Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968

110. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in the United Arab Republic ¹

Washington, March 13, 1968, 0238Z.

129216. Subj: Jarring Mission. Ref: USUN 4095.²

1. For Cairo: Dept agrees you should see FonMin Riad at earliest opportunity to urge UARG to accept latest Jarring proposal. You should draw on reports of Nov 12 conversations with El Kony in NY³ and Ghorbal in Wash⁴ as well as Reftel and following.

2. We believe Israeli affirmative response to Jarring proposal should satisfy UAR position that Israel must “accept” Nov 22 SC resolution. Refusal of UAR to consider proposal therefore difficult understand and would place onus on UAR if Jarring now reports to SC failure of his efforts.

3. We continue believe Jarring mission offers best prospect for progress toward peaceful settlement in ME and that parties should continue cooperate fully with Jarring in his efforts carry out SC mandate. In adopting Nov 22 Res, SC members demonstrated their unanimous view that problem best approached through means of UN emissary. Consultations made clear that Council members not prepared at that time to try to impose terms of settlement on parties and in particular to call for withdrawal of Israeli forces as first step toward settlement. We have no reason believe members have altered views on either of these points and GUAR should recognize they no more likely obtain from SC now type of action Council unwilling to take earlier. If issue returned to SC in circumstances in which UAR negative reaction to Jarring proposal appears to have precipitated collapse his mission, Council members especially unlikely to view UAR position sympathetically. UAR should not expect support from US in such circumstances.

4. We continue believe SC Res cannot be implemented without discussion of substantive issues. We hope parties will accept Jarring’s proposal so such discussion can begin without further delay. Proposal does not prejudice either side’s position. We, of course, prepared continue use our influence in support Jarring’s efforts.⁵

5. For Amman: We do not know what approach Jarring will take with GOJ when he visits Amman Thursday. Specifically, we do not know whether he will raise with GOJ formulation he had prepared for last meetings with UARG and GOI, which was cast in terms of getting Egyptian and Israeli delegations to Cyprus and apparently not directed to Jordanians. While we thus would not wish attempt to foreshadow Jarring’s forthcoming talks in Amman, we consider it desirable that Jordanians be fully aware that UAR is backtracking on Jarring mission in general and on earlier indications it might enter Rhodes-type discussions in particular. Unless you perceive objections, therefore, you should draw on reftel and other relevant messages as appropriate to make following points to GOJ prior to Jarring’s arrival:

A. Israel, according to our best information, has conveyed to Jarring a position which in effect accepts UK Resolution as basis for settlement and indicates willingness to discuss implementation of the resolution under Jarring’s auspices.

B. UAR has backtracked apparently to the extent of no longer viewing resolution including paragraph 3 as a package, reverting to position of demanding prior withdrawal and sterile course of implementation by SC fiat rather than negotiations. We are urging the UAR to reconsider its position to save structure of Jarring mission as the focal point for negotiations to attain objectives set forth in UK Resolution. We hope King Hussein will support this position and weigh in with Cairo to reconsider its negative response to Jarring’s last proposal in light of information that Israel has indicated acceptance to Jarring.

C. You should point out that Arabs would be in vulnerable position if recourse is had to SC since it will be evident that UAR unwillingness to enter into talks brought Jarring mission to deadend.

D. Should Jarring put the proposal to GOJ on Thursday, US hopes King will be forthcoming, bearing in mind we recognize his reservations about getting out ahead of UAR. You should also express our appreciation for constructive and statesmanlike efforts which King and GOJ have made to achieve a settlement.⁶

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton, Davies, and Jones on March 12; cleared by Houghton, and in draft by Sisco and Battle; and approved by Eugene Rostow. Also sent to Amman and repeated to USUN, London, Tel Aviv, and Moscow.
2. In telegram 4095 from USUN, March 12, Goldberg pointed to the possible collapse of the Jarring Mission and urged that efforts be made in Cairo and Amman to persuade the UAR and Jordan to reconsider and accept Jarring’s latest proposal. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 4102 from USUN, March 13. (Ibid.)
4. Telegram 129958 to Cairo, March 14. (Ibid.)
5. In acting on this instruction, Bergus found Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad at the point of leaving for a trip to Turkey. He therefore passed the substance to Mohamed Riad who indicated that he would bring it to the Foreign Minister’s attention at the earliest possible moment. (Telegram 1872 from Cairo, March 13; ibid.)
6. In Amman, King Hussein was out of the country when Symmes sought an appointment in response to instructions. Consequently, Symmes met with Abdul Munim Rifai and told him that he would take up the matter with the King at the first opportunity. (Telegram 3782 from Amman, March 13; ibid.)