Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

211. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, November 3, 1965, 1635Z.

514. Deptel 362.² I saw SecGen Bayulken Nov 2 to inform him generally of my contact in Athens and in The Hague on Cyprus question and to tell him about Dept’s instructions to Ankara and USUN regarding handling Cyprus item in UNGA.³ Turkmen also participated in meeting.

Reporting on my conversation with Mr. Ball at The Hague, I said Under Secretary had reaffirmed US intention to support procedural resolution on Cyprus. Under Secretary had stated that, in his judgment, UN was not the place in which seek change in treaties. Treaties should be reviewed and renegotiated by parties involved; otherwise, agreed solution unlikely. Mr. Ball also had reiterated view that US is prepared to support any settlement of Cyprus problem which Turkey and Greece can negotiate bilaterally and get Makarios to accept. I explained that my stopover visit in Athens had given me opportunity to talk with Ambassador Talbot whose position was similar to mine in that both were in process of settling in and obtaining briefings from our respective staffs. While neither of us was therefore yet in position to speak with much local experience, we found it very useful to explore all aspects of Cyprus problem. In this connection, I emphasized that Embassy staffs in Athens and Ankara were of one mind in their desire to seek constructive solution to Cyprus question and that we did not have separate approaches to problem. (I did not go into any details of my Athens discussions.)

I then told Bayulken our UN Mission had been instructed to discuss with Turkish Del plans for handling Cyprus item in UNGA. Tactical matters re handling Cyprus question would have to be left to these New York delegations but I wanted FonOff to be aware of instructions sent out delegation. After I had drawn on relevant portions reftel, Bayulken expressed gratitude for being filled in on my talks in Athens and The Hague and for reaffirmation of strong U.S. support for Turkish approach. Line of joint action which U.S. envisaged at UN seemed well designed to avoid complications which might result from unsatisfactory resolution. In particular, Turks appreciated U.S. desire to work closely with Turkish Delegation in seeking passage of procedural resolution which, he hoped, would prepare the way for subsequent Greek-Turkish bilateral talks. He was grateful U.S. would work to prevent any reference to Galo Plaza report because inclusion such reference would be heralded as victory for Makarios.

In ensuing conversation, Bayulken and Turkmen made following specific requests for U.S. cooperation and support in our joint efforts to obtain satisfactory procedural resolution.

1. In addition to expressed U.S. willingness to work particularly with WE and LA Delegations to avoid endorsement Galo Plaza report, GOT hoped U.S. would exert similar efforts with other friendly countries.

2. U.S. might wish to take somewhat stronger line re Galo Plaza report than statement that we considered UN endorsement of report as “undesirable”. For example, U.S. might emphasize that reference to report might lead to “serious complications” in terms ultimate settlement Cyprus question.

3. It would be helpful if U.S. could keep in close contact with U.K. Delegation because Turks somewhat worried about firmness of British position. GOT had received memorandum from British regarding UNGA handling of Cyprus issue which, although otherwise satisfactory, contained reference to Galo Plaza report—a reference which perhaps was included because of Galo Plaza’s favorable comments re British bases. On the other hand, British had not mentioned Galo Plaza report in discussions of Cyprus in NATO Council. GOT hoped U.S. could persuade British to drop all reference to this report.

4. In his annual report,⁴ U Thant referred to Galo Plaza report as forming “reasonable basis” for settlement. Turks considered such statement prejudicial and felt SYG should have remained neutral. In addition, they had received reports U Thant had been in touch with Ghanaians re possible Ghanaian initiative and they were also concerned that U Thant was being adversely influenced on Cyprus issue by senior officials in Secretariat. Consequently, it would be helpful if U. S. could express its views on Galo Plaza report to SYG as well.

Bayulken said that when he was recently in New York with former FonMin Isik their appraisal of prospects for satisfactory Cyprus resolution was rather bright. However, one could never be certain about firmness of number of UN delegations because probably more than one-half of delegations had luxury of “playing” with their instructions. Turks believed compromise resolution would ultimately prevail in New York and would pave way for future Athens-Ankara talks but initially they needed to introduce their own substantive resolution for tactical reasons and because of Turkish public opinion.

GOT possessed no definite information regarding timing or substance of Cypriot substantive resolution. Presumption was that it would be similar to earlier Cairo resolution in calling for “unfettered independence” for Cyprus and, in addition, endorsement of Galo Plaza report. GOT could not accept any resolution which suggested that enosis was possible now or in future, that Turkish Cypriots had minority status, or that Galo Plaza report should form basis for Cyprus settlement. They had been informed that way was being paved for introduction by a non-aligned country of satisfactory procedural resolution but cooperation between our two delegations was most important. On basis information I had conveyed to him re instructions to our delegations in New York, he would ask Turkish PermRep Eralp to coordinate his activities and tactics closely with U.S. Del.

Bayulken went on to assure me that Cyprus section of PriMin Demirel’s forthcoming policy statement had been drafted with great care and was quite moderate despite “vilification” campaign against Turkey in Greece. Turks did not wish disturb prospects of talks between two countries and, consequently, statement drafted for Demirel was balanced one which left way open for resumption Athens-Ankara dialogue. I replied that I was glad to hear this because attitude in Greece, as reflected in press, was that Turks were putting pressure on Greeks particularly in Istanbul. Bayulken commented that there was nothing new in Istanbul situation and that question of Greek citizens there was being handled routinely. He concluded by expressing opinion that Demirel government planned to pursue moderate policy toward Greece but its ability to do so would depend upon actions of Cyprus and Greece. Efforts of Greek Government to exploit religion for political purposes were not helpful in this regard.

Hart

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to USUN, London, Paris for USRO, Athens, Nicosia, Istanbul, Izmir, and Adana.
2. Telegram 362 to Ankara, October 30, provided instructions for a discussion with Turkish authorities about consideration of Cyprus at the General Assembly. (Ibid.)
3. The U.N. General Assembly considered the Cyprus question at its 20th session. The First Committee considered the question during 10 meetings December 11–17.
4. For extracts, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 515–518.