211. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State 1

1299. Ref: State 209821;2 Kuwait 1290.3

1.
Amir received me in cordial and relaxed manner, reflecting his belief, which emerged during conversation, that for Kuwait worst of crisis has passed. He insisted I finish my tea before talking business, and we chatted about how we both had had postpone vacation plans. I reminded him that this was my first call since becoming Dean in Kuwait.
2.
When we turned to business, there was immediate and full acceptance of my affirmation that US had not participated in the hostilities. He had had no doubts and never any intentions of breaking relations. He was surprised to learn that Americans had doubted Kuwait’s intentions or capabilities to protect them. He gave a long explanation of his objectives and tactics, including declaration of war, martial law, cutting oil, and participation in the Arab propaganda war. He hoped we would understand. I told him that we had understood the psychology, the politics and the tactics, including the cutting off of oil, but that [Page 404] we had hoped for some secret assurances of Kuwait’s intentions. It was for that reason that I had gone to the Foreign Minister on June 7.
3.
I thanked the Amir for the clarity with which he now assured me of a desire to maintain, and even to improve relations with US. He returned several times to the sequence of events, repeating his reasons and his tactics. He wanted more approbation than I proffered. I congratulated and thanked him for the effective security and hoped that he could soon turn off the propaganda and turn on the oil. He had already started on the radio programs, he said. He also assured me that Kuwait does not want to lose any more income than necessary by its oil restrictions. (I will report more after I discuss with UK Ambassador what Amir told me at end of my interview.)
4.
The Amir asked what I thought of the situation; what would happen. I said it depended upon, first, implementation of the cease-fire, second, upon the attitude of the belligerents, and upon the actions of the United Nations, particularly the Security Council. I hoped that GOK would support forcefully strengthening of the peacekeeping machinery. I then explained the US and Soviet draft resolutions which had not yet come to his attention. I also offered him detailed US intelligence on the war situation. I passed on some authorized [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] information which Amir appreciated and asked for more. I found him surprisingly uninformed about the Kuwaiti troops. He implored me to pass on any new information that we might obtain.
5.
Amir thought it unnecessary for Kuwait to say anything about cease-fire. He observed that Saudi Arabia had said nothing.
6.
To my query about the Amir’s view of the situation, he agreed with the importance of the cease-fire and build-up of peacekeeping. My efforts to interest him in post-war reconstruction were not very productive, but he is aware of Kuwait’s responsibilities.
7.
Amir dismissed the interpreter. Even with my limited Arabic capability, I understood that he had telephoned President Nasser to reiterate his allegiance and best wishes. I also learned that designee Zakaria Muhyi-al-Din had not made a good impression on His Highness during the recent visit. Unfortunately, I could not get the nuances.
8.
I then called on Deputy Grand Chamberlain Ibrahim Shatti, political advisor, to arrange [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for passing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] information and to plant some ideas about settlement. I found him open-minded, but it was evident that he has not yet given consideration to this aspect of the present situation.
9.
Comment: I am fully convinced the Amir and GOK want an increasingly intimate association with US and that the Amir will move [Page 405] rapidly to restore the status quo ante in public relations and oil. Strong security will be continued in expectation of backlash demonstrations. As I left palace, a demonstration was forming and my route was prescribed by a chamberlain who later telephoned the Embassy to see if I had arrived safely.
Cottam
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Jidda, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, London, USUN, Paris, Moscow, Dhahran, COMAC POLAD, and COMIDEASTFOR. Passed to S/S-O, the White House, and USIA.
  2. Telegram 209821 to Kuwait, June 9, instructed the Ambassador that his approach when meeting with the Amir should be to emphasize: 1) the U.S. Government’s military non-involvement in recent hostilities, which it had striven to prevent; and 2) the urgent attention that now had to be given to the many post-hostilities problems, which would require major efforts from all interested countries. (Ibid.)
  3. In telegram 1290 from Kuwait, June 9, Cottam reported he had asked to see the Amir that day or in any event before the Kuwaiti cabinet meeting the next day. He added that the Acting Under Secretary had assured him that Kuwait certainly would not break relations with the United States. (Ibid.)