Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula

209. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait ¹

Washington, April 27, 1967, 6:03 p.m.

183614. Ref: Kuwait’s 1099.²

1. Appreciate your efforts steer Sabah toward UK as supplier Kuwait’s air defense needs. It quite correct underscore stringent USG security protection requirements in connection with any Hawk missile sale. While Sabah may choose overlook these now, GOK might well have serious second thoughts when time came sign agreements and carry out investigations.

2. Dept/DOD see no basis for Sabah statement para 6 reftel that UK unable supply stationary defensive rockets. UK Thunderbird as fixed-installation surface-to-air missile (of type emplaced around US cities) might be even more appropriate to Kuwait’s needs than Hawk, which is mobile field system. Since Kuwaitis have already contracted for UK Lightning fighter aircraft, British Thunderbirds would appear be natural complement to their air defense system.

3. You should inform Sabah we sympathetic Kuwaiti concern re air defense but believe Kuwait’s best defense assurance lies in continued close military supply arrangement with UK. Believe GOK should fully explore possibility of obtaining Thunderbirds from UK before proceeding any further to discuss possible availability of Hawks, which in any case may be less appropriate to GOK needs than Thunderbirds.

4. For London: Agree Embassy’s suggestion (London 8829)³ we take advantage Sabah approach to build F-111 offset case with British in event successful UK Thunderbird sale to Kuwait. Embassy should inform appropriate HMG officials we have been approached by Kuwaiti Govt with request for sale Hawk missiles. In view UK-Kuwaiti defense tie, we are suggesting to Kuwaitis that they first explore possibility acquisition Thunderbird surface-to-air missile system. FYI. For purpose making our case for including an eventual Kuwaiti sale in offset arrangement, Embassy should leave our ultimate intentions re Hawk sale to Kuwait vague and avoid anything indicating USG has reached firm decision refuse Kuwaiti request. End FYI.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 IRAQ-KUW. Secret. Drafted by Korn; cleared by Quinn and Thieberger (DOD/ISA), G/PM Assistant for Special Facilities Joseph J. Wolf, Judd, NEA/RA Political-Military Adviser Colonel Edgar J. Fredericks, and Brewer; and approved by Rockwell. Repeated to London, Baghdad, Tehran, COMIDEASTFOR, and CINCSTRIKE/ CINCMEAFSA.
2. In telegram 1099 from Kuwait, April 25, Cottam reported that he had tried to discourage Foreign Minister Shaikh Sabah al Ahmad from expecting the United States to sell Kuwait sophisticated weapons, and had expressed U.S. support for Kuwait’s treaty with the United Kingdom and the primacy of the British-Kuwaiti defense relationship. (Ibid.)
3. Dated April 26. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 KUW)