113. Telegram From the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State 1

1877. Subj: Jarring Mission.

1.
Spent nearly two hours with Mohamed Riad today (March 14) as follow up to demarche made as reported my 1872.2
2.
Mohamed opened by conveying FonMin’s warm personal regards. FonMin regretted that pressure of time before his departure plus unexpected visit of Nigerian Foreign Minister had prevented his seeing me. FonMin had carefully studied my representations and wished convey his reply. At this point Mohamed read from document and I took notes.
3.
FonMin referred to statement (para 3 State 129216)3 “consultations made clear that Council members not prepared at that time try to impose terms of settlement on parties and in particular to call for withdrawal of Israeli forces as first step towards settlement.” FonMin believes this comment is not pertinent. What we have now is resolution adopted by Security Council stipulating certain provisions. Nobody argues that fact. Moreover, UAR position with regard to UAR acceptance of resolution has been conveyed time and again to Jarring and to Washington. Needless to say that with regard to acceptance UAR has on several occasions informed USG that it accepts resolution as a [Page 231] whole and in its entirety. Ambassador Goldberg spoke of what he called Jarring proposal. Moreover, Ambassador Goldberg reached conclusions and drew assumptions as he did once before with regard to those proposals.
4.
Comment: At this point Mohamed read to me verbatim record of Foreign Minister-Jarring meeting of March 7. While it has several nuances which do not appear in other reports which have reached Dept, do not believe these important enough to justify telegraphic transmission entire text although will do so if Dept so requests. Will in any event air pouch text by courier leaving here March 20. One relevant point re UAR account of conversation is that FonMin carefully notes at end of his aide-memoire that Jarring did not leave paper at end of conversation but took it away with him. Moreover, UAR version of conversation raises some interesting possibilities re SC implementation of resolution if we come to that stage.
5.
(Resume FonMin’s remarks.) FonMin believes that account of conversation with Jarring is self-explanatory and should answer Goldberg’s comments. It clearly sets forth the UAR position on the Security Council resolution, a position known to the US Government over an extended period. Therefore, it was with surprise and indeed dismay that UAR noted there seemed to be a deliberate attempt on the part of Ambassador Goldberg to confuse the issue and worse still to confuse the UAR position—a position which is clear and honest. It is to be noted that the adoption of the Security Council resolution took place after lengthy discussions between Ambassador Goldberg and FonMin. These discussions concluded on note that SC resolution should be implemented.
6.
Should UAR thus take it that US is now changing its declared position re its support for implementation of the resolution? If this is case, UAR cannot but take note with dismay of such a position. UAR’s definite aim, which is also aim of international community, is to reach peaceful settlement through honest implementation of resolution. This cannot be achieved except through an explicit and formal declaration by the parties. The UAR has made such a declaration and it is to be noted that it has done so not today, not yesterday, not last week, not last month, but since first visit of Jarring to Cairo. Meanwhile and through all this Israel has evaded doing the same.
7.
UAR insists that to attain a true peaceful settlement the parties should take clear stands as regards implementation of the Security Council resolution. In all fairness and honesty, such a stand could not and should not be criticized. On the contrary, it should be welcomed.
8.
The US in taking the position as conveyed by Goldberg is most certainly supporting Israel’s approach and indeed agreeing to Israel’s demand, namely holding negotiations. Goldberg must remember that [Page 232] since its aggression last June, Israel insisted on negotiations. Yet nevertheless the SC resolution when adopted, completely ignored this approach and requested the parties to implement its provisions through the Special Representative. Hence the issue of negotiations is neither relevant nor pertinent.
9.
Goldberg furthermore said the US cannot support the UAR (cf. para 6 USUN 4102).4 This does not surprise FonMin.
10.
FonMin does however note that no pressure has been exerted by USG, along lines Goldberg public declaration, for implementation of resolution. In this respect Goldberg had referred to what he called a statement made to him by FonMin in New York. (Comment: This has reference to: “Riad himself had said settlement cannot be imposed on sovereign governments: they would have to agree.” Cf. para 4 USUN 4102.)
11.
At one time words had been put in FonMin’s mouth. Now he was confronted with a new trend, namely taking words out of context. True story was following: during a discussion between Goldberg and FonMin Goldberg said he could not put pressure on Israel because it was a sovereign state. FonMin had replied that he did not ask Goldberg to do that but that all he asked was that Goldberg declare US position regarding aggression and withdrawal. Unfortunately, US refused to take such a stand. To refresh memories on this point and on the question of pressure, in conversation between FonMin and Secretary Rusk, Secretary had also refused idea of US declaration stating US is not Upper Volta and when US says something it should know it should be implemented.
12.
One has a right in the light of such deliberate attempts aiming at confusing the UAR position to ask what goal, what aim Ambassador Goldberg has in mind. One could also ask whether true and honest cooperation could really be worked out between the UAR and US in solving this crisis. End of FonMin’s comments.
13.
I said I would of course convey the Foreign Minister’s remarks to my government. I had some preliminary comments of my own however which I wished to make. First of all, I did not at all like the tone of this communication. If UAR has any interest in achieving a degree of cooperation with us, this was hardly the way to go about it.
14.
Secondly, I said that just as consistently as UAR had stated its acceptance of resolution and readiness to implement it, USG had pointed out that resolution itself clearly implied some sort of discussion among the parties.
15.
Finally, I noted that Jarring formula as presented to Riad carried as its point a statement that UAR and Israel have accepted the Security Council resolution. Subsequent to March 7 USG has informed UAR in Washington, New York and Cairo that Israelis have accepted Jarring formula. Does this not carry us past the point of acceptance which UAR has been stressing and to the stage of required discussions? Mohamed said that while USG had informed UAR of Israelis’ acceptance, Jarring had not done so. I immediately asked that if Jarring did so, what would UAR’s position be. Mohamed refused to answer this question but again noted that only word for Israel acceptance had come from USG and not from Jarring.
16.
Mohamed said that FonMin will be back on the job March 18 but if prior that US has anything convey, he at my disposal any time.
Bergus
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to USUN.
  2. See footnote 5, Document 110.
  3. Document 110.
  4. Telegram 4102 from USUN, March 13, reported on a March 12 conversation between Goldberg and UAR Permanent Representative El Kony. Paragraph 6 recorded Goldberg’s assertion to El Kony that, since Israel had gone on record as supporting the latest proposal put forward by Jarring and the UAR had not, the UAR should reconsider its position or forfeit U.S. support. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR)