Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, June 10, 1964, 9:03 p.m.

3547. Subject: Strauss Visit. CSU Chairman Strauss concluded five-day visit in Washington yesterday and departed for Chicago where he will receive honorary degree (De Paul University). Strauss commented before departing that his Washington visit, which he said had been for “informational” purposes and not the main objective of his trip to US, had been most satisfactory. His Washington schedule included appointments with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Rostow, Tyler, Gerard Smith, Schaetzel, Creel and GER/BTF officers. On Capitol Hill he met with Senators McCarthy and Fulbright, who escorted him to Senate floor during civil rights bill debate. Understand Strauss also had conversations with Dean Acheson and Walter Lippmann.

In general Strauss’ approach was one of friendly reasonableness. On several occasions he expressed himself in basic agreement with US policy on Germany and East-West relations as outlined to him. On another he commented that the last thing in the world he wanted was to be considered in any way as anti-American. Highlights of substantive discussions, during which he came down heavily and repeatedly on theme of no real détente without solution of German problem, included following:

1. “Détente”—We stressed that range of US-Soviet agreements thus far very small; all big questions, such as German problem, still remained unresolved. We were concerned that any feeling of détente might cause Europe to relax prematurely. Strauss asserted that détente policy should be looked upon as political weapon, not as “chance to go to sleep.” Furthermore he would be strongly opposed to any détente based on nothing more than series of concessions to Soviets. He stressed that there was no way to solve German question short of general change in political structure in Eastern Europe; thus no isolated solution of German problem possible.

2. Eastern Policy—Strauss said he favors active eastern policy if undertaken in realization there has been no change in basic principles of Communism and that we make use of changes taking place to strengthen centrifugal forces in Eastern Europe. Strauss also said he favors trade relations and exchange of FRG trade missions with Eastern Europe but only provided they are used to strengthen nationalist tendencies in Eastern Europe and to endeavor reconcile those countries to establishment of a united Germany.

3. Reunification—We told Strauss that while we do not think it helpful deliberately to maintain tensions over issues which can be settled with Soviet Union, we are convinced that a permanently divided Germany cannot be reconciled with our basic security and national interests. No one in Washington believes it possible to shove German problem under rug, but on other hand there is no indication that Soviets are prepared to agree to reunification on terms compatible with Western security. Strauss replied he had no doubts or basic reservations about US policy on reunification as outlined to him.

4. MLF—CSU will support MLF but may suggest two conditions: (1) MLF should not lead to nuclear disengagement from continental Europe; and (2) US should be prepared at some future point to turn MLF over to a European sovereignty if prerequisites therefore are met.

5. European Integration—Strauss sees no chance of progress in framework of Six and suggested consideration of European confederation as halfway step to federation, with only three or four member countries if necessary.

6. Southeast Asia—We stressed to Strauss world-wide nature of Communist threat and potential threat to Europe (including Germany) posed by any deterioration our position in Viet Nam. Strauss took line that Germans were inhibited from accepting greater commitments in world at large by unhappy memories of their past history as a world power.

Detailed memcons follow.²

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 1 GER W. Confidential. Drafted by Charles K. Johnson, cleared in EUR, and approved by Creel. Repeated to Munich.
2. Memoranda of Strauss’ conversations with Secretary Rusk and Assistant Secretary Tyler, both June 9, are ibid., POL 1 EUR, and ibid.,POL 32–4 GER, respectively. Memoranda of his conversations with Rostow and Creel are ibid., POL 21 EUR E–EUR W and POL 32–4 GER. A memorandum of the Strauss-Schaetzel talk is ibid., POL GER W–US. No records of conversations with McNamara or Smith were found.