Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

366. Memorandum of Conversations¹

London, April 22, 1968, 7:30 a.m. and 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

• United States-Greek Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• Under Secretary Katzenbach
• Assistant Secretary Battle
• Ambassador Phillips Talbot
• Mr. Daniel Brewster
• Mr. Laurence Eagleburger
• Mr. Sidney Sober

Ambassador Talbot began by speaking of the recent SIG action² stating that the release of certain selected military items would be most helpful. He then sketched in recent developments in Greece including the government’s action remitting agricultural debts, noting that the regime was obviously trying to curry favor with the farmer. It is conceivable that the Greek Government might be looking to a Peron-type situation basing itself on farm-labor support. He also noted that American Church-World Service representatives, who had been working with this Greek Government and previous ones considered this one, in fact, quite efficient. They also believed the Greek in the countryside was fairly well satisfied with his present lot.

Mr. Battle asked whether the business community and the “establishment” was not being affected by the Greek Government’s rather spasmodic actions, particularly in the economic field. Ambassador Talbot replied affirmatively stating that the businessman is maintaining a “wait and see” stance and is annoyed with some of the government’s more stupid actions. Even though the economy is in a “slow-down period”, the government has moved effectively to collect taxes and direct tax receipts have been stepped up by 47% as against a year ago.

The Under Secretary asked what pressures there were internally on the Greek Government to return to political normalcy. Ambassador Talbot replied no effective pressures—basically those at work came from the outside world. He and the British Ambassador were the only two NATO representatives in Greece who were really pressing the Greek Government in the direction of Constitutionalism.

Mr. Battle asked whether the proposed release of the military items listed in the SIG paper would make the Greek Government think that it could get away with less forward motion toward normalization. Ambassador Talbot replied “no”. In his view they had not as yet settled in their own minds on the Constitutional question and the next two months were all important. It was during this time that our influence would be most meaningful, that is, while they were shaping their Constitutional thoughts. The Greek regime recognizes that it needs the West but at the same time is examining alternatives. It could also tighten up on the many privileges which the United States enjoys as, for example, the rights of overflight without advance clearance. The Government could generally take on a posture more like the present Turkish stance.

The Under Secretary said the problem he sees in the Greek situation is that the Greek regime is not interested in making genuine progress toward Constitutionalism. They may be prepared to say they are taking actions for the purpose of a facade, but we want to make sure that it is their facade not ours.

Mr. Battle, returning to the question of the timing of the release of certain selected MAP items, asked whether the best timing would be between now and June or between June and September. Ambassador Talbot said definitely between now and June.

Ambassador Talbot then spoke of two contingencies which (although considered remote by his colleagues) might call for a rapid decision as to a United States posture.

1. A take-over by the junior military.

2. A countercoup by senior military with possible participation of former politicians. Ambassador Talbot could foresee a situation where we would be called upon for help.

Mr. Battle responded by saying that we would have to look at the situation at the time, analyzing the composition of the group which was supporting the coup and those who were carrying it out, we would need to weigh carefully its chances of success, and its general acceptability to the Greek people. It was not possible to make any advance commitment.

Ambassador Talbot then described briefly three groups which might attempt to join forces to achieve a transitional changeover.

1. Karamanlis, former Prime Minister, plus ERE elements, the “apostate group” led by Stephanopoulos, and moderate Center Union elements.

2. Another group might include certain non-political “establishment” types, such as Professor Zolotas, former head of the Bank of Greece, Lambrakis, newspaper owner, and a variety of younger men including some former politicians.

3. A left-of-center group including from Andreas Papandreou to the far left. None of these groups are very far along with any planning or coordination of their efforts.

In response to questions as to whether a release of selected MAP items would deflect anti-junta planning by any of the political leaders, Ambassador Talbot thought it would not since the men recognized that the resumption of the shipment of selected MAP items was designed by the USG to press the Greek regime back to Constitutionalism.

The Under Secretary asked why Greek political figures (George Papandreou and Kanellopoulos) were boycotting the Greek regime’s efforts to draw up a new Constitution. Ambassador Talbot replied that this stance on their part grew out of the fact that they as politicians could not afford to be associated in any way with the Greek regime’s actions.

Finally, Ambassador Talbot raised the question of how active he should be in prodding the Greek Government. The Under Secretary responded that we should continue to push them privately and quietly, but not publicly. Mr. Battle pointed out that Ambassador Talbot could use the same theme he had used with the Greek Ambassador, namely that reestablishment of the traditional warmth in US-Greek relations would depend on the return to normal democratic processes.

In a second session at 6:30 p.m. April 22 (with all participants present except Mr. Sober) the question was raised by Ambassador Talbot as to the value we placed on Greece for the special facilities it offered. He also asked whether it was likely that we would be placing increased demands on the Greek regime for facilities as a result of any possible Turkish phasing-out of military installations. It was stated that on the basis of Ambassador Hart’s assessment concerning facilities in Turkey there would be no call at present to absorb further DOD requirements in Greece. In this connection the Under Secretary requested that a memorandum be drafted to the Defense Department asking how valuable and irreplaceable the present DOD installations were in Greece.

There followed a general discussion on the contribution made by the Greek regime to a settlement of the Cyprus problem last fall and to an improvement in Greek-Turk relations.

Speaking of future MAP the Under Secretary noted the problems involved in anticipating the levels of 1969 MAP on a worldwide basis and determining what portion of the Military Assistance Program specifically be allocated to Greece. He thought Ambassador Talbot, on returning to Athens, should give the Greek regime a rather frank assessment of the mood in the United States. He should urge them to continue on the road back to political normalcy but not to the point where it would bring about a major crisis.

Speaking of the house arrest of the two former Prime Ministers³ and the fact that forward motion on the release of selected MAP items in accord with the SIG decision was related to lifting this restriction, the Under Secretary stated that without instructing the Greek regime to release these two men, the Ambassador could describe the domestic problem created for us, both in Congress and with public opinion, by their continued detention.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GREECE–US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Brewster and approved in U on May 16. The meetings were held in the U.S. Embassy.
2. On April 16, the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) reaffirmed its recommendations for resuming limited military assistance to Greece. Documentation relating to the SIG decision is ibid., SIG Files: Lot 74 D 265, SIG Memo 58 and SIG/RA.
3. On April 15, Kanellopoulos and Papandreou were arrested for “excessive” political activity.