348. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State 1

2771. 1. At request of Pattakos, I went to Pentagon at 1:15 a.m. local to meet with Generals Angelis, Zoitakis, and Pattakos and Colonels Papadopoulos, Makarezos, and Paleologopoulos [Paleologos?] and Under Minister of Foreign Affairs Christopoulos.

Papadopoulos, in his new role of Prime Minister, began conversation by asking whether I had heard this evening’s radio announcements of government and whether I had any comment to make on today’s developments. I replied that I heard not only announcements of government but also message of King. Then, as authorized by Department, I proceeded to read verbatim from first part of Embtel 2751.2 Elaborating on themes in this message, I reminded Papadopoulos and others that only recently my government had exerted great effort to prevent conflict in this part of Mediterranean, at times bloodshed had seemed inevitable but was avoided only at last minutes. Now once more we have reached [Page 712] point where blood could be spilled—this time in a civil conflict which would be even more tragic. Surely something could be done to avert such a catastrophe. I also said I was under instructions to convey this same message to the King and to urge both sides to resolve differences peacefully through negotiation.

3. In response, Papadopoulos adopted self-righteous position that his government had in no way misbehaved and that it was King and Kollias who, suddenly without warning, left Athens to overthrow revolution. His government, on other hand, had acted properly, even following Constitution in appointing regent. It was King’s, not Athens government, which had created present crisis and danger of bloodshed. Papadopoulos, backed by several of his colleagues, repeatedly insisted they had complete control of Greek armed forces, as well as support of all social classes.

4. I commented we are now faced with critical situation involving what are claimed to be two governments, each side claiming loyalty and support of people and armed forces. We are not in position to judge merits of conflicting claims, but existence of two governments obviously would create potential disaster for Greece, as well as legal questions for USG. For example, what is position of King? Has he abdicated, in their view?

5. Papadopoulos argued that, by leaving Athens and disappearing, King had “abandoned” his duties as Monarch. Therefore, according to Constitution, government had appointed regent in his place. I replied that this interpretation would be difficult for me to persuade my government and others to accept, particularly since King had left Athens only some hours earlier and, as far as I knew, is still in Greece and is acting in accordance with Constitution. Christopoulos broke in to assert that there might be legal question if two governments should actually exist, but events would soon prove there is in fact only one government, i.e., that of PriMin Papadopoulos. I warned them, however, that I could foresee difficult legal problem.

6. Immediate issue, though, was how to avoid internal conflict and strife in Greece. How did they believe it could be avoided? Pattakos’ first reaction was that it was not their responsibility as they had not created problem. I reminded them that Vance had heard this same remark twenty times a day for twelve days during Cyprus crisis. As he had repeatedly answered, need was not to apportion responsibility but to avoid tragedy. Pattakos then indicated that they would be willing to communicate with King if they knew where he was. General Angelis, however, immediately tended to knock possibility of negotiations by stating flatly King had crossed river and burnt his bridges behind him. Papadopoulos implied that there was no need for negotiation as his government had complete control of country. I again stressed that, though [Page 713] we are not in position to judge rival claims, my government, including specifically Secretary Rusk who now at NATO table, is most anxious about danger of bloodshed and that we hope every effort can be exerted to avoid strife. I would naturally inform USG of this meeting and would be available any time for additional talks.

7. Junta officers, as well as Angelis, Zoitakis, and Christopoulos, gave the [no] sign of friction among them and attempted portray air of confidence. Pentagon itself was reasonably calm, though additional guards were posted inside and outside building.

Talbot
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 GREECE. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to London, Nicosia, the Mission to NATO, USUN, the Secretary of Defense, JCS, DIA, USDOCOSouth, USCINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, and Thessaloniki.
  2. Document 346.