36. Letter From Chancellor Erhard to President Johnson1
My dear Mr. President:
I would like to thank you sincerely for your letter which Ambassador McGhee transmitted to me on the 6th of March.2 Your thoughts have been very interesting to me and I would like to assure you that it is my sincere desire to remain in permanent close contact with you.
I noted with particular satisfaction the large extent to which our opinions coincide with regard to the relations between a united Europe and the United States of America. The points of view of the United States and the EEC concerning some important aspects of the Kennedy Round have already been harmonised. I am glad about that and believe that the difficulties still to be expected, particularly in the field of agriculture, can be overcome in the course of negotiations concerning specific proposals and objectives.
The solution of the Cyprus question appears to me to be extremely important for the unity of NATO. As the original peace plan could not be put into the effect we have contributed financially to the peace-keeping action of the United Nations. It appears also to me that the re-establishment of peace on the island is an essential precondition for a political solution which is to be prepared for the United Nations by the Finnish mediator. We are, however, aware of the difficult task of the mediator. My government follows with great concern in particular the efforts of the Soviet government to exploit the discord among our NATO Allies over the Cyprus question and to draw Cyprus into their sphere of influence. I think it is necessary to keep in mind this threatening aspect in any political settlement and to bring it to the attention of our NATO Allies directly concerned.
I fully share your view that in the present situation South Vietnam cannot be abandoned by the West. Neither do I see in a plan for neutralization an appropriate solution to the problem, for nobody can ignore the danger that such a neutralization could open the way towards a future seizure of power by the Communists. In that case Thailand and Malaysia would be threatened directly and thus forced to politically reorientate themselves. A severe undermining of the Western position in the whole of East Asia would result. Therefore, we shall support within our given possibilities the United States in their efforts to maintain South Vietnam [Page 80] as a bulwark of the Free World in South East Asia. We shall continue our assistance for South Vietnam in the political, economic and cultural fields.
As you well know, the Federal Government is prepared to support strongly the efforts of the United States which aim at lessening the Cuban-Communist threat to Latin America. Neither among the Cuban population nor in the other parts of Latin America should under any circumstances as a result of action by the Western countries the impression be created that Castroism is profitable. Within the scope of our legal possibilities we shall continue therefore in our endeavors to keep trade with Cuba on the lowest level. In particular, we shall continue to refuse government guarantees for exports to Cuba.
The support of the developing countries is also in my view necessary for the creation of stable conditions in these countries; this is in the best interest of the Free World. The aid to developing countries will therefore be a very important task for a long time to come. Our future budget plans will significantly reflect our efforts in this field. Intensified efforts in the field of public relations endeavor with increasing success to win over the German people for this attitude. I am, however, certain that I can count on your understanding that our respective annual efforts will have to be in proportion to our economic growth and in particular to our other obligations as, for instance, our defense needs and our obligations in the field of social payments.
Equally I follow the disarmament conference in Geneva with interest and hope; I regret that, in spite of your constructive proposals3 no substantial progress has been achieved since January. I am glad, however, that it was possible to find among the Allies a common basis with regard to the project of the ground observation posts, and thus to provide a constructive contribution to the Geneva talks. This was brought about thanks to the close consultations with our friends and their preparedness to examine and take into consideration our proposals and our concerns. Regarding the freezing of strategic nuclear carrier weapons—which for the time being is probably the most important and far reaching armaments control proposal—consultations are taking place at present, which in my view should be as extensive as possible to thoroughly explore all aspects of the problem, as e.g., the difficult question of inspection. I share your hope that a slowing down of the arms race rather than an escalating arms race will contribute towards overcoming the partition of the German people.
I have appreciated it very much that the American representatives in the Washington Ambassadorial Group endeavor to support and to [Page 81] further quadripartite deliberations concerning a Western initiative for the reunification of Germany. I think that the preparation of such a document is particularly important since it is imperative that we are prepared at all times to take steps vis a vis the Soviet Union in the question of Germany. Such a policy is also of importance because it could counteract the still existing assumption of Moscow that on the Western side a generally passive basic trend prevails with regard to the German question. This false assessment could anew cause Soviet misinterpretations and it could again lead towards an aggressive policy of the Soviet bloc in the question of Germany and Berlin.
Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that the German public expects the West to take steps in the question of Germany. This the more so as almost five years have gone by since the West has last undertaken an initiative namely with the last Western peace plan of 1959.
I am in agreement with you that the stationing of American Armed Forces in Germany in unreduced strength continues to be imperative for the common defense of the alliance. The question of the balance of payments, resulting from the military expenditures of your country in the Federal Republic of Germany is also of greatest importance for my government. The agreements concerning the years 1961 and 1962 having been fulfilled to their full extent I have no doubt that satisfying arrangements can be reached in the discussion between Mr. McNamara and Herrn von Hassel. You may be assured, Mr. President, that I shall support all endeavors to achieve constructive results.
A few days ago Mr. Shriver called on me and gave me your kind letter of the 22nd of April.4 I deeply appreciate this renewed expression of your friendship and I have asked Mr. Shriver, with whom I had a very pleasant and interesting conversation, to convey to you my heartfelt thanks and my best personal regards.
I also like to think back to my visit to your ranch, to our open talks in the spirit of friendship, and to all the considerateness which Mrs. Johnson and you showed me. My wife and I sincerely return your kind wishes and send Mrs. Johnson and you our warmest regards.
I am very much looking forward to seeing you again in June.
With sincere appreciation, I remain,
with warmest greetings,
- Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. No classification marking. The source text is marked “Unofficial Translation.” A notation on the source text reads: “Rec’d 5/9/64.”↩
- Document 15.↩
- For text of the U.S. proposals of January 21 and February 13, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 1012–1028.↩
- A copy of the President’s message suggesting coordination between the German Development Aid Service and the Peace Corps is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Germany.↩
- Printed from a copy that indicates Erhard signed the original.↩