Office of the Historian

76. Memorandum of Conversation1

US/MC/8
Paris, December 14, 1964, 5 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

  • United States
    • The Secretary of State
    • Ambassador Thompson, G
    • Mr. Tyler, EUR
    • Mr. Spiers, EUR/RPM
  • Germany
    • Foreign Minister Schroeder
    • Ambassador Grewe, NATO PermRep
    • Mr. Scheske, Foreign Office
    • Mr. Rute, Foreign Office
    • Mr. Kusterer (Interpreter)

SUBJECT

  • Germany and Berlin

Foreign Minister Schroeder said that he had been disappointed with Saturday’s Quadripartite discussions.2 While he recognized that Butler and Rusk had both informally raised the idea of a Four-Power body on Germany with Gromyko, there was no reason not to approach the Soviets more formally with the idea. He recognized the chance of acceptance was practically nil. However, this was not a criterion. The question for Germany is, would such a reminder of Four Power responsibility be useful? His answer was yes. It would counter the ever repeated Soviet thesis that the problem of Germany is for the two Germanys to settle. It was an urgent German requirement that this be put forth officially and jointly to the Soviets. He did not feel that this should depend on the prior working out of a complete plan on Germany and the security problem. The latter would be difficult and take at least 6–12 months. The French would not cooperate at this point. But this does not make impossible a move such as Germany now wished. If the Soviets show interest in the idea then Western talks can proceed, and it is not necessary to answer all the possible questions ahead of time. He personally could see no risk in making such a move. If the Soviets do not accept the proposal there would be no harm in having made it. However, there is harm if nothing is done. “My very serious and frank request to the United States is to be cooperative in this project.” There is a much bigger risk in Germany and for international public opinion if discussions continue as at present with the Soviets on marginal subjects. (He noted he had no objection to these discussions if they did not touch on vital German interests.)

The Secretary asked why it would take 6–12 months to agree on answers to questions which might be put to us in negotiations with the Soviets. [Page 183] Schroeder said that he was speaking about coming to an agreement on a complete and detailed plan for European security which would settle the status of Germany, the problem of alliances, defense, etc. This would take even more than a year if it could be done at all. Trying it could only have a negative effect among the allies without changing the actual international situation one bit. Development of such a plan was completely out of the question as far as France was concerned and maybe even for the UK and US. Nothing could be worked out which was realistic in terms of acceptability to the Soviets.

That is why Germany favors the most modest starting point: an appeal to Four Power responsibility. Let the Soviets reject this. The West would have put up a proper reminder and German public opinion would gain the necessary impression of Four Power desire to deal with Germany as a whole. Such a move could be made very soon, within 4–6 weeks.

Ambassador Thompson noted that timing was a problem of some moment. The new Soviet Government was working out new lines of policy which could be unfavorably influenced by a Western initiative of this nature. Schroeder disagreed, noting that the reaction of the new Soviet Government can be anticipated. They will not need to think very much before reacting. In the meantime, we would have the reminder of Four Power responsibility and we can await the changes in the international situation which are required before a realistic plan can be developed. Since such an appeal would be within the “framework of the Western thesis,” there should be no far-reaching consequences.

The Secretary noted his understanding that it would be advantageous to German public opinion in the pre-election period to talk generally about reunification, and that there would be disadvantages in talking about frontiers, arms control or security guarantees. The trouble is that discussions with the Soviets cannot be so limited. President Johnson will ask him what the Soviet reaction will be to any course of action we recommend. The Soviets may make counterproposals or ask questions, “a, b, c and d.” Are we ready to deal with these on an allied basis? We are not now prepared to deal with the consequences of what we may initiate.

Schroeder said he thought there is an answer to these observations. The high probability is that the Soviets will reject an appeal. On the other hand, there is nothing they could say which we would not know how to answer. Unless there is something sensationally new in favor of the West from the Soviets, we have answers to all possible Soviet questions. These have all been agreed in the past year. What Germany wants is nothing more than repeating the Western position in some suitably diplomatic form, such as a Three-Power note containing a proposal to the Soviets.

[Page 184]

Ambassador Thompson asked if it were really in the interest of the German public to court an abrupt Soviet rejection. He was surprised at Schroeder’s view that this would be helpful. Schroeder agreed that it would be necessary to discuss the precise formula to be used. It may not be necessary to refer explicitly to “reunification.” We could talk in terms of a Four-Power body to deal with “Germany as a whole.” The FRG was extremely grateful for the President’s Georgetown policy speech3 but we now need to make a visible attempt to bring about discussion with the other side. He said that if the US were forthcoming, the French and British would come along. That is why he strongly hoped to be able to rely on U.S. support.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–4 GER. Secret. Drafted by Spiers on December 15 and approved in S and G on January 19, 1965. The meeting was held at the Chancery. The source text is marked “Part III of III.”↩
  2. December 12; see Document 75.↩
  3. For text of the December 3 address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64, Book II, pp. 1632–1635.↩