Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

210. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, October 22, 1965.

472. Refs: Embtels 416, 452, 454; Deptels 278, 279; Nicosia’s 172 to Dept.² Proposals re Cyprus Issue.

Embassy has reviewed Cyprus question in context of Demirel’s victory,³ FonMin Isik’s earlier discussion in US re Cyprus, and remarks of Turkish officials during Ambassador’s initial calls. We have also taken into account helpful suggestions contained in Nicosia’s 172 to Dept and attitude of Greek Government as reported by Embassy Athens. Against this background, it seems to us that major elements in current situation are following:

1. It is improbable that bilateral Greek-Turkish talks will be resumed before UNGA Cyprus debate despite Turkish efforts to renew discussions.

2. Turks believe they have commitment from us to support procedural resolution at UN. Even assuming US as well as possible Soviet support, Turks are concerned that majority of GA will approve substantive resolution, perhaps including reference to “self determination” for endorsement of Galo Plaza report.

3. Looking beyond UNGA vote, over which Turks have limited control, indications are that Demirel is anxious to try to achieve early resolution of Cyprus question so that he can devote his attention to Turkey’s domestic problems. Compared with predecessor coalition government, he will head strongest Turkish Government since 1950’s and thus will possess somewhat greater margin of flexibility. However, area of maneuver open to Demirel will remain small because he perforce will operate within familiar framework of Turkish national interests and also be ever sensitive to question of Turkey’s prestige.

4. In contrast to greater political stability in Turkey, Stephanopoulos government’s future seems doubtful. From our perspective, in view heightened Greek-Turkish tension which will probably intensify during UNGA debate, it seems probable that in immediate future no Greek Government will be able to consider new initiatives re Cyprus which would require any concession. Consequently, enosis-Greek territorial compensation formula appears shelved.

5. On Cyprus itself, Makarios’ internal position apparently remains strong despite possibly weaker international position as reflected in August UNSC action and Soviet shift in direction of Turkey. Archbishop appears even less subject to Athens’ influence than before, fact which Turks would now be willing to concede, and he remains determined to block any externally imposed solution.

6. Given political situation in three countries directly involved, and prospect of residual bitterness after UNGA vote, US initiative probably will be required to move Cyprus issue off dead center.

On basis Isik’s conversations in Washington and Ambassador’s discussions here with Isik and Bayulken, it is clear that Turks are still anxious to engage us in some type of joint planning, although they have no specific proposals in mind.

In order partially to meet Turkish desire without actually becoming involved in joint planning, they believe some merit in our exchanging views with GOT on informal basis. We might begin by reviewing with Turks various alternative proposals, including those which have been considered before, with objective of determining parameters of Turkish position. To create atmosphere of mutual confidence it would be advisable to hold talks in secrecy while making clear to Turks that no commitments on our part were involved during preliminary exchanges.

In this connection, we believe conversations with Turks should begin by explaining alternatives rather than on basis of US-drafted general outline of reasonable proposal (Nicosia’s 172 to Dept), but we should be prepared put forward such an outline if talks evolve in fruitful direction. Talks should begin in Ankara on bilateral basis because it is highly unlikely that Turks would be willing to agree to Nicosia as focus of talks involving Archbishop, UK HICOM, Greek, Turkish and US Embassies. In addition to Turkish belief that Cyprus issue should be resolved primarily between Ankara and Athens, Turks would fear their interests would not be properly protected in Nicosia where they would be represented only by charge, who would be operating in Greek-Cypriot dominated environment, subject to influence by unreliable Turkish-Cypriot community, and out of direct control of Ankara.

Parallel with informal talks in Ankara, we might wish to consider similar noncommittal bilateral exchanges in Athens and Nicosia, informing all three governments that we were carrying on informal exploratory talks in other capitals but that US did not view its role as mediatory one. Instead, our task would be to try to determine whether there was any possibility of forward motion on Cyprus issue by talking independently to parties involved.

Depending on progress made in talks in Ankara (and possibly Athens and Nicosia), we could decide whether there was any prospect for direct negotiation between interested governments in light of prevailing circumstances. It might, for instance, be desirable to encourage resumption of Athens-Ankara dialogue building upon conversations which US had previously undertaken with two governments. At that point, it could also be decided how and when Makarios might be brought into picture. We are inclined to agree with Embassy Nicosia’s view that Makarios should be brought into discussions in early stage so that he does not remain aloof only to sabotage ultimate solution. Turks would remain skittish about including Archbishop in any discussions but their final attitude would hinge upon prospects of satisfactory settlement, rather than upon principle involved, and they might be willing to include Makarios if apparent that weak Greek Government could not deliver. Throughout proposed preliminary discussions with Turks (and possibly with others), we would remain alert to desirability of injecting third party into discussions at appropriate time. This could be done by again calling for UN intervention. Despite Turks’ unhappy experience with Galo Plaza, or possibly through Acheson type arrangement.

Comments requested.

Foregoing thoughts are put forward on tentative basis to elicit reaction of Department and other interested posts. During stopover in Athens as well as at The Hague, Ambassador plans to discuss some of these ideas with Ambassador Talbot. If Ambassador Belcher or Department have any preliminary reactions, their comments could be forwarded to The Hague.⁴

Foregoing drafted prior to receipt of Deptel 342.⁵

Hart

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Athens, Nicosia, London, USUN, The Hague, Paris for USRO, Istanbul, Izmir, and Adana. There is no time of transmission on the source text; the telegram was received at 9:46 a.m.
2. Telegram 416 from Ankara, October 9, reported on a conversation with Isik. (Ibid.) Telegram 452 from Ankara has not been found. Telegram 454 from Ankara is summarized in footnote 2, Document 209. Regarding telegrams 278 and 279 to Ankara, see footnote 3, Document 209. Telegram 172 from Nicosia is summarized in footnote 6, Document 209.
3. In the October 1965 elections, Demirel’s Justice Party won 52.9 percent of the popular vote and 240 seats in the Grand National Assembly.
4. In telegram 209 from Nicosia, October 25, Belcher endorsed the approach outlined by Hart, adding that the United States needed to begin planning for its role in negotiations, and that a role had to be found for Makarios. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
5. Telegram 457 to Athens (Document 209) was also sent to Ankara as telegram 342.