Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

365. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, March 27, 1968, 1747Z.

4087. Subject: US policy toward Greece. Ref: State 133784.²

Summary: In strategic terms I believe we have been on right track with Greece since April 1967 in emphasizing importance of return to constitutionality and representative government. Moreover, given US interests in Greece, absence of acceptable alternative to present regime, and our incapacity to legislate Greece’s future, I see no practical alternative, barring accidents, to continuing on same course for at least next six months or so. If this is accepted, our current policy problems are primarily tactical. Here I recommend that we (1) release immediately certain selected defensive and training items on MAP suspension list, with further time-phased releases programmed for (A) June (provided GOG then publishes its own constitutional draft in reasonably acceptable form), (B) September (if plebiscite successful), and (C) as quickly thereafter as we can be confident of early implementation of Constitution, and (2) promptly open discussions with GOG on FY 68 MAP allocations and FY 69–FY 73 planning figures. If political process goes reasonably satisfactorily, MAP relationship could be fully restored before end of 1968, which in any case is probably earliest practical timing. In event of impasse or breakdown, MAP deliveries could if necessary be stopped again at any point. End summary.

1. Looking ahead in Greece has rarely been easy but hardly ever more difficult than now. Malaise, as Department observes, currently characterizes both regime and wider public opinion. Strains within revolutionary group arise from growing awareness that it has achieved no glowing public success since its dramatic seizure of power, that its administrative inexperience and ineptness are now generally perceived, and that its continuing preoccupation with vigorous security measures, however necessary in its own view, is proving detrimental to constructive programs and to public support. Public opinion is also influenced by current economic downturn (not wholly or perhaps even largely ascribable to Junta policies, though general malaise is a factor), and by expressions of hopes (by lower-ranking Junta members) or of fears (by opponents) that present “national government” will cling to power indefinitely. To extent any or all these trends may strengthen in coming months, strains will also mount.

2. In these circumstances we sense Papadopoulos may not yet see his future course clearly, while facing challenges by Junta “hard-liners” that he is not being sufficiently firm and revolutionary. Their spokesmen frankly press for long-term authoritarianism and no nonsense about return to traditional politics. Outside government and army we detect little strong enthusiasm for this military-based regime, though number of big businessmen continue in vanguard of its support. We hear considerable though still disorganized and quietly voiced opposition, none of which it should be noted surfaced during November Cyprus crisis or King’s countercoup. Most widespread reaction, however, seems still to be acquiescence by people who are either apathetic, or want to keep their heads down or, for lack of better solution and out of distaste for conditions before last April, are prepared to give regime more time to make discernible progress. Predictably, many Greeks seem to feel that in end Uncle Sam can be counted on to take lead in efforts to oust Junta.

3. At present our Greek contacts perceive no realistic alternative to present regime. Nor do we. Certainly neither King nor Caramanlis, Papandreous, or any other former political leader now commands assets necessary to re-establish leadership. Nor, so far as we can tell, are people now in mood to generate new civil war. While another military coup is conceivable either through split in present Junta or by group outside it, we have no evidence that a successful move of this kind is in offing; and another abortive attempt would have adverse effect of playing into hands of Junta hard-liners, whose reaction would be recourse to further authoritarianism and stricter security controls over populace.

4. It follows that I, for one, view with extreme skepticism risky thesis explicit in Andreas Papandreou’s position that if all US support were withdrawn and regime ostracized it would “collapse of its own weight.” Were we to act on basis of such an assumption I fear reaction, on contrary, would be one of intransigence, inverted nationalism and ascendancy of radical faction in Junta which would result in increased authoritarianism, worse image abroad, greater divisiveness of Greek issue in NATO and possible jeopardy to our important bilateral military facilities here. Even if, as [garble—contended?] by Junta’s opponents, ultimate outcome of such a process would be present regime’s downfall, time it would take to produce such a result is unpredictable and process would bring probable danger of civil strife before that corner could be turned. These considerations argue strongly in my mind against adoption of such a policy, especially at this stage when we do not yet know how far it may prove possible to push regime toward a return to more democratic ways or to enmesh it sufficiently in process so it will be unable to retain present degree of authoritarian control.

5. We face possibility that Junta under influence of hard-liners may in fact be pursuing constitutional process fraudulently and with design mainly of misleading US and international opinion and masking underlying aim of prolonging its exclusive hold on power. I see no way at present to guarantee against this possibility, which is what politicians fear. However, waiting for elimination of any chance of it before we make any responsive gesture to constitutional steps already taken would in my opinion be course most likely to bring result we least desire. Specifically, with reference to points raised in para 4 of reftel, continued frustration of regime over US failure to lift any of MAP restrictions could, in our estimate, have following adverse consequences: (1) strengthen hand of radical elements in Junta and thus slow down return to constitutionalism and reinforce authoritarian tendencies; (2) stimulate nascent GOG inclinations to look elsewhere—France, for instance—for military equipment, with attendant disruption of standardization criteria and probable prejudice to military efficiency and pro-American orientation of Greek armed forces, and (3) lead GOG to re-examine extensive military and VOA facilities rights it grants US (and continued to extend in highly cooperative fashion, it should be recalled, during 1967 ME crisis) and possibly to curtail those rights.

6. On other hand, adoption of even an imperfect constitution (comparable, perhaps, to Turkish Constitution of 1961) would be more likely to initiate process of return to greater measure of representative rule. Once a Constitution—indeed almost any Constitution not patently unacceptable—is adopted by plebiscite, I believe external and internal pressures are likely to build up on regime to permit its entry into force in reasonable period (12 to 18 months at the outside). If September constitutional draft should contain provision postponing application for two or more years while regime continued pursue unrealistic or unacceptable revolutionary goals, government would run risk of its rejection. We would in any case be afforded a further legitimate opportunity to put pressure on regime to get on faster with important business of return to constitutionalism.

7. As to what new advice and guidance we might give, I am not as sanguine as Iakovos and Pappas that Revolutionary Committee as whole is yet ready to listen to foreign counsel³ though Papadopoulos might consider suggestions within limits. In next few months country’s course will be importantly shaped by progress or failure along road to constitutionalism, economic betterment, and relations with Turkey. In my view most pressing problems for GOG now are (A) how to attract broader and higher range of skills to improve governmental performance and thus give flexibility and success image which are prerequisites for a transition to parliamentary rule; and (B) a political plan to find the exit gate from present narrowly-based governmental structure. New Constitution will presumably provide formalities of transition but, realistically, substance of transition is likely to be accomplished only when Junta has fixed upon its own future course from among several current possibilities. It could establish its own political organization with intention of contesting and presumably winning first elections, find strong civilian front man or group from behind which it could continue for some time to exercise real power (as happened in Turkey after 1961), or seek some other resolution of its obsessive determination not to turn country back to “same old corrupt politicians” who ran it before 1967. To extent we can contribute wisdom in solving these real issues of present regime, our advice could be welcomed.

8. I sense that most leading Greek politicians have concluded they cannot afford to jeopardize their own future prospects by collaborating with present rulers. At least some realists among them, however, also hope Junta can be pressed by others to put forward for adoption a Constitution under which political life can be reactivated. To put it bluntly, they don’t want to dirty their own hands by dealing with Junta but expect us to do whatever necessary to get show back on road. In past week such personalities as Papaligouras and Mavros have virtually admitted this to me even though they would not say so publicly. On other hand, the only political figures so far willing to help in this effort are asking extremely stiff price of Junta. Markezinis and Tsouderos, for example, have indicated willingness to join present government on condition they be given complete control of economic policy. Papadopoulos has not bought these terms. In these circumstances we have little choice but to follow policies dictated essentially by our own conception of what would be best for Greece and our own interests.

9. On this question essential ingredients, as General Burchinal has put them, are solid and determined NATO membership on eastern flank and comparatively unrestricted availability of bases and facilities in support of US unilateral requirements in Eastern Mediterranean. These goals include further progress on encouraging beginning GOG has made in improving bilateral relations with Turkey and moving toward resolutions of Cyprus problem. Moreover, it is essential to pull Greece along to political posture with which other NATO countries can live. We have even more basic interest in attempting to prevent breakdown of Greek polity with all adverse consequences that would follow.

10. As I have suggested, in my view this means we must deal with present regime, supporting and focusing on its relatively responsible elements, and give it encouragement and not just lectures to get back on constitutional track. Therefore, I believe it is important for USG to make concrete move in acknowledgment of progress to date in constitutional process. First part of two-fold action should be to begin unfreezing MAP suspension lists, starting with clearly defensive and training items, and to resume carefully time phased delivery MAP items. Current Soviet buildup in Mediterranean makes minesweeper natural initial candidate for early delivery. This could be justified on basis NATO requirement without increasing regime’s capability in internal security. Training and transport planes would also have high priority. Then in June and September other items could be released. Presumably such lead time would be required under normal circumstances to deliver suspended items. By end CY 68, if all goes well, I would hope we could be past outdated posture of using selected restraints on MAP deliveries as tactic to achieve long-range political purposes. If things go badly, deliveries could again be interrupted.

11. Having taken this initial step, the second action which should be almost simultaneous would be to initiate discussion on FY 68 MAP and this year’s 5-year planning exercise based on mix of grant aid and cash and credit sales. In discussing FY 68 program with GOG, we could make certain assumptions on lifting of all suspended items in current program. My advisors tell me very little time remains to meet current year deadlines. I believe it is therefore essential that we move promptly on this second action.

12. In my judgment course outlined above, while it does not guarantee success, represents most promising policy line available to USG for constructively influencing Greek situation in its present parlous condition. On basis recommended decisions USG and Embassy could safely lean harder on GOG than if we abstain from gestures responding to constitutional steps already taken.⁴

Talbot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 GREECE–US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to EUCOM.
2. Dated March 21. (Ibid.)
3. The Department of State reported on the views of Iakovos and Pappas in telegram 133260 to Athens, March 20. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 GREECE)
4. In a March 29 letter thanking Talbot for this analysis, Brewster reported that the question of resuming MAP aid to Greece had not yet been resolved. (Ibid., Greek Desk Files: Lot 71 D 6, Correspondence to and from Athens)