210. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State1
1275. 1. In frank, friendly talk with Foreign Minister Sabah al Ahmad, he reiterated promise full security for all Americans, including homes of those somewhat isolated. He noted that Kuwaitis have volunteered for national guard and that labor unions have volunteered to help protect oil communities.
2. After reaffirming US not supporting Israel during hostilities, I asked Sabah for his personal view. He asked me to understand the reasons Kuwait had participated in the propaganda war and had cut off oil to US-UK.2 I told him that I had understood pressures, politics, psychology and tactics, and that I had reported them fully to Washington. What was missing, I said, was first-hand knowledge of GOK’s attitude and hence its intentions. I had assumed personally that Kuwait was doing effectively, even cleverly, what it had to, under extremely difficult circumstances. I was faced with an immediate decision. Washington had instructed me to start evacuating official dependents and [Page 402] advising other Americans to leave. I was not asking Sabah for advice, but trying to ascertain Kuwait’s intentions. Were I to act from what I saw and heard, we would start evacuations at once.
3. Sabah reiterated Kuwait’s problems, the pressures from other Arab states, and its desire for continued good relations with the United States. He hoped that the oil would be flowing again in a few days. Again he promised absolute security for all Americans, and added that the decision on evacuation is, of course, your own. Please tell your government that and ask them to bear with us.
4. I said these assurances were not sufficient. I had to know GOK attitude and intentions, whereupon Sabah confided personally and privately that he did not believe US planes had accelerated the flow of supplies immediately prior to the hostilities. I thanked him for the information, but said I would have to report it, and that I had been instructed to ascertain the views of His Highness the Amir. Sabah said that his views reflect official opinion and that it would be unnecessary for me to see the Amir. He again asked that what he had said be kept confidential. I assured him that it would not be thrown back at him. I also agreed to defer my request for an audience with the Amir until further instructed.
5. Sabah assured me of full GOK cooperation in event we should evacuate dependents and other Americans. He would not object to our chartering planes. At this point he made a grand gesture: “You can use our planes.” I told him we may have a thousand people to go, to which he replied “That doesn’t matter, we are at your disposal.” To my query, Sabah said he disapproved of cease-fire at this time, but noted that the point of cease-fire was up to those most directly involved. He acknowledged disappointment with the military situation. He asked where all the planes Israel had used could possibly have come from. Again I said not from US; perhaps your intelligence estimates were low. I referred to an earlier private conversation with Bishara in which I said “Israel has much more capability than you think.” Bishara, who was present, recalled it.
6. Seeking to underscore the importance of maintaining diplomatic relations with us, I mentioned the likelihood of UK and US working together on post-war reconstruction. Sabah said Kuwait would certainly do her duty, but this was no time to talk about it.
7. The idea of an Arab Foreign Ministers meeting in Kuwait beginning June 8 was not his. Baghdad was the sponsor and had made the agenda. Sabah thinks it untimely. However, when I pressed him on his long-standing reliance on summitry, he agreed that the meeting might be useful. Replies have not come in from all of the possible participants.
[Page 403]8. Comment: In view of assurances for security and unlikelihood that Kuwait intends to break relations, I will postpone the evacuation of dependents. UK Ambassador taking similar position. Morale of entire staff and dependents high. I reiterate opinion Kuwait may be place we can hold on and look to future.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Cables, Vol. IV. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated to London. Another copy of this telegram is filed in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Handwritten notations on the telegram read: “Mr. President—This is good news! Walt” and “Another place to hold the line.”↩
- Telegram 208481 to Kuwait, June 6, reported that the Kuwaiti Ambassador telephoned at 11:30 a.m., saying he had been instructed urgently to convey to the Department that the Government of Kuwait had adopted two resolutions: 1) to stop all oil exports to the United States and the United Kingdom; and 2) to accept Iraq’s invitation to hold an urgent meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers. The Ambassador said it was his understanding that the decision to stop oil exports was based on the conviction that Cairo’s reports that U.S. carrier-based aircraft were assisting Israel were correct. (Ibid.) For documentation on the Arab oil embargo following the Six-Day War, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXXIV, Documents 228 ff.↩