Office of the Historian

108. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey1

Washington, August 7, 1964, 9:16 p.m.

193. Ankara’s 223, 224 and 225.2 While we are sorting out what happened today and implications for Geneva talks, NATO, and UN, you should make crystal clear to GOT our conviction further air action [Page 227] tomorrow would be major misfortune. We understand Thimayya exerting every energy to achieve effective cease fire and there are indications that Greek-Cypriots are becoming responsive to his proposals. Whereas Geneva talks admittedly have not yet found basis for GOG-GOT agreement, we have not at all believed Acheson has reached end of road. We fear today’s events may have substantially increased roughness of diplomatic track; whether Acheson can salvage talks will be highly dependent on next actions taken by all parties. If any possibility of continuing Geneva talks is to remain, it is essential that there be no further military action.3

We have invested very great effort to pull our two allies back from abyss which yawns before them. We hold no brief for many Greek-Cypriot actions and have appreciated Turkish restraint. However, military action in midst of particularly delicate and significant diplomatic round in Geneva can only drive Greeks into an extreme position publicly as well as privately. It makes clarification and consideration of base question well nigh impossible this week as planned. Moreover, we disagree with Turkish estimate that Greeks will not react. As we have strongly urged restraint on Turks, so we are strongly urging restraint on Greeks.

For Athens: Follow up initial approach with Greeks and ensure they take measures to dampen reaction and particularly to get cease fire into effect.4

For Nicosia: Our ability to restrain Turks is obviously inter-related to Makarios willingness agree with Thimayya on cease fire. We should support his efforts actively in every appropriate way.5

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8, CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TAG. Drafted and approved by Talbot and cleared by GTI, Cleveland, and Ball. Also sent to Athens and repeated to Nicosia, London, USUN, and Geneva for Acheson.↩
  2. Telegram 223 from Ankara, August 7, reported that Turkish aircraft had already left on their mission. (Ibid.) In telegram 224 from Ankara, August 7, Hare reported that Erkin said no bombing was planned in the overflight of Cyprus and that he would check into reports the jets had fired at targets. (Ibid.) In telegram 225 from Ankara, August 8, Hare reported that the Turks were concerned by reports that Mansoura had fallen to Greek Cypriot attacks and maintained that no Turkish aircraft had fired during the overflight. (Ibid.)↩
  3. In telegram 234 from Ankara, August 8, Hare reported that Erkin stated that the Turks had no plans for further demonstrations and wanted to continue talks at Geneva. (Ibid.)↩
  4. In telegram 235 from Athens, August 8, the Embassy reported Greek public statements calling for a cease-fire on the island. (Ibid.)↩
  5. In telegrams 202 and 210 from Nicosia, August 8, Belcher reported his efforts to secure a cease-fire. (Ibid.)↩