217. Record of Meeting1
INTERDEPARTMENTAL REGIONAL GROUP FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Record of IRG Meeting—June 4, 1968
The meeting was devoted to several current Near East military problems, as outlined in IRG/NEA 68-19.2
Possible Arms Sales and Presidential Determination for Kuwait The IRG noted recent requests by the Government of Kuwait to purchase military equipment (patrol boats, helicopters, armored personnel carriers and 155mm howitzers) from the USG. The Defense member expressed the view that the Kuwaitis hoped for some kind of USG involvement in their security going beyond the mere supply of arms, in anticipation of the British military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971 and the prospective termination before that time of the British defense commitment to Kuwait. He thought a decision to sell arms to Kuwait would be followed by requests to us by other small states in the Gulf (e.g., Qatar, Abu Dhabi) for the supply of arms. The Defense member expressed concern over the dangers of our taking steps to “fill the vacuum,” by selling arms to states with which we do not now have a military supply relationship, as the British withdraw.
The CIA member remarked that we had to take into account the possibility that Kuwait might seek to buy arms from the Soviets, if it [Page 413] could not meet its requests from the British or, failing that, from other Western sources. He recalled that “deal” of 1963 when the USSR succeeded in getting GOK approval for the establishment of a Soviet Embassy in Kuwait in return for Soviet agreement to remove its blackball on Kuwait’s entry into the United Nations. The CIA member said the Soviets would almost certainly wish to introduce military personnel into Kuwait in connection with any supply of Soviet arms. The establishment of such a relationship by the USSR and Kuwait would inevitably tend to damage our interests in the area.
The Chairman said he saw the issue in terms of our broad interests in the Persian Gulf area. He recalled that the IRG had recently agreed on the general outlines of our policy vis-a-vis the Gulf, and it was entirely consistent with that policy that we should encourage Kuwait to continue to look to the UK as its source of arms.3 However, in cases where the United Kingdom could not adequately meet Kuwait’s requests, it could be in the U.S. interest to sell certain things to the Kuwaitis. The Chairman said he appreciated the concern expressed on this point, but it was his view that if we should decide that it was in our interest to sell some arms to Kuwait in accordance with our current restrictive policy, we could do so without involving ourselves deeply in the question of maintaining Kuwait’s security. In any event, we would have to have more information—including a clear idea of British views—and a specific transaction in mind before proceeding further. If we eventually decide that we should agree to any Kuwaiti request for arms, we should be prepared to seek the President’s approval at that time, spelling out the basic policy issues (e.g., close collaboration with the British, the requirements of legitimate defense, avoidance of an unnecessary arms race, the Soviet angle, etc.). The Chairman stated it would be premature at this time to seek a general Presidential Determination under Section 521(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act, which would be required to make Kuwait eligible for purchases through Department of Defense channels.
“The Group agreed that although the Soviets will try to increase their presence and influence in the Gulf area, the key to the future of the region in the next few years will be developments within and among the various Gulf states themselves. It is neither politically feasible nor desirable for the US to ‘replace’ the British presence in the Persian Gulf. Our policy should be directed along the lines of (a) encouraging the British to maintain as much of their present special role in the Gulf as they can, as long as possible (including their role as principal arms supplier to various Gulf states); (b) encouraging the Saudis and Iranians to settle their outstanding differences regarding the median line and other issues; (c) encouraging greater political and economic cooperation generally among the Gulf states; and (d) avoiding an undue military buildup by Gulf littoral states.” [Footnote in the source text. For a record of the February 1 meeting, see Document 131.]
[Page 414]It was agreed that there should be further staffing of the pending Kuwaiti requests. This should include consultation with the British, seeking the UK’s views on the reasonableness of Kuwait’s requests and on the UK’s ability to meet them; we should also seek a general British view on the future development of the Kuwaiti armed forces.
[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]
MEMBERS PRESENT
- Executive Chairman: Mr. Battle
- ACDA: Mr. van Doren
- AID: Mr. Wheeler
- CIA: Mr. Critchfield
- DOD: Mr. Schwartz (Mr. Earle)
- JCS: Brig. Gen. Doyle
- NSC: Mr. Saunders
- USIA: Mr. Carter
- State (NEA): Messrs. Davies, Dinsmore, Houghton, Atherton
- State (G/PM): Mr. Wolf
- State (L): Mr. Wehmeyer
- Staff Director: Mr. Sober
Staff Director
- Source: Department of State, NEA/IRG Files: Lot 70 D 503, IRG/NEA 68-21—Record of IRG Mtg June 4 on Current Near East Military Problems. Secret. Drafted by IRG Staff Director Sidney Sober on June 6.↩
- Not found.↩
- The following is a paragraph from IRG/NEA 68-8, the record of the IRG meeting of February 1, 1968:↩