Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

89. Letter From the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Bonn, January 16, 1965.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

You will have seen our 2643² dealing with my meeting on January 15 with Chancellor Erhard. I hope that you found the results of this meeting to your satisfaction, also how the question of a reunification initiative was handled following my telephone discussion with Bill Tyler prior to the meeting. I subsequently received your 1989³ which, I believe, reflects some misunderstanding of what I had in mind. I did not in my 2622⁴ intend to suggest that we give an answer to the Germans on any proposal by ourselves—any more than I had in my 2565⁵ to which it referred. Indeed, in 2622 I stated quite the opposite. “It was not my intention in the Embtel to suggest that we work out something with the Germans on a reunification initiative following which we would obtain British French agreement. What I intended to say was merely that we would be willing to sit down in a Four Power meeting to attempt to work something out, i.e., as we do through the Ambassadorial Group.”

My position with the Germans on this question since my return has been entirely based on what you had agreed to in Paris, i.e., to be willing to consider the German Four Power Council proposal on a US–UK-French-German basis. I assume that we still are prepared to do this and was in my 2622 merely trying to clarify a question raised in paragraph A of Deptel 1978,⁶ merely that we were prepared to join only in an initiative “constituting a substantive approach.” The Four Power Council concept is not in reality a substantive approach. This is the latest proposal that the Germans have put forward and one that we agreed in Paris that we would be willing to consider in a meeting of the Four (France, US, UK and FRG). Although I did not even commit us to this in my meeting with Erhard, I would appreciate it if the point could be further clarified.

As to the general question as to whether we should support a German initiative at all, I still feel strongly along the lines of Embtel 2565 that we should. Many observers have been saying this—Walt Rostow among others for over a year. This assumes, as I am convinced, that the Germans are, following your backgrounder, now prepared to come to grips with the substantive issues concerned and help work out agreed positions. A Four Power Council proposal would not, on the surface, appear to require answers to all issues that would ultimately be raised. I hope that if we do agree to this, that we can do so with sufficiently good grace to permit us to get some credit. Up to this point, although we seem ultimately willing to consider a German proposal, the impression we give is that we do so very reluctantly.

I am convinced that the Germans are entitled to an initiative—that one is overdue whether this is an election year or not. If a man is sitting on you, you have every right to ask him occasionally to get off. I think that even if it is turned down by the Russians, that we have the right—indeed the obligation—to continue to point out to the world, the monstrosity in the 20th century of keeping 18 million people in neo-colonial bondage. I have personally never accepted the argument to the effect that the asking for an initiative would trip off another Berlin crisis. That is not what tripped off the last one. The Russians appear to want to keep the situation normal in Berlin. If we restrain ourselves in raising with the Soviets questions just because we fear an aggressive reaction, there will be little dialogue between us. The theory that we must stick rigidly to the status quo on the German and Berlin question or else the Russians will make things bad for us, does not give adequate consideration to the dynamics of the German people today. They are not content to sit still and will not. The question is whether these energies are vented through constructive action or by means which would disrupt the existing balance.

I know that the Germans can be very irritating at times in their excitability, indecisiveness and constant need for reassurance. But unlike the French under President de Gaulle, their basic policies in Western Europe continue to be along lines consistent with our own broad objectives. To keep them moving in this direction, we may sometimes have to accept their lead in making public gestures which alone we would find useless or even undesirable.

Sincerely yours,

George

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 32–4 GER. Secret.
2. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Document 69.
3. Not found.
4. Document 87.
5. See footnote 7, Document 83 and footnotes 2 and 4, Document 84.
6. Document 84.