Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

367. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, May 6, 1968, 1326Z.

1730. Subject: Cyprus: Local talks. Ref: State 158278.²

1. We have previously reported abundant evidence that Turks at least considering implementation of some separatist projects. Nicosia’s 1409, 1414 and 1615³ spell out reasons for our suspicions about air-sea links with Turkey, development of economic autarchy and establishment of separate Turkish Cypriot government. In fact, TCPA itself could be regarded as first step in separatist movement.

2. More recently we would cite following as casting further doubt on Turk-Turk Cypriot “good faith” regarding compromise solution to Cyprus problem:

A. Fact that Turks have not made even minor reciprocal move in areas of normalization and military disengagement in spite of real concessions by Greeks (removal of 7,000 illegals) and Greek Cypriots (lifting economic and travel restrictions and limited withdrawal of National Guard from certain areas);

B. Manner in which GOT torpedoed UNFICYP efforts establish verification procedures in response GOT request (Nicosia’s 1710 and 1716);⁴

C. Statement made last week by Denktash to officers of UK HIGHCOM that Legislative Council of TCPA would soon have to meet to “formulate” regulations on certain matters (which is bound to elicit agonized howl from GOC and to be regarded as another step on way to provisional Turk Cypriot government); and

D. Withdrawal last Tuesday morning of compromise offer on venue made Saturday by Turk Cypriot leadership (on basis of timing and Bulak’s statement—Ankara 5577⁵—it appears withdrawal ordered by Ankara).

3. Comment: We feel question not so much one of determining “Turkish intentions regarding Cyprus talks” but one of determining Turk Cypriot-Turkish intentions regarding entire Cyprus problem. Key to latter question is, of course, GOT. In this connection our analyses of GOT intentions must necessarily be speculative. What might be done of positive nature is for USG to clarify views (by calling in Esenbel and by demarche in Ankara) to point out that we opposed to unilateral moves by either side that would worsen situation; that we feel it now up to Turks to make some positive response in areas of normalization (UK took such action when Stewart saw Caglayangil in London—London 8477),⁶ and that we hope GOT will be able to accept some form of compromise on venue problem.

4. We see much to be gained by telling GOT officially of our interest in and views on current developments in Cyprus dispute and specifically our belief that time is ripe for positive reciprocal action by Turks-Turk Cypriots. Makarios has little room left for unilateral compromises. In Saturday speech he struck pessimistic tone by commenting that prospects for talks not bright and that, although door for talks open as far as Greek side concerned, “frequent recent Turkish statements do not permit great margins of optimism.” In addition, hints are beginning to creep into Greek Cypriot press that because of Turk intransigence perhaps best policy for GOC is return to confrontation with Greece’s help.

5. To regain momentum lost in past ten days we believe reciprocal move by Turks in areas of normalization, as well as willingness by both sides to compromise on venue seem necessary.⁷

Smith

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Noforn. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, Ottawa, the Mission to NATO, and USUN.
2. Telegram 158278 to Nicosia, May 3, expressed Department of State concern about the disagreement over venue and requested further information on factors motivating the Turkish Cypriot stand. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 1409 from Nicosia, February 28, expressed concern that future moves by the Turkish Cypriot community might heighten tensions on the island. (Ibid.) Telegram 1414 from Nicosia, March 1, reported increasing signs that the Turkish Cypriots would form an independent administration. (Ibid.) Telegram 1615 from Nicosia, April 13, reported that Turkish Cypriot radio was signaling a hardening of position by Denktash. (Ibid.)
4. Telegram 1710 has not been found. Telegram 1716 from Nicosia, May 3, reported Turkish Cypriot demands that UNFICYP verify that Greek nationals were separated from the Cypriot National Guard. (Ibid.)
5. Telegram 5577 from Ankara, May 2, reported apparent Turkish willingness to consider Cyprus as a venue for later intercommunal talks. (Ibid.)
6. Telegram 8477 from London, April 26, reported British suggestions for use of Beirut as a venue for talks. (Ibid.)
7. Representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities met on May 21 at a Nicosia dinner party hosted by Osorio-Tafall. This meeting initiated the intercommunal talks. The Embassy in Nicosia reported on the meeting in telegram 1825, May 22. (Ibid.) Formal talks began in Nicosia on June 24.