Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

83. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, January 11, 1965, 3 p.m.

2558. Subject: Malaise in Germany. Germany is at the moment in a near crisis of confidence with respect to its external relations. As a part of this malaise a series of recent developments has, moreover, created a situation in our own relations with the Federal Republic which, at best, can be described as awkward. A typical view, conveyed to us last week by Jean Monnet’s assistant, Max Kohnstamm, who has been seeing German officials in Bonn, is that the Germans are aware that their foreign policy has suffered a number of reversals recently and that nearly all have in some degree involved the United States. Most important, he claims, is the general interpretation given our much publicized National Security Action Memorandum,² to the effect that the U.S. has abandoned the MLF and has thereby suffered a major political defeat at de Gaulle’s hands. The net effect, according to Kohnstamm, will inevitably be to support the Gaullist group in the CDU/CSU and drive the Germans closer to the French.

I do not believe that this view dominates Erhard’s thinking. I believe he still places highest priority on his relations with us. Schroeder personally does not have a French alternative, however, he has given me the clear impression that he feels “let down”—both in connection with the MLF and his proposal for a reunification initiative. Many German officials and party leaders go further in questioning whether their foreign policy has not run into a dead end and does not, therefore, require some radical revision. CDU/CSU Fraktion leader Barzel, for example, has recently expressed views of this kind, while FDP Vice Chancellor Mende has publicly called for more emphasis on German national interests in the formulation of policy. There are predictions of substantially closer German accommodations to the policies of de Gaulle during Erhard’s meeting with him on Jan 19.

To recapitulate: Starting with the Paris meetings early in December, the Germans seem to have suffered one rebuff after another. Schroeder returned from Paris after a much-publicized failure to obtain Allied agreement on a communiqué stressing the desirability of an initiative on German reunification. Although the basic French responsibility for this has generally been recognized, there has also been much comment to the effect that the lack of U.S. enthusiasm played an important role. The public distortion of the backgrounder of December 30 has served to bring into question our basic attitude toward the whole concept of an initiative.

Although the German Government gained some stature from its hard decision on the grain price problem, there has been continuing criticism from farm groups that the government has sold out their interests, and from others for having acted too late or for having failed to exact anything substantial in return for German concessions. There is a feeling that despite the sacrifice Germany made on the grain price, it has earned nothing from de Gaulle—i.e., Schroeder’s rebuff on the initiative came afterwards. The U.S. position in the grain price matter has, moreover, been interpreted as having contributed to their lack of success. We appeared to be encouraging them in the deal in making a decision which took away some of the returns they had expected.

Although now put in better perspective, the approval of the construction of a synthetic fiber plant in the GDR by an American firm was at one time widely interpreted as reflecting a change in U.S. policy toward the GDR. The Germans were mainly influenced by the size of the project in comparison with previous American trade with the GDR, and by the fact that we had not advised them in advance of its spectacular exposure by a German newspaper.

In addition to the widespread belief that the U.S. had in effect abandoned the MLF project, or is at least prepared to let it stagnate, there exists even in the Foreign Office a feeling that we have left the Germans to negotiate the matter out with the British, a task to which they do not feel equal. There is wide impression that the MLF is “dead.”

As a reflection of German sensitivity, which is exceptionally acute at this time, there have even been expressions of uncertainty and dismay as result of the comments made by the Secretary in his TV interview with Mr. Abel³ concerning the conditions under which a review might be made of the size of our forces here. It seems significant to us that the German reaction to the news of French gold purchases has often been more critical of the United States than of France. A frequent theme taken up by both press and government officials is that the French purchases may do a service to the Western world if they lead to more vigorous American action to eliminate our balance of payments deficit. Many German editorials tend to view sympathetically the French concern over the continued flow of direct U.S. investment to Europe.

Erhard’s failure up to this point to gain acceptance of his proposals for European political integration constitute another disappointment. He has on many occasions called publicly for increased efforts toward political unification and on Nov 3, 1964 put forward a specific plan.⁴ It received, however, only a lukewarm reception and has been followed by an alternative Italian plan.

The French received the plan with little less than contempt and have, at least by implication, even after the favorable German grain price decision, continued to link it to the MLF. This is at least one setback in which we have not been involved.

The constant German preoccupation is to avoid “falling between stools” which they now feel in a sense that they have done. The government tends to feel that out of loyalty to us they have both endangered the Franco/German alliance and exposed themselves to the disagreeable infighting of the Gaullist minority in the CDU/CSU. On the other hand they feel that they have not been successful with us. They purport to see in recent events our having gone out of our way to make conciliatory gestures to London (on the MLF), to Paris (Rusk-de Gaulle and McNamara-Messmer talks)⁵ and to Moscow (State of Union Message), during a period in which they have suffered only setbacks.

In theory the Germans would like to see us reach a rapprochement with France, which would take them out of the middle where they feel caught between us. In fact they are equally apprehensive that we will make a deal with de Gaulle, whom they think we really value more than they, and that they will be left out with no “stool.” President Luebke stated publicly before the German Cabinet the other day (Embtel 2530)⁶ that the way to better German-American relations was to better German-French relations, i.e. presumably this will re-arouse our competitive instincts.

There is, therefore, a great incentive for Erhard—when he meets with de Gaulle on Jan 19—to attempt to avert further open attacks by de Gaulle and inside attacks by de Gaulle’s German followers during the election period. In doing so he may be able to retrieve a small place in de Gaulle’s good graces, and at the same time make us more receptive. In the final analysis the Germans, for both their Western and Eastern policies, have to lean on someone. If they should become convinced that we will no longer provide the political support, they would unquestionably turn toward the French as the next best.

In a following telegram⁷ I will attempt to analyze the issues that we face with the Germans on specific points, and to come up with a positive line on as many threads of policy as possible which can be presented to Erhard when I see him prior to his departure for his meeting with de Gaulle on the 19th.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 1 GER W. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Paris and London.
2. See footnote 11, Document 79.
3. For text of the January 3 interview, see Department of State Bulletin, January 18, 1965, pp. 62–74.
4. For text, see Europa Archiv, 1965, vol. 2, pp. 562–572.
5. A report on the Rusk-de Gaulle talks, December 15, 1964, is in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Document 64. The McNamara meeting under reference presumably was held during the NATO Ministerial Meeting at Paris December 15–17. No record of the conversation was found.
6. Not found.
7. In telegram 2565 from Bonn, January 11, McGhee discussed the possibility of a separate German initiative on reunification. (Department of State, Central Files,POL 32–4 GER)