Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

47. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 11, 1964, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

• The German Question

PARTICIPANTS

• Germans
  • Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder
  • Baron Herbert A. von Stackelberg, Minister, Embassy of Federal Republic of Germany
  • Mr. Weber, Interpreter
• US
  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador George C. McGhee
  • Mrs. Lejins, Interpreter

(At the beginning of the meeting, the Secretary and Mr. Schroeder met alone for approximately 30 to 40 minutes.)

The Secretary reiterated certain points discussed by him with Mr. Schroeder pertinent to the German question. He said that the US was willing to explore whether the Poles, Rumanians and Hungarians might possibly be interested in a permanent German settlement. There was no doubt that Khrushchev was under pressure from the other East European countries. There was growing anxiety in Moscow for a number of reasons. The President’s talk,² for instance, had been well received in the other East Bloc countries although it had an unfavorable reaction in Moscow. Perhaps it would be possible to build in Eastern Europe an interest in a permanent German settlement, which was not necessarily in the interest of Moscow.

Mr. Rusk said that we had received an intelligence report to the effect that the Soviets might announce the withdrawal of 15,000 men from somewhere in Eastern Europe. It was uncertain whether this might be from Hungary or Eastern Germany. It could well be that the Soviets would then say this is what we have done; let this be an example and do likewise. The US has said repeatedly, however, that this type of procedure is no basis for us to use.

The Foreign Minister said he felt that the possibility that the German trade commissions and their contacts in various Eastern European countries would lead to desirable political consequences was very remote and limited. In any event, developments would be slow and take a long time. The first persons sent to these countries by Germany were eating bitter rice. However, eventually something might come of it, and these trade contacts were useful. There was no objection on the part of Germany to the efforts of the United States in this direction. When the situation was right, the Germans would follow through. After all, the Minister said, that was the whole purpose of establishing trade relations. It was not Germany’s primary objective to make the Eastern European countries happy economically.

The Secretary then suggested that talks with the small Eastern European countries be undertaken only after the possibility of talks with Russia had been made public. If talks with the other countries were undertaken without such preparatory moves, there might be a severe reaction in Moscow. But if such talks were preceded by a public announcement, as indicated above, pressure might well be applied on Moscow by the other countries.

Foreign Minister Schroeder then reverted to a point previously discussed with the Secretary, concerning possibilities of action with reference to the question of German reunification. He briefly set forth four points: (1) A proposal might be made by Germany, which would then have the support of the three Western Powers. (2) A four-power commission could be established with a mandate; the exact nature of such a mandate to be the subject of discussions. (3) A plan might be submitted to Moscow by the three Western Powers. This, however, would be the most difficult line of action. (4) A point could be chosen at which the three Western Powers would reconfirm vis-à-vis Germany their intention and responsibility for the reunification of Germany. A very opportune occasion might perhaps be the signing of the pending Friendship Treaty. In any event, opportunities must constantly be sought for the three Western Powers to show their responsibility for reunification and to express their will to carry it out. This must be kept a live issue, and the Foreign Minister has urged Chancellor Erhard to discuss this with the President tomorrow.

The Foreign Minister continued that it was perfectly clear that unless this was done the Germans would get the impression that the question of German reunification had been placed into a psychological icebox, and that those who carry on the discussions with the other side were no longer interested in this issue and might even fear to state their stand on the German problem vis-à-vis the Soviets. This impression had very undesirable implications among the German people.

The Secretary strongly emphasized that, while he was aware of this German reaction, he did not know how he could do more than he had actually been doing in this respect. It was a fact that in all his talks with the Soviets he had spent at least two-thirds of his time speaking about Germany and the German problem.

The Foreign Minister quickly pointed out that he did not wish to be misunderstood and that what he had said should not be construed as a complaint. He felt, however, that everyone had to look ahead and had to gauge possible reactions to whatever would be undertaken, in order to avoid bad reactions both on the international and the national scene.

The Secretary then said he felt that it might be possible to put together several different things into one package; for instance, a declaration might be forthcoming from the Federal Republic of Germany, made publicly to all four powers. This might be followed by a thoughtfully prepared Three Power declaration in the nature of a Western response, aimed at the Soviet Union. All this should be done publicly. Then it would be up to the Soviets to pick this up and do something with it or not. That might be the occasion that might point toward the opening of discussions.

The Secretary stated that it was his impression that the Soviets do not speak about reunification in the sense in which we see it. They constantly come back to it as a problem to be settled by the two Germanies.

The Secretary raised the possibility of turning this to advantage, though he indicated he realized that Ulbricht was not the man to try this on. Did the Foreign Minister think that the established trade contacts might possibly lead to some opportunities in this respect?

The Foreign Minister indicated that he viewed the political results of the trade relations in Eastern Europe skeptically. These countries of Eastern Europe were interested in improving their economies; they were not interested in the German question. They were interested in throwing off Soviet exploitation and in improving their economic ties with the West. The question of German unity did not enter into this, as far as they were concerned. They were interested solely in the economic aspects and it gave them a feeling of independence. The Foreign Minister felt, however, that they could not and would not be allowed to go very far in either respect. The Soviet Union was the controlling and dominating power, which would not permit any developments in the long run that were not in the Soviet interest. The small Eastern European countries were well aware of that.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–4 GER. Confidential. Drafted by Lejins and Kent and approved in S on June 19. The meeting was held in Rusk’s office. Schroeder accompanied Chancellor Erhard on his June 11–13 visit to the United States. McGhee commented on these meetings in At the Creation of a New Germany, p. 148.
2. Reference is to President Johnson’s May 23 speech at Lexington, Virginia. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, Book I, pp. 708–710.