326. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State1
2589. Vanto 33. Subj: Vance meeting with FonMin Caglayangil—November 27. Vance, accompanied by Ambassador Hart and John Walsh, met at 0800 with FonMin Caglayangil and Turkmen. Although speaking in somewhat bewildering rococo style, Caglayangil was courteous and friendly throughout the two-hour session. Vance opened the substantive section of the talks by conveying to Caglayangil the deep [Page 671] appreciation of Greek Foreign Minister Pipinellis for the personal message from Caglayangil.2 He then said that he had discussed with Pipinellis the GOT concern about the schedule for Greek force removals. In an effort to meet this problem, Pipinellis had written letter to Vance containing a specific schedule which would move all Greek forces in excess of London-Zurich levels within a three-month period. He had authorized Vance to pass this letter to Caglayangil.3
Having established a favorable frame of reference, Vance then turned over a document containing the GOG’s formulation of a draft accord, which he had received from Pipinellis on the previous evening.4
After carefully reading the document, Caglayangil said he would take it to his government. He went on to say that Greece and Turkey were faced with two problems, the Cyprus question and the crisis born out of that question. In the past hectic week the GOT, aided by the US, had tried to resolve the crisis and had not wished to bog down in the vast ramifications of the Cyprus question. Vance had convinced him that, while the GOT had not given an ultimatum, world opinion believed that the GOT had cornered Greece.
Vance had found an ingenious way out in the form of a response to an appeal from the SYG. This idea would have solved the crisis. Greece could have reacted positively, contributing to an eventual atmosphere in which the basic question of Cyprus could have been solved. However, the Greek document is designed to show the public that the GOT has renounced the London/Zurich Accords, thus prejudging the Cyprus question. This is unacceptable to the GOT.
In response, Vance said that when he first came to the area he had felt that it would be wise to let the parties find a solution within the concept of an appeal by the Secretary General. In a sense, he had acted as a postman.
After reading the Greek draft last evening, it was clear to him that it would not be acceptable to the GOT. He felt the time had come for him to synthesize the ideas of both sides. The object of the document which he had prepared was to solve the immediate problem, and to leave to future negotiations the overall problem of Cyprus.5 He could contribute little to the solution of that complex issue.
While largely based on the GOT draft of November 25, it does not include certain elements included in the Greek and Turk drafts. It is, [Page 672] however, a fair and honorable formulation which, if approved, would resolve the immediate crisis.
In response to Caglayangil’s question, Vance said the GOG had [garble—not?] seen the draft text presented to him but he has discussed the concept in the draft with the Greek Foreign Minister. Vance said he believed there was a reasonable chance that it would be accepted by the Greeks and he would bring all his energy to bear on the Greeks if the text were accepted by the GOT.
At the conclusion of certain clarifying comments by Vance, Caglayangil said he could easily discuss Vance’s draft and would take it promptly to the Prime Minister and to the Cabinet. However, he was troubled by the Greek three month time table.
Vance said the important thing is the written Greek commitment to withdraw. Since it takes time to move troops, a three-month broad schedule was not unreasonable. When Vance asked what the GOT schedule was for reducing the mobilization rate, Caglayangil stated there is no time-table. However, if the Greeks begin to withdraw, the GOT could return to the November 15 levels immediately.
President and Prime Minister have been meeting with party leaders. We will not receive any word before 2000 local.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 1717Z and also sent to Athens, Nicosia, and USUN.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 325.↩
- Not found.↩
- Quoted in Document 325.↩
- The Vance draft was transmitted in Vanto 34 from Ankara, November 27. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/VANCE)↩