346. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1
2751. 1. Suggest I be given standby instructions, to be executed at what seems appropriate moment, to attempt to make contact with King and with Junta leaders to express USG’s strong hope questions of government in Greece can be resolved without bloodshed. I would like to say US as ally and friend of Greece not intervening in domestic issue but, as recent Cyprus crisis demonstrated anew, warfare in this part of world can redound to benefit only of Communists. We do not know what plans either King or Junta may have, but we should exceedingly deplore any conflict between elements of Greek armed forces that have been assiduously built up in the past two decades with our substantial assistance. However difficult it may be for contending groups to settle their differences peacefully, we urgently request both sides to find ways to solve present crisis by negotiation.
2. Although it will presumably not be practicable to get this message to King in immediate future, there could be utility in conveying it to Junta leaders. As I see our interests, first object is to get quick resolution with minimum of bloodshed. Whatever we may think of King’s wisdom in making this move today, our interests now lie on side of his success since his failure would probably not only destroy monarchy but fasten extreme military Junta on Greece for years to come.
3. If and when we satisfied that King has gained full loyalty of northern army, so that preponderance of Greek armed forces committed [Page 706] to his side, I would wish to add to above message strong appeal to Papadopoulos to make deal with King rather than attempting to fight it out. By then he would know military odds against his success. He would know we have strong interest in seeing all elements in Greece accept peacefully government constituted by King. I could say we understand King’s broadcast offered Junta forgiveness if they capitulated immediately, and promise that we would strongly urge King to honor this offer even at this late hour if Junta agreed. Alternative, I would point out, could be nothing but disastrous destruction of fabric of Greek society.
4. There could be moment in immediate future when passive presence of Sixth Fleet units in Greek waters could have powerful psychological impact here (notably on Papadopoulos). I will withhold recommendations until we see how situation clarified.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 GREECE. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Repeated to the Mission to NATO for the Secretary.↩
- In telegram 84028 to Athens, December 13, the Department of State authorized Talbot to act as suggested in paragraphs 1 and 2, but instructed him to avoid any action suggested in paragraph 3 at that time. Any use of the Sixth Fleet would be delayed until developments in Greece were clearer. (Ibid.)↩