Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

98. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State ¹

Ankara, August 1, 1964, 2 p.m.

191. Embtel 188² gives general account my conversation with Erkin yesterday re Cyprus. Following are points with specific reference Geneva conversations which require TAG transmission.

1. Erkin said that in his opinion cession of Karpas Peninsula was not enough. Would be impossible sell to Turkish people. Regarding territorial compensation elsewhere, GOT uninterested in acquiring territory in Western Europe, which apparently British idea. Re Kastellorizon, it so small that impossible consider as serious concession. These comments were made somewhat incidentally with Erkin making no attempt at outlining formula which could accept.

2. Erkin said he felt situation had developed to point where US and GOT should agree on solution, following which Acheson would endeavor convince GOG and GOG to convince GOC. I observed this not my understanding of modus operandi of Acheson who I thought had made clear that his first effort would be directed to attempting narrow area of difference between Turk and Greek viewpoints, following which consideration could be given to bridging gap by specific recommendations of our own. However, I assumed that whether this done would depend on degree of disparity of Turk and Greek views as established by current Geneva exchanges.

Erkin did not pursue further.

3. Erkin said he had heard from Erim that Acheson hoped get somewhere by end of next week. He hoped so because passage of time inimical to Turkey.

4. Referring to Athens leak as “despicable” and references of Makarios to Acheson as unpardonable, Erkin said this not first time however that there had been leak and referred to an unspecified article in London Times which he felt had been made privy to info furnished by British representative in Geneva. He observed this unfortunately falls within familiar pattern of British laxity in maintaining confidence and added this puts GOT and especially himself on spot when, having scrupulously adhered agreement maintain secrecy, others fail to do so with result that Turkish press demands know why press elsewhere given information of vital importance to Turkey while Turk press kept in dark (only info in our records which might have bearing on this is London’s 441 to Dept³ which did not attribute anything to Acheson but did suggest rather assured awareness by Times of trend developments in Geneva).

I drew on Deptel 156⁴ as authorized re Athens leak and Erkin appeared quite satisfied as far as our role concerned.

5. Finally, Erkin wanted know what we would be prepared do if Geneva talks broke down and to what extent GOT could count on our support. I replied would be difficult give specific answer to this question for simple reason that it based on hypothetical situation in which talks might end. Would depend on degree of progress made, analysis of resulting situation, etc., which are presently unknown. Erkin did not dispute this but did say he foresaw time approaching for some major decisions and he would ask us most earnestly to give subject serious consideration now.

Hare

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Exdis-TAG. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, London, and Geneva for Acheson.
2. Telegram 188 from Ankara, August 1, reported that Turkish positions were hardening as a result of Makarios’ actions and that Erkin was again stressing the need for immediate action on Cyprus. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 441 from London, July 27, reported British press stories indicating a “more flexible” attitude on the part of Papandreou after his talks in London. (Ibid.)
4. Telegram 156 to Ankara was sent for action to Athens as telegram 165, Document 95.