Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

268. Intelligence Memorandum¹

No. 0827/66

Washington, May 26, 1966.

SAUDI ARABIAN ARMS PURCHASES

1. During the last few months long-standing US-Saudi Arabian military aid discussions have come to a head. The stepped-up pace of the negotiations has reflected King Faysal’s rising concern over the Egyptian threat in Yemen. A good part of Faysal’s requests now have been met by combined US and UK efforts. However, Faysal may well refer to these matters when he visits the US beginning on 20 June. The following detailed roundup may prove useful for background on where we stand at the present time.

2. From 1957 to 1965 Saudi Arabia obtained $119.3 million in military assistance from the US; in addition, from 1954 to 1965 it obtained $24.1 million from all other sources, but none from the Communist bloc.

3. For at least two years Saudi Arabia has been dickering with several agents for a military aid package. The make-up of this package has varied, as has the nationality of the agents. The US was always predominant, the other bidders being French, British, Swiss, and German. By last fall the US (Lockheed) had won out over all other bidders.

4. At this point the British approached the US and asked if we would agree to offer a joint defense package with them as a means of offsetting British balance-of-payments problems. We agreed, with the condition that the all-US bid also remain in the competition. In the end, the joint UK-US bid was accepted, and the letter of intent was signed in late December. The joint package contracts were signed on 5 May 1966.

5. Under the joint arrangement, the British were to furnish 40 M3 Lightning supersonic jet fighters with Firestreak air-to-air missiles and 25 Provost jet trainers (British Aircraft Corp.) at about $155 million; a radar system, Type 40, with data-handling equipment (Allied Electrical Industries) at about $70 million; and training, technical operations, and maintenance work (Airwork, Ltd.) at about $76 million. Total British sales are thus about $301 million. The US portion of the package consists of ten batteries of Hawk ground-to-air missiles (Raytheon) at about $100 million.

6. After the first of this year, relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt became tense, and Saudi Arabia sought immediate interim purchases of air defense weapons. King Faysal told the US ambassador on 20 February² that he “understood” the US position vis-a-vis Egypt and would not ask the US for such interim assistance.

7. On 28 March the British stated that Saudi Arabia had purchased six subsonic Hawker Hunter jet fighters and two T4 Lightning trainers, and has requested four additional Lightnings. Airwork, Ltd. was to provide maintenance and civilian pilots for “instructional” purposes. The four extra M2 Lightnings were eventually provided. This contract, in excess of $35 million, was also signed on 5 May 1966, and on 7 May two Hunters landed in Saudi Arabia.

8. In early April we learned that Saudi Arabia was negotiating with Britain for the purchase and delivery of two Thunderbird ground-to-air missile batteries by late June or July, at about $42 million. The US, attempting to avoid undue Saudi expense and multiplicity of weapons, offered to advance delivery of one Hawk battery to October 1966. Saudi Arabia said it had expected partial early delivery and still wanted delivery by July or at least the loan of a training Hawk battery from July to October. The US said it could not do this.

9. Saudi Arabia has continued to negotiate with the British for Thunderbirds. However, as time passes and an Egyptian attack fails to materialize, the Saudis may have second thoughts about Thunderbirds. The most recent report indicates that the Saudis now feel that two batteries are too expensive and have asked if one battery could be had at a reduced price. The British will probably try to oblige.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-4/67. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only; CIA Internal Use Only. Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency.
2. See Document 259.