216. Airgram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State 1
SUBJECT
- U.S. Policy Assessment
REF
- II FAM 212.3-5; Embassy’s A-274 of March 21, 19672
SUMMARY
Since the Embassy’s last policy assessment three events, the Arab-Israeli war, the devaluation of sterling and the UK announcement of military withdrawal east of Suez, have severely tested the ability of Kuwait’s leaders to sustain the country’s sovereign independence and to maintain its impressive pace of modernization. These same events had a profound effect on the ability of the U.S. to pursue our objectives in Kuwait, and added a new factor in the equation which suggests that a third, broader objective be included in our basic policy which we now would describe as:
- 1.
- To maintain maximum free-world access to Kuwait’s resources and to limit access to Communist and other nations who actively espouse systems different from ours.
- 2.
- To obtain maximum support from Kuwait for the free world and its basic institutions.
- 3.
- To convince Kuwait that its future progress and (even its survival) as an independent nation depend on its willingness and ability to cooperate in regional efforts to maintain area stability. U.S. capabilities in Kuwait were eroded by the Arab-Israeli war and its aftermath. It is widely believed that Israel owes its military and political successes to U.S. support, and that the U.S. is the main enemy of Kuwait and the rest of the Arab world as far as Israel is concerned. The U.S. is still tacitly regarded in Kuwait, however, as the protector against the spread of communist influence. The U.S. also continues to be the prime market and source of technical skill, equipment and capital. Thus hate and distrust intensified while awareness of the need for [Page 412] the U.S. increased. Kuwait became extremist on the Palestine issue, remained committed but dubious about pan-Arabism and turned towards cautious moderation on matters concerning oil and money.
U.S. tactics must be accommodated to the sharper ambivalence, but we should continue to identify mutual interests and to urge Kuwait to support its national interests in free world institutions and systems, with special emphasis on regional cooperation.
[Here follows the body of the paper.]
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 KUW-US. Secret. Drafted by Cottam, Deputy Chief of Mission John N. Gatch, Jr., Political Officer Robert H. Carlson, Public Affairs Officer John W. Vonier, and Economic Officer James A Placke; and approved by Cottam. Pouched to Arab capitals, Ankara, Karachi, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Tokyo, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, and USUN.↩
- Not printed. (Ibid.)↩