Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

45. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, June 1, 1964, 9 p.m.

4418. Subject: Preparations for Erhard visit; US–FRG relations. On the general state of US–FRG relations, I would not suggest that there is at present anything resembling a crisis in confidence. There is not. All essentials are in place. At the same time, a certain uneasiness has developed in recent weeks over the manner in which our alliance is operating. The Germans have gained the impression that they are becoming the object of mounting demands from us.

The following is by no means a complete list of the things we have officially asked the Germans to do in recent months which require effort or sacrifice on their part: increase their aid to underdeveloped countries; speed up formation of their peace corps; send troops to Cyprus; send aid and a medical unit to South Vietnam; give aid to Zanzibar; give aid to Turkey; extend the offset agreement; increase their military budget; make concessions to Yugoslavia; support our position on observation posts and other disarmament matters; liberalize their restitution program; give arms aid to Israel; increase American imports. Since many of these requests have been made on the occasion of visits by high American officials, their acceptance has often appeared to be the result of pressure.

This does not mean that these requests should not have been made, although with regard to timing and emphasis perhaps we should in the future pay a little closer attention to their cumulative effect. It is logical that Germany come under increasing pressure for requests of this type because: 1) increased prosperity in Germany makes it possible for her to do for the first time things she could not have done in the past, indeed creates an obligation on her part (as the second or third free world economic power) to do so; 2) Germany’s interests have been, up to this point, largely centered in Europe and she must be persuaded to play more of a world role; 3) despite the offset, we still pay budget-wise for the 7th Army here, which should provide us considerable leverage in asking favors of the Germans; 4) Germany has many problems, such as reunification, for which she needs assistance from us and other free world countries, hence she must be prepared to help us with our problems.

It is moreover to be expected that it is we, as the residuary legatee of the free world’s problems, who, on most occasions, must ask the FRG for help. The Germans, during this period, have asked for little that is new (perhaps because we already do so much), but even in the few matters of minor importance which they have put up to us, e.g., Bavarian coal, they have had little success. We have, of course, shown consideration in certain instances, such as delaying the withdrawal of Roundout and Long Thrust forces, and retaining the extra strength of an augmented battalion in Berlin. In the one matter of capital interest to them, however, for which they have sought our backing at the highest level, i.e., their initiative on reunification, we are still hesitant.

Sensitivity with regard to seeming pressure from the US is particularly great in the FedRep because of the still recent experience of occupation. The reaction often takes the form of criticism of the Federal Government for a lack of backbone and an independent policy. This creates internal pressure on the government to demonstrate its independence which, in turn, could lead to serious problems for the government and possibly to actions that are contrary to our, or even to their, interests.

In addition, there is at present the special and important circumstance that Chancellor Erhard and Foreign Minister Schroeder have embarked on the difficult task of pursuing a more “flexible” foreign policy toward the Soviet Union—which is entirely in accord with US policy and in opposition to strong forces within their own party. If they are to retain public support and ward off attacks from their opponents, they must not appear to be acting under US pressure. The attraction of Schroeder’s efforts to achieve an improvement in the Federal Republic’s position in Central and Eastern Europe through trade agreements and missions and cultural exchanges is that it is considered to be a German initiative. If it should come to seem only a reflection of US policy, it would become far more vulnerable to attack by the group around Adenauer and Strauss.

With this in the background, it seems to me important that we draw the following two conclusions from recent developments in our relations with the FRG:

1. Whenever it does not run contrary to our vital interests, we should welcome, and, when possible actively encourage FRG foreign policy initiatives. In this way we can assist the FRG to establish an independent identity for its policy and thereby (paradoxically) make it easier for the FRG to follow our lead on matters where US vital interests are concerned. This is one reason why I have long hoped that we could support the FRG initiative on reunification. With success on this score, the FRG would be in a stronger position to cooperate with us elsewhere.

The current question of the FRG-ChiCom relations presents some of the same opportunities and hazards for us as the reunification initiative. Looking at the problem from Bonn, there could be advantages to an FRG trade agreement with the ChiComs if it includes a Berlin clause; it would, from current indications, not go much beyond the “private” trade agreement of September 1957² and would not involve a politically more significant exchange of trade missions; yet it could effectively serve to isolate the Pankow regime further and make Ulbricht’s personal position more difficult. It would tend to improve the FRG position in those non-aligned countries where ChiCom influence is considerable; it could cause further dissension between Moscow and Peiping; and it might give the FRG an additional lever in future dealings with the USSR. There are obvious disadvantages from the US point of view, possibly of such a compelling nature as to force us to continue to dissuade the FRG from such a step. However, we may at least wish to consider the desirability of the FRG having somewhat more latitude in their China policy.

2. We should avoid placing the FRG in a position where it seems, publicly, to acting as a result of US pressure. I realize that in view of our position and responsibilities there are times when we must exert pressure. We should, however, do so sparingly and privately if possible, giving the FRG every opportunity to convey the impression of taking independent action and to receive whatever credit may be derived therefrom. We should avoid any appearance of “lecturing” to the FRG. The period when this could profitably be done has long since passed.

I would cite our recent approach on South Vietnam as a case in point. From what we have heard, our handling of the matter at Bonn and The Hague³ left the Germans with the impression that they were being pushed too openly. This occasioned some resentment in government circles, and a cool, often critical, press reaction.

In view of the various items which we shall probably be pursuing with the Chancellor during his Washington visit, I would particularly urge that we avoid any appearance that new FRG concessions to US policy (such as grain price) result directly from the meetings. My suggestions for treating specific points which may arise during the conversations will follow in separate telegrams.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 7 GER W. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Berlin.
2. Reference is to the agreement signed in Beijing, September 27, 1957, between the Eastern Trade Committee of the West German Federation of Industry and Commerce and Chinese for the Promotion of International Trade.
3. Conversations in Bonn were reported in telegram 4246, May 19, telegram 4341, May 26, telegram 4393, May 29, all from Bonn. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) No record of discussions at The Hague meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers was found.