327. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece1
75051. Tovan 30.
- 1.
- We have hesitated to offer any specific comments re tactics your negotiations on assumption those officers on spot who are advising you are in position best fulfill this function.
- 2.
- As we follow evolution of draft proposal however we are impressed with extent to which ultimate success your mission could [Page 673] depend on reaction in Nicosia in view built-in veto Makarios might have by declining join proposed tripartite approach to SYG. We unaware whether you have discussed this Makarios problem with GOG.
- 3.
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For what it may be worth as supplement to what you may have heard and may hear, consensus here among officers experienced Cyprus affairs, is that even if you go to island with draft omitting express reference to London-Zurich and without direct reference to Turkish contingent you will not be able avoid substantive discussion with Makarios in which it will presumably become clear to him that settlement envisaged will include continuance Turkish contingent on island and Turkish insistence on validity London-Zurich agreements.
Belief here is that in such situation Makarios can be expected either reject proposal outright or attempt finesse by counter proposals. Unless Greek Cypriots have been intimidated by assigning high degree credibility danger Turkish attack, which appears not to be case, officers here consider Makarios likely will continue rely on his basic assets, namely, (a) status of Cyprus as sovereign independent state with all that implies; (b) membership in UN giving Makarios access to SYG and UN organs for protection; (c) psychological ties with Greece which can be exploited to inhibit action by GOG in connection such matters as unilateral withdrawal Greek forces from Cyprus over opposition of Makarios.
- 4.
- There arises accordingly question whether tactics can be developed to deter Makarios from reverting to his classic waltz around ring tightly clutching the UN. Only approach which has occurred to us is based on premise Makarios more likely attempt torpedo or evade your proposal if he is in doubt about ultimate political consequences than if he has fairly clear idea where it would lead. If he can be persuaded that political situation beyond your immediate proposal would be satisfactory from his standpoint he may be willing accept proposal. Our thought is that you might discuss this aspect of the problem frankly with Makarios and refer to Declaration of Reconciliation2 as type of settlement which would appear possible in near future and which would establish political environment in which GOC, its officials, and its people could prosper, politically, economically, and socially. Ambassador Belcher would have coordinated this ahead of time with Canadian Ambassador, and you would say Declaration is Canadian proposal.