to defend Saudi Arabia under all or any circumstances, or for an indefinite long term period… . we want to avoid future misunderstandings and to preserve U.S. freedom of action”.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Faisal Visit Briefing Book, 6/21-27/66. Secret. Drafted by Korn and cleared by Symmes, Davies, and Hare.
  2. See footnote 2, Document 396.