Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

99. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, August 2, 1964, 11 a.m.

282. From Acheson for Ball, Finletter and Talbot. Reference: Deptel 291.² Our communications with you are better than telegraphic, they are telepathic. As indicated my telegram to Athens,³ we too have been thinking of possibility skipping Cypriot full independence stage and going direct to enosis; we too saw dilemmas cited your telegram.

Following are our immediate comments, possibly to be followed by others later:

We would prefer to see next move in steps, rather than one big, desperate leap. Turks have been remarkably patient, but this can’t last for length of time needed to work out whole scheme you outline unless in meantime they see something moving at least slightly in their direction. They have given quite a lot already, the Greeks hardly anything at all. I much doubt Turks would be responsive even to Ray Hare’s eloquence so long as they have clear impression Greeks simply standing fast on extreme position.

I therefore hope Labouisse can induce Papandreou to send Nikolareisis back before mid-week with forthcoming proposals,⁴ including long-term lease arrangement for at least part of Karpas Peninsula. Believe Turks would compromise for about time mentioned your telegram, and they might even accept shorter time period. These are things that could be bargained out, through me, or directly, if Greeks would once accept principle of Turkish base.

If we can get these points accepted Athens, we can go to work full blast to work out agreement on substance of settlement.

As to method of putting agreement into effect, seems to me line to be explored is that of formulating some fairly vague announcement of agreement in principle which would say that understandings reached provide for safeguarding Turkish national security and welfare of Turkish Cypriots together with right of Cypriot self-determination and that both governments are satisfied on this. Then plebiscite or other action on enosis could be precipitated.

Realize this will call forth Makarios opposition and require very strong Greek propaganda effort together with use all available methods control His Beatitude, but if we don’t approach enosis with at least this much assurance to Turks we risk overthrow of Inonu government and even Republican regime in Turkey. Fact is, procedural dilemma we face simply will not go away.

We are hesitant about proposed use of NATO because:

1. It would seem impossible to keep it secret, considering atmosphere and attitudes in Greece and number of governments who would know about it.

2. If, or rather when, it becomes public knowledge, it will produce an array of Afro-Asian and SovBloc states, and probably also U Thant, in support of Makarios.

3. We doubt that NATO has any more or as much influence as US on Greeks, and we have already failed in massive frontal attack on Papandreou. As personal comment I would add that I couldn’t predict where effort guided by Mike Pearson would end.

4. Finally, public NATO pressure on Greece if successful would have effect of change in Greek policy and position from one founded on Greek national interests to one adopted under duress applied by Anglo-Saxons. Could any democratic government stand this?

In short, I think we had better continue to try to play this big trout rather than risk everything by hauling on the line.⁵

Tubby

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Nodis-TAG. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, and London.
2. In telegram 291 to Geneva, August 1, Ball, reacting to Makarios’ rejection of the “Acheson memorandum,” outlined a suggested scenario for U.S. action and requested Acheson’s comment. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 281 from Geneva, August 1. (Ibid.)
4. In telegram 197 from Athens, August 2, the Embassy reported that Costopoulos had told Anschuetz that Nikolareisis would “probably” return to Geneva on Tuesday, August 9. (Ibid.) According to Nikolareisis, Papandreou accepted rest of my proposals and threw in Kastellorion to boot. It is important that Nikolareisis be empowered confirm this on his return. (Recent reports from Athens have cast serious doubt on sincerity of Papandreou’s offer.)
5. In telegram 176 to Athens, July 30, Ball commented that he “accepted” the scenario outlined by Acheson and instructed Labouisse to ensure that Nikolareisis’ instructions met the requirements of this plan. (Ibid.)