209. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece1

457. Cyprus: Athens 647; Ankara’s 454.2 As a result of Greek-Turkish contacts at UN, and more settled governmental situations both Athens and Ankara, more attention being focused on Cyprus issue.

Although Isik professed acceptance no result of dialogue with GOG during talks Washington (Deptels 278 and 279 to Ankara),3 in recent conversations Ankara he has emphasized need to recommence (Embtel 454). Greeks have implied further discussions enosis not practicable because GOG unable in near future commit itself to compensations satisfactory to GOT, but there are indications GOG still desires further consideration enosis. Both Athens and Ankara seem to be jockeying around re resumption dialogue for reasons perhaps associated respective tactics at UNGA.

We believe some action might be desirable to clear atmosphere or nudge parties into further consideration settlement possibilities and action need not await playing out UNGA discussions. This is important since it appears extension mandate UNFICYP (due discussion around Dec. 15) likely be difficult if there has not been forward movement on solution discussions.

Ambassadors should seek opportunity make following points:

In Athens: Urge GOG to resume Sgourdaios-Isik talks. No progress toward settlement seems possible until Athens has cleared atmosphere by making some sort of counter-proposal to the initial enosis discussions. Notwithstanding comments contained Embtel 647, if Greeks can reopen meaningful dialogue and present counter-proposal, way might be opened to further progress in this and other fields. By showing willingness continue talks, GOG would prove to world it in fact desires settle Cyprus question and Turk charge Greeks not interested in talking about settlement would be blunted. Reaction to “Turkish blackmail” [Page 442] might have been expected, but we would hope GOG would not over-react to recent Urguplu remarks.4
In Ankara: Being careful to avoid giving Turks impression we engaged in joint planning, Ambassador might draw on materials furnished so far in effort to stimulate Foreign Ministry’s consideration various alternatives, as purely intellectual exercise. While suggestion made to Isik in Washington that GOT should consider bringing GOC into talks elicited no enthusiasm, we should explore whether new government might be able to face up to fact that sooner or later GOT must communicate in some way with GOC if independence is to be discussed.5
In Nicosia: We appreciate comments contained Embtel 172,6 which will be taken into consideration in formulation of Dept’s next steps.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority. Drafted by McCaskill and Bracken, cleared by UNP and GTI, and approved by Hare. Also sent to Ankara, Nicosia, London, and USUN.
  2. Telegram 647 from Athens, October 19, reported press reaction to Urguplu’s statement on the possibility of attacks on Greek property in Turkey. (Ibid.) Telegram 454 from Ankara, October 16, reported Turkish concern about the latest Greek statements on Cyprus. (Ibid.)
  3. Telegram 278, September 25, reported the Ball-Isik conversation (see Document 207). Regarding telegram 279 to Ankara, see footnote 1, Document 207.
  4. In telegram 711 from Athens, November 3, Talbot reported that with a new government formed, Prime Minister Stephanopoulos was hoping to resume talks with Turkey and was awaiting signs from Turkey of a willingness to talk. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP)
  5. In telegram 476 from Ankara, October 22, Hart reported that he had talked with Isik who had outlined the Turkish positions on Cyprus in detail and indicated that Turkish participation in further talks would depend on the outcome of the General Assembly discussion of Cyprus. (Ibid.)
  6. In telegram 172 from Nicosia, October 5, the Embassy supported the idea of expanding talks among the parties involved in the dispute. (Ibid.)