149. Memorandum From the Country Director for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, and Aden Affairs (Brewer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle)1
SUBJECT
- Developments in the People’s Republic of Southern Yemen
Anti-regime turbulence in the PRSY hinterland commenced about July 23. Since then, clashes with the military, in Aulaqi tribal districts, and in upper Yafai, Dathina, and adjacent Lahej, Radfan and Haushabi areas of Southern Yemen (see attached map)2 have posed the first substantial threat to the National Liberation Front (NLF) regime in PRSY since its founding November 30, 1967. A serious complication for the government arises from a sizeable element of Aulaqi officers in the Army whose sentiments parallel those of their kinsmen in the hinterland. According to one report, some hundred Aulaqi officers [Page 302] have been suspended as the result of their petition to the Army High Command in favor of “national unity” (see below). Aulaqi officers have long been lukewarm to the NLF, and were known before independence to harbor some sympathy for FLOSY.
Southern Yemenis have plenty of reasons for unhappiness, no doubt including a growing sense of possible economic disaster ahead of them. There is, moreover, growing impatience with single party government as represented by the NLF and an attempt by anti-government groups to broader representation. This reflects the political ambitions of factions in the country which have been excluded from a share in ruling the country.
An interesting aspect of the situation has been the call by various disparate groups for “national unity”, presumably envisaging a coalition government. It is not clear to what extent the up-country disturbances are indigenous in origin, or to what extent they may reflect organization from outside, but signs suggest something of the latter. Representatives of FLOSY, the PRSY Army, and the South Arabian League (SAL) have reportedly been meeting in Beirut since July 23. They are said to be seeking an agreeable basis for a coalition government to take the place of the present single party (NLF) regime, with some moderate NLF participation. The PRSY Foreign Minister went to Taiz, Yemen, on July 29 for urgent discussion with the YARG. Both FLOSY and emigre elements recently returned there, and we surmise the PRSY mission is aimed at getting the YARG to neutralize their possible cross-border activities.
Aden radio on July 28 carried a PRSYG communique alleging that Saudi Arabia, “international imperialism” and its intelligence service (read CIA), agents of the Sultans, the SAL and the remnant of FLOSY are behind the trouble. More serious, “NLF Commandos” and “People’s Guard” members were asked to report to NLF headquarters to pick up weapons, an indication of less than full Army support for the Government and an act implying there is a lack of security resources available to the PRSY and NLF establishment. On July 29, the regime also called for “general mobilization”.
While the NLF has not yet shown any readiness to share the seat of power, President al-Shaabi had, since March, moved toward the center politically in response to Army pressures against the extreme leftist tendencies of some NLF leaders. Now that tribal opposition has broken out, the regime may be faced with its most serious crisis yet. Whether the tribes are only responding to the outside stimulation mentioned above, or whether their move is strictly their own response to what they must consider to be an increasingly intolerable situation, is not clear. Unruly as they are, even under normal conditions, it takes leadership to mount sustained and effective tribal actions. It will take [Page 303] money and more leadership to keep them going if their efforts to assert themselves are not successful. On balance, it would appear more than likely that there is an organization with a pointed objective behind the reports of tribal skirmishes, probably including some Saudi encouragement.
There is just a chance, given the relatively demoralized state of affairs in PRSY at the moment, that a move for power by a combination of anti-radical forces could succeed in either forcing President al-Shaabi to accept a moderate coalition of political forces or to step down. If, on the other hand, he and his regime are able to weather this threat, he will be in debt to the radicals for stemming the opposition. He seems already to be turning to the radicals (i.e. People’s Guard) for help. The crucial question now seems to be whether the bulk of the Army will remain loyal and thus succeed in continuing the increasingly divisive inter-tribal disturbances.
We have advised the Office of News in case a question is raised to label as sheerest fancy any reference to PRSY claims that the US is involved in these events. Interested posts have been so informed. We are counselling our Embassy to maintain a low profile and have asked London and Jidda for their host government’s assessments of the situation.