Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

349. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, December 14, 1967, 1915Z.

2807. First installment possible effects of King’s abortive countercoup.

1. This estimate will doubtless be revised as the specific events of December 13/14 become known.

2. King Constantine’s abortive attempt to overthrow April 21 coup government has wrought change on Junta’s future options. The new Papadopoulos government would now appear to be undisputed master of Greece, with no potential internal check on its tenure or its programs.

So long as the King remained a factor in internal political equation, there existed possibility that King could exercise a certain measure of control over Junta and in extreme circumstances it was believed that he had capability to oust Junta with support from certain loyalist army elements in the north. With King now out of country, and clear demonstration that Junta is in ultimate control of armed forces that count, hardliners in Junta will doubtless conclude there is no obstacle to indeterminate rule by Papadopoulos and company.

3. Other pressures that existed before December 13 which were being exerted toward a restoration of constitutional representative government in Greece continue with undiminished potential: US Government, NATO, Western opinion in general, and international climate. Presumably these can have some effect on Junta’s program for a restoration of normality. However, there is no ace in hole, no possible alternative to coup group, since a different government could only be imposed by military intervention from abroad, which is apparently inconceivable. Some elements of Junta therefore will now attempt more confidently to enjoy prospect of setting own timetable, with assurance that no one can forcibly change schedule or “force” them to do anyone’s bidding.

4. Question which should become more clear in next several days is whether Papadopoulos and company will now take a more relaxed attitude toward constitutional reform and an eventual return to a parliamentary system through elections or feel “events” have put them on their metal. First inclination will doubtless be to think that since they can’t be forced out, why should they be in a hurry to leave. And therefore they would probably focus on trying to carry out their revolutionary program of reforming the administration, making bureaucracy efficient, changing habits and working methods of Greek people, and generally “shaping up” country. Regime’s leaders might be more willing to use strong measures to effect changes they desire, since they no longer need be as sensitive to anyone else’s opinion. Alternate pressure will be that “incident” has challenged “honor” (filotimo) of national government and Junta must prove Constantine was wrong in prognostication in his appeal that they were not interested in constitutional reform and implementation.

5. Effect on Greek people of more stringent measures being used by Junta and apparent lack of any realistic alternative to present regime may be to polarize populace increasingly into regime supporters and opponents, with a diminishing category of apathetics. This would not in immediate future mean activation of larger group of activists (bomb throwers etc.) in opposition. Oppositionists who looked to King to “do something” or expected that foreign pressure would eventually cause government to fall or give up power will now, in some numbers, decide they must turn to direct action against government in one fashion or another. However even elements who favor comparing dangers of WW II resistance and now—when Communists took over active resistance movement in mountains—find it difficult to forecast development activist resistance movement of this type. This particularly true since Greeks of WW II resistance forces were not necessarily from sophisticated urban groups (who are trying be “articulate” opposition at present) but from peasants who had double motivation—foraging for food and shoot it out tradition with “government” of whatever mark existed. In the end, Papadopoulos government, by its new demonstration of strength, determination and staying power will probably gain tolerance of many Greeks whose primary political instinct is to find which way the wind is blowing and then to bend with it, in other words to join ranks with the apparently winning side.

Talbot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 GREECE. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, the Mission to NATO, the Secretary of Defense, USUN, JCS, DIA, USDOCOSouth, USCINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, and Thessaloniki.