148. Record of Meeting1
INTERDEPARTMENTAL REGIONAL GROUP FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Record of IRG Meeting—July 10, 1968
The IRG met to consider U.S. policy and future military presence in the Arabian Sea littoral. The discussion was focused on a paper (see IRG/NEA 68-24)2 which had analyzed our continued interest in the area and made certain action proposals.
[Page 300]The IRG noted a recent decision by the Department of Defense, approving in principle the concept of constructing a modest military facility at Diego Garcia.3 It would provide certain capabilities for communications and POL storage, and include an 8,000-foot runway. It could provide a potential backup site in the event that MIDEASTFOR cannot be based at Bahrein after the U.K. withdraws. British agreement is to be sought to fly a British flag over the facility and to obtain whatever financial and manning participation may be possible.
The IRG agreed that new problems will arise as the British withdraw militarily east of Suez, including the Persian Gulf, by the end of 1971. The recent Soviet naval calls at ports in India, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, East Africa, and Aden presumably foreshadow the Soviet Union’s intentions to expand its naval presence in the years ahead.
Focusing on the Persian Gulf area, the IRG reaffirmed its view that the key to the future of the region in the next few years would be developments within and among the various Gulf states themselves, and that it is neither politically feasible nor desirable to “replace” the British presence in the Gulf; our policy should be directed along the lines of encouraging greater cooperation among the Gulf states themselves, and particularly between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
The IRG agreed that MIDEASTFOR continues to serve a useful purpose in “showing the flag” and in manifesting a continued U.S. military presence and interest in the region. Militarily, MIDEASTFOR has a potential role in evacuating American citizens in an emergency and could perform certain other limited functions. Its main mission, however, will probably continue to be defined very largely in political and psychological terms. The IRG agreed that, in connection with future decisions on MIDEASTFOR, we should keep in mind the importance of avoiding any impression that the United States Government was backing out of the area.
The IRG decided to defer action on a proposal for a modest expansion of MIDEASTFOR (which currently consists of one tactical command vessel and two destroyers) pending a further study of MIDEASTFOR’s mission. This study, to be undertaken by Defense and Joint Staff representatives with participation by State and by other agencies as may be appropriate, should consider MIDEASTFOR’s capabilities and limitations, in both a military and political sense; the future requirement for a U.S. naval presence in the area; and the question of whether a force of the present size is appropriate [Page 301] to its mission. This study should be submitted to the IRG for its consideration.
Staff Director
MEMBERS PRESENT
- Executive Chairman—Mr. Battle
- AID—Mr. Wheeler
- CIA—Mr. Critchfield
- DOD/ISA—Mr. Schwartz
- Treasury—Mr. Cross
- USIA—Mr. Carter
- OJCS—Brig. Gen. Doyle
- State—Messrs. Davies, Brewer, Eliot (NEA); Hadsel, Ruchti (AF); Ausland
- G/PM; Neuman (L)
- DOD—Mr. Murray
- Staff Director—Mr. Sober
- Source: Department of State, IRG/NEA 68-27 Files: Lot 70 D 503, U.S. Policy & Future Military Presence in Arabian Sea Littoral. Secret. Drafted by Sober on July 15.↩
- Document 142.↩
- See Document 48.↩