Office of the Historian

147. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara1

JCSM-380-68
Washington, June 19, 1968.

SUBJECT

  • Persian Gulf Study (U)
1.
(C) In view of the announced decision of the United Kingdom to withdraw its military forces from the Persian Gulf in 1971, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA has submitted a study concerning the political and military impact of this withdrawal as it relates to his responsibilities. A copy of this study is attached hereto.2
2.
(C) The study has been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and determined to be a timely and useful document for consideration in future policy actions in connection with the UK decision. Because of the wide range of the recommendations in the study, the contingent nature of some, and the time frame during which actions might become appropriate, it is not considered necessary, at this time, to forward recommendations on all matters addressed by the study. With the exception of those considered to be of a more immediate nature and addressed below, the recommendations will be considered when time and events determine such action to be appropriate. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will forward any resultant recommendations requiring your attention.
3.
(S) The recommendations which are considered appropriate for attention in the near future are:
a.
Establishment of a US arms policy for the lower Persian Gulf States and Kuwait.
b.
Establishment of a Defense Attache Office in Kuwait. 4. (S) With regard to an arms policy for the area, we should continue to regard the United Kingdom as the primary arms supplier for the lower Gulf States and Kuwait (Iran and Saudi Arabia are not included in this grouping). However, if we were unwilling even to consider requests for purchase of arms to assist in their self-defense, we could soon find those states turning to radical Arab or communist sources to meet requirements not filled by the British. Therefore, it is recommended that, while we should continue to look to the United Kingdom as the principal arms supplier in this area, the United States should be prepared to consider favorably on a case-by-case basis limited [Page 299] sales of arms to Kuwait and the lower Gulf States to meet legitimate defense needs not met by the United Kingdom.
5.
(S) With respect to the establishment of a Defense Attache Office in Kuwait, there will be a definite need for such representation by the time British military forces depart the area. Even now, increasing Soviet and radical Arab activity in the area and the loss of the Attache Office at Baghdad call for more complete intelligence collection capability. (Three Soviet Navy ships have visited Persian Gulf ports during the past 2 months.) In view of the lead time required and the current need for representation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Department of State be requested to undertake negotiations with the Government of Kuwait for approval of a Defense Attache Office.
6.
(S) For your information, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA has been informed that action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on his proposal for upgrading the ships assigned to the Middle East Force will be held in abeyance until such time as the threat may warrant and the Middle East Force has a higher relative priority for available resources.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
J. O. Cobb
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director, Joint Staff
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Persian Gulf 092, 19 June 68, 1968. Secret.↩
  2. Attached but not printed.↩